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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
State and Society in Economic Development 
The final decades of the twentieth century were marked by a massive restructuring and 
transformation of global political and economic activities. The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods agreement in the early 1970s, and the subsequent wide-ranging effects of this 
collapse showed how increasingly interdependent the global political economy really 
was. Countries around the globe from the first world to the third underwent dramatic 
periods of domestic restructuring in order to keep abreast of these momentous changes. 
It is this global flux of restructuring which provides the initial context for this thesis. At 
the heart of this global transformation is a radical shift in economic policies and 
organisational structures away from the interventionist prescriptions of Keynesianism, 
and towards a renewed emphasis on the neo-classical model of market liberalisation as 
the means of achieving economic growth and development. 1 This new, broad current of 
economic policy prescription - often termed neo-liberalism - has generally been 
consistent in its implementation throughout the world. In the last two decades many 
developing countries around the world have thus adopted economic reform programs 
aimed at reducing balance of trade deficits, lowering the domestic rate of inflation and 
increasing levels of private investment - all in the hope of increasing domestic levels of 
economic development through the mechanisms of the free market. Known more 
commonly by the broad term structural adjustment2, these reform programs refer to 
policy packages that include among their essential features macro-economic stabilisation 
(with an emphasis on fiscal and monetary policy), the liberalisation of goods and factor 
markets through deregulation and the simultaneous reduction of external_harriers and 
I By renewed emphasis I am referring to the laissez-faire policies predominate in the global political 
economy throughout the nineteenth century up until the end of World War One. 
2 The genesis for these programs of economic reform can be found in the resurgence of the neo-classical 
economic paradigm of competitive markets in the wake of the global crises of the 1970s. This neo-
classical ideology behind the majority of political, social and economic reform efforts in the last two 
decades has been devoted largely to the creation of competitive markets. However, while efforts to 
improve the functioning of markets in developing countries may have had a positive impact on growth in 
recent years, the impact ofthese refonns on equity may be less than optimal. 
controls, and the privatisation (to varying extents) of the public enterprise sector.3 The 
severe initial social costs characteristic of these reform programs mean, however, that 
their goals of increased economic development and macro-economic growth are often 
only achieved with varying degrees of success.4 (UNDP 1997) This inability to achieve 
the full benefits of these reform programs has led a number of theorists to reason that the 
failure of these programs is due to the fact that many of the states of the developing world 
possess a low level of capability to implement and maintain the impetus of these reforms 
in the face of high levels of social umest. 
This thesis thus takes as its initial starting point the proposition that reform success in the 
developing world is a function of state capacity. This, however, is a far more 
complicated question than initial scrutiny might lead one to believe, as recent work has 
suggested that state capacity is, paradoxically, a function of the degree of connectivity 
between the state and wider society. This emerging body of literature has persuasively 
demonstrated that a high level of connectivity between the institutions of the state and 
wider civil society, variously known as embeddedness, can, contrary to earlier doctrine, 
actually lead to the strengthening of the institutions of the state through the effective 
expansion of the capacity of the state. (see Evans 1997; Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994) 
Periods of structural adjustment were chosen as the empirical context for this thesis, as 
the logic of an economic stabilisation progranl, and the more long term structural 
adjustment program, is not merely to cut trade and budget deficits by reducing 
consumption, but also to shift the whole structure of domestic production of an economy 
3 Structural adjustment programs began initially as a way for countries to obtain foreign exchange in order 
to pay back international debtors. Before 1985 structural adjustment had been given a narrow 
interpretation, concerned more with adjustment to outside shocks such as the oil price increases of the 
1970s, and the debt crises of the 1980s. By the mid-1980s however, the social problems associated with 
the implementation of the standard adjustment measures had led to widespread criticism of the Bretton 
Woods institutions that were the primary promoters of adjustment in the developing countries. As a result 
of this criticism the IMF and the World Bank began to modify their working defmitions of the goals of 
successful adjustment towards the notion of adjustment 'with a human face' through the incorporation of 
social issues such as human rights and concern for the poor into their programs, and by becoming more 
flexible on the forms of conditionalities associated with their adjustment lending. Throughout this period 
Structural Adjustment increasingly came to embrace all the objectives of what had earlier been covered by 
the term 'development'. 
4 There are a number of mechanisms through which structural adjustment programs can lead to increases in 
poverty and in levels of inequality. The devaluation of currencies may lead to retail price increases for 
imported goods. Prices of goods and services in general may rise as Government subsidies are removed. 
Government cut backs may mean both that Government services to the poor are cut, and unemployment 
rises as public sector jobs are eliminated. 
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so as to increase the country's ability to earn foreign exchange while simultaneously 
reducing domestic demand for foreign exchange. 
Structural change is [thus] change ola system rather than change within a system. 
It involves the modification of the rules of the game that frame organisational 
interaction, define organisation roles, responsibilities and relationships and 
regulate inter-organisational competition and conflict. (Metcalfe 1993: 182) 
Periods of structural adjustment and economic stabilisation thus provide an ideal 
opportunity to explore the critical role that linkages in developing countries between state 
and society play in the realisation of political and economic goals. 
Structural Adjustment Programs 
There are a number of reasons why governments decide to implement stabilisation and 
structural reform measures.s These reasons can include a combination of factors such as: 
serious domestic economic crisis; reduction in the power of the groups with the strongest 
vested interests in the status quo; decisive political leadership working within a 
competent and cohesive technocracy; and changes in the international environment. 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1992a, 1995; Nelson 1990, 1994; Williamson 1994) In the 
smaller and poorer countries of the developing world these programs of reform are often 
instigated as a pre-condition of funding aid from multi-lateral institutions such as the 
World Bank or the Asian Development Bank or direct bi-Iateral aid from more 
prosperous countries. This is not to say, however, that all programs of reform undertaken 
by the small and poor countries of the world are forced upon them by external agencies. 
The period of structural reform undertaken by Papua New Guinea in the mid-1990s was 
composed not only of an external aid-conditionality component, but may also be traced in 
part back to a domestic desire to restructure the institutions of the country in order to 
bring domestic arrangements more in line with the APEC-derived free trade aims of the 
Osaka Agenda. 
5 Much of the recent development literature has promoted the neo-classical conception that the market is 
the governance mechanism best suited to the achievement of economic development due to its 'naturally' 
allocative capacity. This theoretical belief has been transferred into empirical policy reality in developing 
countries around the world through the instig!\tion of short-term programs of economic stabilisation and 
associated longer-term programs· of structural reform. 
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Economic Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
The mechanics of economic stabilisation programs and related periods of structural 
adjustment are by necessity complicated. Nonetheless, each process can be seen to 
contain a number of key basic components. Economic stabilisation programs are 
primarily designed to control the rate of inflation in order to provide domestic 
macroeconomic stability through the correction of imbalances in government budgets, 
balance of trade deficits and the money supply. To that end the implementation of these 
programs necessitates that the governments of the economies being stabilised impose a 
series of difficult austerity measures, such as cuts in government expenditure andlor 
increases in taxation, wage freezes in the public and the private sector, devaluation, credit 
restrictions (particularly on public-sector borrowing from the banking system), and 
increased real interest rates. Structural adjustment, by contrast, is a longer term process 
whereby the reduced fiscal disequilibria from a program of economic stabilisation is set 
in place through the construction of appropriate institutional structures - with the long 
term goal being the establishment of sustainable macroeconomic conditions. These 
structural adjustment reform programs generally contain five interrelated components: 
they free up restraints to the operation of the free market; controlled prices are adjusted to 
scarcity values; resources are shifted through the process of privatisation from state 
control to private ownership; the government's remaining role in guiding development is 
rationalised; and governmental institutions are reformed in order to carry out 
government's new roles. (Roemer and Radelet 1993: 67; cf Haggard and Kaufman 
1992a) Structural adjustment programs thus aim to reduce budget deficits and tighten 
monetary policy through the liberalisation of trade and exchange rate regimes - processes 
which are in general part of the longer term plan to expand the role of market forces and 
the private sector. Generally speaking, economic stabilisation, as a strategy of reform, is 
frequently a precondition to a period structural adjustment.6 (Roemer and Radelet 1993: 
65) 
While structural adjustment programs are designed to provide the correct institutional 
context for economic development, this process is complicated by the fact that in most 
6 However this is not always the case, as the example of the Cook Islands suggests. The long tenn plans of 
refonn in the Cook Islands were overwhelmed by the fiscal crisis of early 1996, which led to the early 
initiation of big cuts in the country's civil service. 
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cases the economic reforms characteristic of these adjustment packages mean that severe 
social costs are imposed early on in the process with few, if any, immediate 
accompanying benefits. The success of structural adjustment programs can therefore be 
seen to be dependent upon the ability of the state to not only implement but also to 
maintain the impetus of the reform objectives. Problems can thus ensue when the state 
has a low ability to implement and maintain these reforms. (Corkery 1997) These 
problems of low state capacity can, however, be overcome if governments are able to 
acquire the support of various sections of wider society. (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 
20, 1992a: 8) The existence of diverse and multitudinous networks of support for the 
state within society can thus playa crucial part in the success of programs of reform due 
to the ability of these ties to effectively enhance the capacity of the state. The success or 
. failure of the structural reform process in the developing regions of the world can 
therefore be seen to be heavily dependent upon the nature of the linkages between 
domestic political and social institutions. (Perkins and Roemer 1993: 7-8) This 
realisation of the negative relationship between low state capacity and low levels of 
reform success shook the neo-liberal foundations of the development fraternity. The 
recognition that state capacity directly affected the success of programs of economic 
reform was contrary to the widely held neo-classical belief that the market was the most 
efficient form of governance mechanism and led to a questioning of the necessarily anti-
state foundations of then current development thinking. 
Crisis of Governance 
By the early-1990s staff at multi-lateral lending institutions such as the World Bank, and 
academics and policy analysts around the world had begun to notice a disturbing trend in 
structural adjustment programs. They were not working. (World Bank 1992) Standard 
structural adjustment programs had relied heavily upon neo-classical economic 
foundations for their design and implementation. These ideas had been found wanting in 
developing countries where the lack of any strong institutional framework meant that the 
'invisible hand' ofthe market had been unable to function effectively. The identification 
of this 'crisis of governance' led to modification to the thinking behind the process of 
structural adjustment and the re-focusing of development discourse upon the problem of 
'Good Governance.' 
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The 'Good Governance' discourse is fundamentally concerned with the way in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country's social and economic resources for 
development. (ADB 1995; World Bank 1992, 1994) The 'Good Governance' agenda is 
based upon the belief that the failure of structural adjustment programs to bring about the 
economic development that they had so promisingly offered was due to the inability of 
'correct' economic policies to be implemented in the absence of the 'correct' governance 
structures and institutions. (Larmour 1998: 5) Before policies of economic growth can be 
implemented the 'Good Governance' discourse therefore asserts that a 'correct' 
institutional framework is required in order to facilitate the functioning of the free 
market. There are six attributes essential to the creation of this 'correct' institutional 
framework, these being: participation; transparency; accountability; rule of law; 
effectiveness; and equity. A major objective of the 'Good Governance' influenced 
structural reform process is thus to promote constructive interaction amongst all sectors 
of state, market and society in order to achieve these six goals. 
The Good Governance agenda is therefore intricately concerned with notions of civil 
society, as the empowerment of civil society can lead to the promotion of notions of 
accountability, legitimacy, participation and transparency; all key areas in the 
Governance framework. While civil society is often defined negatively as that which is 
not of the state - a distinction which can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes (1983) and 
John Locke (1978, 1997/ - it can, however, be defined positively in the sense that it is 
the framework of institutions such as familial kinship structures, and informal and formal 
voluntary associations which exist independently of any centralised political authority. 8 
It is this positive sense, in tum, which has been so central to the emergence of the 
governance agenda, as in the World Bank's view, the institutions and organisations of 
civil society play an important role as they can create vertical links between the state and 
citizen, thereby voicing local concerns more effectively and exerting greater pressure on 
7 These two theorists argued that since there it was hypothetically possible to dispense with a centralised 
political authority such as the state, there was a need for a concept to describe the relationships within 
which the remaining institutions were embedded - a distinction which can still be seen to continue to be 
present in much current work, with Ernest Gellner for instance negatively defming civil society as "the 
social residue left when the state is subtracted" (1994: 212) Civil society, as a conceptual variable, thus has 
a long history been defmed in much modem literature as an unwilled 'natural' entity distinct and separate 
from the willed political order of the state. (Lively and Reeve 1997) 
8 There is also often a normative component in defmitions of civil society, most clear in de Tocqueville's 
work Democracy in America (1969), which argues that a functioning civil society is critical, and crucial 
component of any vibrant political and economic order. 
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public officials for higher levels of performance and accountability. (World Bank 1993: 
61; see also World Bank 1992: 49) Governance issues thus concern not only the correct 
functioning of official political institutions such as the state, but also the complex 
mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups exercise 
political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs 
at all levels. 
Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and 
civil soci~ty. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state 
creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates 
jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction -
mobilising groups to participate in economic, social, and political activities. 
Because each has weaknesses and strengths, a major objective of our support for 
good governance is to promote constructive interaction among all three. (UNDP 
1997: 2) 
The emergence of the 'Good Governance' agenda has thus lead to the realisation, even 
amongst some of the most neo-liberal institutions in the world (World Bank 1993, 1997), 
of the continued need for the state to provide an enabling environment for the 
coordination and construction of the appropriate· institutional framework for the 
functioning of the market.9 The problem is therefore not so much whether the state 
should be involved as it is a question of how the state should be involved, for "although 
market reforms suggest a lesser role for the state, any well-functioning economic system 
still requires a well-functioning government." (Perkins and Roemer 1993: 6; see also 
Kochanowicz 1994: 196-199) The problems associated with constructing this enabling 
environment have also led to the necessary widening of the scope of adjustment lending 
to incorporate the widest possible sense of the political and the economic, with questions 
concerning the possible positive effect of linkages between the state and wider society 
impacting on the international developmental community through the recent publication 
of a number of influential reports. (World Bank 1993, 1997) This expansion of the scope 
of development thinking has also been mirrored by a similar transformation in the 
9 The new institutional economics with its focus on the need for institutional frameworks to provide 
governance structures for economic transactions further supports this argument. See Douglass C. North 
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theoretical literature on development away from 'state-versus-society' forms of 
theorising into a more holistic 'state-in-society' approach. This new approach has led to 
a radical restructuring of the way in which the concept of state capacity is theorised. 
State or Society 
Variously defined as instruments of domination (Milibrand 1983; Poulantzas 1980), 
corporate actors (Evan, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985), arenas of social conflict (Lowi 
1969/1979; Nordlinger 1981) and the guardian of the universal interest of society over 
which it has jurisdiction (Hobbes 165111987) the role of the state in development 
discourse and social theory has a long and varied history. From the Greek city-state to 
the East Asian developmental state it has figured as one of the primary units in analyses 
of the political. Throughout this long and varied history however, one key question 
continually provokes both discussion and argument amongst theorists: what is the nature 
of the relationship between the state and wider society? This question has been couched 
in many different guises and forms, but regardless of whether or not it is posed as a 
question of state strength (Dauvergne 1998; Migdal 1987, 1988), state power (Mann 
1984) or state effectiveness (World Bank 1991, 1993, 1997) the core concern underlying 
all these approaches is the same - that of the relationship between state and society - and 
it is this core concern that is the driving force behind the construction of this thesis. 
The state is generally defined as the authoritative and legitimate institution identified with 
a specific geographic territory through which the body of citizens associated with that 
territory are ordered, organised and controlled. The state is differentiated from other 
institutions within society in that its authority is legal in nature and is therefore based on 
procedural rules which have more general recognition in society than other rules. The 
state also possesses both the maximal control of resources within the territory and the 
only legitimate monopoly on the use of coercive force in the territory. (Weber 1964) As 
an organisation, the state is composed of numerous agencies that are coordinated and led 
by a centralised executive authority (the government), that has the ability and authority to 
make and implement binding rules by which individuals, and other organisations within 
(1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) and Oliver Williamson, (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press). 
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the specified territory of the state, must abide. 1o A glaring deficiency in this general 
Weberian definition of the state is, however, the lack of any attention to the question of 
community. (Lannour 1992: 101) The realisation of this lack of attention to the notion of 
community has resulted, in the l~st thirty years, in a dramatic transformation in theorising 
on the role and powers of the state. 
Up until the beginning of the 1980s the majority of social and political analyses tended to 
reduce the role of the state to little more than a tool of particular social groups (Lowi 
1969/1979; Nordlinger 1981) or economic classes (Block 1978; Milibrand 1983; 
Poulantzas 1978, 1980). These Pluralist and Marxist perspectives, however, came under 
attack in the early 1980s from an emergent group of European and American theorists -
later knoWn as the Statists - who claimed that these analyses had placed too much 
emphasis on the society side of the state-society nexus - a process which had in turn 
reduced the role of the state to little more than a dependent variable in any analysis. With 
the 1985 release of their book 'Bringing the State Back In', Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol thus brought the state out of the conceptual wilderness 
and back into the academic fold as a legitimate and important variable in social analysis. 
These Statists argued, in contrast to the earlier Marxist and Pluralist viewpoints, that the 
power of institutions such as the state to constrain action must be taken seriously in any 
analysis of the political. Strongly Weberian in their approach, the Statists argued that 
state officials should not be seen merely as members of society who happened to work 
for the state, but instead should be viewed as careerists who identify Closely with their 
vocation. Rather than acting on their own preferences these careerists acted on those of 
the state - thus state policies were unable to be reduced to the impact of mere societal 
preferences. Statists thus emphasised the degree of centralisation of the modem state, 
and the extension of state power over society. However, although the impact of the 
Statists was dramatic, and led to a renewed interest in the functioning of the institutions 
of the state in both the developed and developing world, their overly deterministic 
analyses Were open to a number of criticisms. By placing an inordinate amount of 
theoretical weight upon state structures and political legacies in defining state action 
Statists effectively excluded any real consideration of both society and individual action 
10 Lannour (1992: 102) distinguished between the state "as a pennanent bureaucratic apparatus" and 
government "as a smaller and usually transient group of politicians and senior officials who try, with more 
or less success, to give state activity coherence and direction." 
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in their analyses. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, theorists dissatisfied with the overly 
deterministic conceptions of the state offered by the Statists - an exclusion which left 
them open to the same charge of over-determinism that they had earlier laid against 
Marxist and Pluralist forms of analysis - began to argue that it was time to "bring society 
back in." (Clark and Chan 1994: 333) 
State and Society 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault has argued that: 
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily 
extend beyond the limits of the state ... First of all because the state, for all the 
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of 
power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of 
other existing power relations. (Foucault 1984: 312) 
This concern with integrating the state within the broader context of society underlies 
much of the recent literature on the role of the state in economic and political change. 
Wary of falling into the trap of social determinism characteristic of earlier Marxist and 
Pluralist approaches, the theorists of this new body of literature are also keenly aware of 
the danger of descending into the state-centred determinism of the Statists. Realising that 
the state is necessarily embedded within a complex historically contingent matrix of 
social forces, which both constrain and empower action, recent theorists of the state have 
brought the notion of society back into focus as an important variable in the analysis of 
state capacity. (Clark and Chan 1994; Evans 1989; 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1997a; 
Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994) Moving beyond the zero-sum 'state or society' 
formulations of earlier perspectives these new theoretical frameworks embrace a 
synergistic 'state-in-society' approach in which state-society relations can be seen to lead 
to positive effects of mutual empowerment. This new perspective has much in common 
with the emergent 'Good Governance' agenda, wherein government performance can be 
perceived as much a function of civic ties as it is a function of institutional design. 
(Larmour 1998: 10) Focusing on the associational spaces that exist between the authority 
of the state and the exchange relations of the market this approach is based upon the 
assumption that informal networks, formal associations and other civic groups that fill 
10 
these spaces provide critical mechanisms of coordination and resource allocation within 
societies. (cfHollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck 1994; Lipton 1991) Thus; 
states and markets are both essential mechanisms of social coordination, but they 
work best when they are rooted in networks and associations that cushion risks 
and build trust among the relevant economic actors. (Kaufman 1999: 368) 
The use of this state-in-society approach thus allows us to take into consideration the 
roles that individuals not situated in either the market or electoral politics may play in this 
process, thereby widening the scope of the political, as an understanding of the politics of 
reform requires not only the identification of the relevant actors in the political process 
and the specification of their preferences and political resources but also the analysis of 
the constraints placed upon action by existing social and political structures. The use of 
this approach can also help overcome the critique that is often made of comparative 
analyses, that they are overly structural in their approach (Kiser and Hechter 1991), 
without having to resort to a mere interpretive description of events. Taking much from 
institutional sociology with its emphasis upon the broader socio-cultural context in which 
bureaucratic and economic behaviour is embedded, this state-in-society approach implies 
that that the politics of reform will be characterised less by the calculated pursuit of 
income or power than by more reflexive normative behaviour which is in turn itself the 
result of a historically contextualised matrix of social relations and institutions thereby 
emphasising the path-dependant nature of social and political transformations within 
individual national societies and sub-national regions. (Stark 1992) 
What this thesis proposes to do then, is to explore the relationship between state-society 
connectedness and the associated levels of success in implementing and maintaining 
structural adjustment programs. In doing so this thesis is based upon the investigation of 
three interrelated propositions. These being: 
1) Is the state-in-society approach a valid model to use in the construction of 
developmental policy; 
2) Does this form of interaction lead to the successful achievement of 
developmental objectives; and therefore; 
3) Is the state-in-society approach thus a valid developmental model? 
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In order to explore these propositions, two recent cases of structural adjustment, one in 
Papua New Guinea and one in the Cook Islands, have been chosen as the empirical 
vehicle for this investigation. These two countries provide an excellent opportunity for 
comparative analysis for a number of key reasons. I I 
Introducing the Cases 
With over five hundred separate languages and cultures spread over the various islands 
that constitute the territory of modem Papua New Guinea, it can rightly be called one of 
the most ethnically diverse countries in world. Environmental factors combined with a 
high level of social diversity and associated lack of national integration within in its 
population of approximately four million have meant that the problems of economic 
development that face Papua New Guinea are extreme. In stark contrast to the diverse 
nature of Papua New Guinea society, the micro-state of the Cook Islands, situated in the 
south-western Pacific basin is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the 
world. 12 While the smallness of the Cook Islands population (now approximately 16 
500) would lead one to believe that the problems of economic development faced by the 
country would be no where as extreme as those faced by a larger country such as Papua 
New Guinea, the problems of extreme physical remoteness brought about by having a 
total dry land surface area of just over 200 square kilometres spread over 13 islands 
covering over a million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean means that the Cook 
Islands have encountered major difficulties in increasing indigenous levels of economic 
development. The onset of economic crises in both these countries in the mid-1990s 
meant that both countries were forced to undergo periods of structural adjustment and 
reform, and it is these periods of structural reform that provide the context for the 
comparative analysis of the question of the relationship between state-society interaction 
and the achievement of developmental objectives. Both countries have also only recently 
II While the best method of testing these propositions may have involved the comparison of a single 
country undergoing two separate periods of reform, one in the 'Washington Consensus' era and one in the 
'post-Washington Consensus' era, the recent nature of the paradigm shift means that reforms undertaken 
under the aegis of this new model would, at this point in time, only be in their fIrst year of implementation 
at best. 
12 The indigenous languages spoken on the island groups that make-up the modem Cook Islands are all 
mutually intelligible, although some dialectal difference are apparent especially between those of the 
Northern Group, where some of the islands were exposed to a strong cultural influence from the societies 
of Western Polynesia. 
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achieved freedom from colonial rule - with Papua New Guinea achieving independence 
from Australia in 1975 and the Cook Islands achieving self-government from New 
Zealand in 1965. 13 The fact of recent self-government means that the structures of the 
state in both countries are relatively new, and hence not as developed as those in 
countries with longer independent histories, which effectively means that both of these 
states are still necessarily dependent upon wider social support for both their legitimacy 
and wider operational existence. This necessary need for wider social support means that 
both states actively require a degree of social connectedness in order to achieve their 
developmental goals, thereby providing the necessary context for the comparative 
analysis undertaken by this thesis. Additionally, the high degree of similarity in the 
underlying objectives ofthe reforms in the two countries combined with the fact that their 
reforms were also undertaken at about the same time and over approximately the same 
time period mean that the two cases provide an ideal opportunity for comparison. 
In order to investigate these questions the thesis is structured along the following lines. 
Chapter two presents a brief outline of the deVelopment of 'development' thinking over 
the last century. Tracing out the interconnections between changes in the international 
environment 'and changes in the spheres of comparative politics and developmental 
policy this chapter draws attention to the recent emergence of the new state-in-society 
paradigm in international developmental thinking. The chapter then demonstrates the 
linkages between the Developmental State literature, with its, focus on embedded 
autonomy, and the emergence in recent years of a dramatic shift in developmental policy 
focus, a shift exemplified best by the emergence of the post-Washington Consensus. The 
thesis then explores two discrete case studies. In this second section of the thesis recent 
structural adjustment programs in the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea are explored 
in order to investigate the extent to which state-society linkages have contributed to the 
success, or lack of success, of these programs of reform. The construction of these cases 
involved periods of fieldwork in both countries, where numerous interviews were carried 
out with both public and private sector representatives. Whilst conducting this fieldwork ' 
13 While Papua New Guinea is fully independent from Australia, and has been since 1975, the Cook Islands 
operate in a state offree association with New Zealand. This state of free association means that while the 
Cook Islands are fully sovereign in their domestic government some foreign affairs duties such as defence 
are carried out by the New Zealand government, but even then only at the request of the Cook Islands 
government. Additionally all Cook Islanders are automatically New Zealand citizens. The implications for 
this association are explored more fully in the later chapter specifically on the experiences of the Cook 
Islands. The Cook Islands are free to leave this arrangement at any time. 
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extensive use was also made of local newspapers and other archival sources. The third 
and final section of this thesis then analyses these case studies in terms of the 
applicability of the state-in-:-society approach to the success or failure of their respective 
programs of reform. The final chapter concludes the thesis by offering up a possible 
motive for the success of the Cook Islands program and failure of the Papua New Guinea 
reform program. Arguing that the key difference between the two countries may their 
degree of social homogeneity, it asserts that social homogeneity may have been a 
necessary variable in the success of the East Asian developmental states. The final 
chapter argues, however, that through a renewed recognition of the need to root all 
processes of development within the particular context faced of each community, region 
or country there may still be hope in salvaging the developmental state paradigm as a 
valid deVelopmental model. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON STATE AND SOCIETY 
IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
Early Developments 
The study of the interaction of the state with society in the promotion of economic 
and political development has had a long and turbulent history for much of the 
twentieth century. While the period preceding World War One was characterised by 
the continuance of the lassez-faire policies so pre-eminent in the nineteenth century, 
the momentous changes that World War One brought to the international 
environment, combined with the shock of the Great Depression, led Governments 
around the globe to became more directly and deeply involved in the economy. The 
expansion of the role of the state was initially somewhat spontaneous as governments 
responded to the decline in international demand for export products. These initial 
reactions were consolidated throughout the mid-twentieth century by the rise and 
spread of Keynesianism. With its stress on demand-side economics, Keynesian-
derived economic policy necessitated the existence of a strong and pervasive state. 
However, this state strength was dependant, at least in part, on connections to wider 
society. Thus, apart from the Fascist states of the pre-World War Two era, and the 
Socialist governments of Eastern Europe and East Asia, states across the world 
maintained strong connections with non-state groups such as labour unions in order to 
increase their capacity to implement and maintain policy decisions. The state was 
thus an important social system in the developed countries of the world in the period 
immediately preceding and following World War Two, as a strong state was a 
necessary adjunct for the establishment of the industries and production-line methods 
of the Keynsian-Fordist forms of economic development characteristic of this J>eriod. i 
1 Fordism was an ideology of production characterised by four major themes, these being (i) mass 
production for mass consumption; (ii) managerial guidance by a combination of government and 
corporate planning; (iii) a high degree of cooperation between governments in international trade 
policy; and Civ) a form of domestic politics revolving around organised working class and business 
interests. Emerging in the wake of the devastation of World War Two, Fordism's heyday as a mode of 
production peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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The wide-ranging devastation of World War Two, and the desire to escape from a 
similar catastrophic upward spiral of inflation as had happened in the years following 
World War One, led the leading powers of the era to create the Bretton Woods 
system. With the goal of international economic stabilisation, the dual institutions of 
the Bretton Woods system - the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank-
were created in order to oversee and coordinate the maintenance of favourable 
balances of trade. In order to achieve this goal the currencies of the world were 
pegged to the US dollar which was in tum fixed in terms of gold. While governments 
maintained their economic sovereignty at a national level, the Bretton Woods 
institutions coordinated these governments financial movements at the global level, 
issuing reports which allowed governments around the world to control their capital 
movements through the manipulation of exchange and interest rates. The growth and 
development of the 1950s that the success of the Bretton Woods system and the 
Marshall plan allowed Japan and the war-ravaged states of Europe to enjoy also led to 
an increasing awareness by the international community of the wide income 
differentials among the 'developed' and 'developing' countries of the world. This 
awareness led to the Bretton Woods institutions taking on a new role - that of 
channelling foreign aid to the 'developing' countries of the world. Following in the 
apparent success of Keynesianism, the preferred conduit for the distribution of this aid 
in these developing countries was the state. The 1950s thus saw the emergence of 
new 'development economic' theories in response to the under-development of large 
numbers of countries around the world. Arguing along a Keynesian framework that 
market failures were holding back the development of these states these theories 
argued that the state needed to playa central role in the development process. These 
market failures were identified by these development economists as being produced 
by the presence of externalities, monopolies, and a general lack of mobility of factors 
of production. These failures were not insurmountable, however, and were able, so 
these development prescriptions argued, to be overcome through state based in~ustrial 
pushes. The 1950s were thus witness to the emergence of a new form of development 
paradigm - Modernisation theory. 
Modernisation Theory 
Based on the argument that external flows of capital, trade and technology had 
positive effects . on national development, Modernisation theory argued that 
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developmental growth was dependant upon the creation of policies designed to attract 
foreign capital. (Deutsch 1961; Lipset 1959; Rostow 1963) In order to attract such 
foreign capital, Modernisation theory argued that structural changes needed to be 
made to the institutional and organisational make-up of developing countries. 
Traditional institutions and organisations were seen as pre-state and therefore pre-
rational, with traditional institutions perceived as hindering the operation of capitalist 
markets. (Huntington 1968) In order to modernise and achieve economic 
development, Modernisation theorists therefore argued that developing societies 
needed to adopt the same organisational and institutional structures - as well as the 
associated political and social values - as those possessed by the developed states of 
the world. The adoption of these 'modem' institutional and organisational structures 
was in tum dependant upon the assumption that state apparatuses could be used to 
foster the structural changes necessary in order to bring about development. This 
process of institutional re-structuring was dependant upon three key interrelated goals, 
these being - (i) the rapid acceleration of industrialisation; (ii) the modernisation of 
agricultural forms of production; and (iii) the provision of the infrastructure needed in 
order to facilitate increased levels of urbanisation. These early development theorists 
thus perceived the dense matrix of social ties that bound individuals and institutions 
together within society as an impediment to development. 
Dependency and Dependencia Theories 
The only major critiques of Modernisation theory in the 1960s and early 1970s were 
that of the neo-Marxist Dependency and Dependencia schools. The first such theorist 
to voice his concerns at the theoretical failings of modernisation theories was Andre 
Gunder Frank (1967) who argued that the economic dynamics of capitalism created 
social and political institutions of exploitation - resulting in the movement of capital 
surplus from the developing 'peripheral' countries to the developed 'core' countries. 
Called 'Dependency' theory by its supporters, it argued that governments and.culture 
were only epiphenomenal to the question of development. (Deyo 1981; Evans 1979; 
Hayter 1971; Payer 1974) The only hope for true development for these peripheral 
countries, so these theorists argued, was through the dismantling of the international 
structures of accumulation that they saw as responsible for the continued repression 
and state of dependency of the developing world. A related school of thought 
emerged in Latin America at about the same time as Frank's theory of Dependency. 
17 
Called Dependencia theory it argued that the lack of development in Latin America 
was not due just to the structure of the international political economy, but was also 
heavily dependent upon the complex interaction of domestic forces including political 
structures, social movements and historically conditioned alliances. (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979) This more sophisticated theory was a distinct attack upon 
Modernisation theory which had long argued that political stability was of key 
importance in the development process, as political legitimacy and accountability 
were of secondary importance to the attainment of economic and technological 
development.2 (Huntington 1968) 
The modernisation/dependency paradigms dominated discourse on the comparative 
politics of development for almost two decades. However, the dramatic changes of 
the international environment in the 1970s and 1980s from a Fordist to post-Fordist 
international order foreshadowed a similar shift away from this 
ModernisationlDependency nexus of development discourse, and towards the 
emergence of new forms of development paradigms.3 
Dramatic Changes in the International Environment 
The 1960s signalled the beginning of the crisis of the Keynsian-Fordist model of 
economic growth predominant in the post-World War Two international environment. 
By this point in time the post-War Western European and Japanese economic 
recoveries were complete. Their internal markets were saturated with domestic 
consumption products, and it was only a matter of time before the drive to create 
export markets for these same products meant that the US position of export 
hegemony would be threatened. This recovery of these states' economies occurred 
just as the success of the Fordist rationalisation model meant that increasing numbers 
of workers in these countries were being displaced. (Harvey 1989: 14)) The 
accompanying decline in effective demand brought about by this process further 
contributed to the building crisis in the international economic system. These various 
2 Huntington (1968) argued that political instability resulted when demands .exceeded a political 
systems capability. . 
3 While a strong correlation may be drawn from the similarity of these changes further work could 
usefully to be done investigating the intricate linkages and cross-dynamics of this dual process during 
this period of change. Changes in the ideological climate appeared to be correlated with real shifts in 
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processes eventually led to a profit squeeze in the industrialist capitalist states' 
national economies, a profit squeeze that reflected the crisis of over-accumulation that 
the rigidity of the Keynsian-Fordist model of production had produced. Austerity 
measures adopted by states to resolve this crisis provoked widespread popular protests 
by citizens of these advanced capitalist states, resulting in a rapid increase in money 
wages. This process of clamp-down and associated mini-recession from 1970-71 was 
succeeded by a mini-boom from 1972-73 that proved to be the "final phase of the 
long postwar boom." (Wayton and Seddon 1994: 6) The US dollar devaluation of 
1971, the oil-crisis of 1973-74 and the associated international recession of the mid-
1970s signalled comprehensively the end of the post-war golden years of growth. The 
accompanying collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the OPEC oil crisis 
therefore produced a new turbulence and volatility into the major economies of the 
world in the 1970s and the 1980s. (Agnew and Corbridge 1995: 103) This increased 
volatility in the international environment was accompanied by efforts by 
manufacturers and various financial institutions to search out additional markets, and 
wider outlets for investment. (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 9) This search was also 
accompanied by an internationalisation of financial markets through market 
deregulation, and the increased abandonment of exchange controls. This period in the 
history of development thinking, a period characterised by Harvey as a change from 
Fordism to Flexible Accumulation (Harvey 1989: 141-172), witnessed a decrease in 
state intervention in economic production, a decrease influenced by institutions such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The Birth of Structural Acijustment Programs 
The growth of the Euro-bond and Euro-dollar market following the OPEC crisis in 
1973 meant that enormous loans became available to Third World countries in the 
1970s. The money re-entered circulation as it was lent, at low rates of interest, by 
many European banks to governments in the developing world in order to-finance 
domestic development projects.4 The growing international economy of the 1970s, 
and the loans this enabled, thus saw the initiation, throughout the developing world, of 
the structure and fonn of the international environment. 
4 There were two major problems with this situation; fIrst, borrower countries were becoming 
dependent upon on what were perceived as near endless flows of cheap credit with long maturities, 
secondly the banks were lending beyond the level of prudent fmancial acumen and they had little 
control of how the loans were being used. (Stallings 1992: 59) 
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numerous large-scale development projects. Since the loans went primarily to 
governments most of the development investments were made by state-owned firms, 
the result of this was an expansion of the public sector in much of the developing 
world. (Stallings 1992: 51). Between 1970 and 1982 Third World countries received 
an inflow of US$480 billion, which amounted, subtracting interest payments, to an 
average of 1.7 percent of GDP per year over the twelve year period. However, the 
onset of the second OPEC oil shock in 1979-1980 spelt the end of this false boom, 
and led eventually to the international recession of the 1980s. 
The advanced industrial countries responded to the onset of the second oil shock by 
raising their interest rates in order to combat inflation. The result of this for the 
developing world was an increase in the interest on their debt that they were supposed 
to pay back, at the same time as their non-oil export revenues stayed the same or 
decreased due to the decrease in the demand for primary products in the international 
market resulting from the higher international prices for oil. The onset of the 
subsequent oil crisis meant that many of the European banks that had been lending 
massive amounts of monies to developing countries called in their loans. On 13 
August 1982, as a direct result of this chain of events, the Mexican Minister of 
Finance arrived in Washington DC with the announcement that his government could 
no longer continue to service its debt as per its original contractual agreement. A 
package was quickly put together to 'save' the Mexican economy but the failure of 
the Mexican government to service its debt saw banks react by discontinuing their 
'voluntary' lending services. As many developing countries were expectant of, and 
dependent upon the continuation of the loan schemes to service their own debt 
repayment schemes the crisis in Mexico was inadvertently extended to other 
developing countries. In order to avert a massive international fiscal crisis a form of 
creditor cartel was set up. This cartel consisted of a number of large banks from the 
United States, Europe and Japan who grouped themselves into committees, one for 
each debtor nation, who were to oversee the debt management process of their 
respective country on behalf of all creditor institutions. (Feldstein et al 1987) In order 
for placate the creditors fear of defaulting each of these debtor countries also needed 
to have a stand-by arrangement in place with the IMF. 5 In an attempt to resolve the 
5 This concerted cartel approach by the creditors meant that the heavily indebted countries had very 
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crisis the creditor banks owed money by Third World governments were told by the 
IMF that only if they supplied additional monies to the creditor countries would the 
IMF agree to supervise the debtor governments' economic policies. (Stallings 1992: 
65) In this way the banks' loans would be protected at the same time as the debtor 
countries were provided with a much needed influx of capital in order to service their 
debt repayment schemes. However, this scheme soon broke down when it was 
realised that the debt crisis was not just going to disappear in a few years as had 
previously been thought. The breakdown in creditor unity occurred as the large banks 
became increasingly annoyed at the lack of monetary support they were receiving 
from the industrial countries, while the smaller banks just wanted to cut their losses 
and run. The Brady plan - wherein the IMF continued to loan to countries in arrears 
to banks - also worked to undermine the international creditor cartel as debtor 
countries defaulted on service payments in the knowledge that the IMF would service 
their loans. (Stallings 1992: 65-66) The work of the IMF and the World Bank in the 
1980s was thus primarily geared to a strategy that directed their lending towards 
ensuring the repayment of their donor countries debts to private creditors. However, 
as private banks increasingly pulled out of the developing country loan business the 
IMF and World Bank began to take up the slack. Thus, in the 1980s International 
Financial Institution's (IFI's) such the IMF and the Asian Development Bank began 
to replace private bankers as the suppliers of capital to the developing world. (Kahler 
1990) 
In order to protect their investments, the IFI's began in the late 1980s, to incorporate 
notions of conditionality into their loans, with the notion of conditionality being 
formally incorporated into the amendments of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. 
Similarly, during this period the notion of conditionality became a feature of many 
other bilateral loan schemes as well, with the World Bank further developing the 
notion of conditionality to create Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) and Sectoral 
Adjustment Loans (SEALs) in an effort to ensure a stable macroeconomic climate in 
its donor countries. 6 It is thus generally agreed that the 1980s witnessed a dramatic 
little opportunity in which to improve the terms which were offered. One way for this lack of choice 
by the debtor countries may have been avoided would have been the creation of a debtor cartel, but this 
never came to fiuition. (Stallings 1992: 61; Tussie 1988) 
6 Stabilisation policies of IFls thus emerged in the 1980s due to a number of reasons; (i) the IMF 
increased its resources so that its loans became quite significant, (ii) private sources of [mance dried up 
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change within the policy objectives of the IFIs, away from a focus on debt 
stabilisation policies and towards a form of policy which pursued deeper structural 
changes in debtor countries economic infrastructure. (Stallings 1992: 76) 
Accordingly there was a movement away from the use of World Bank: disbursements 
for specific projects and towards broader structural adjustment loans.7 
This movement by the IFIs towards a greater reliance on the operation of the free 
market in the achievement of developmental goals drew heavily upon the emergent 
neo-liberal school of thought. In this neo-liberal approach to development the state 
sphere was to be reduced to the minimum, and bureaucratic control was to be replaced 
by market mechanisms wherever possible.8 The early structural adjustment programs 
thus comprised policy prescriptions designed to combat inflation through the adoption 
of tight monetary policy in order to liberalise the operation of the free market. Due to 
the predominant belief that the free market was self-regulating and that once the 
effects of a economic shock had been mitigated the 'invisible hand' of the market 
would inevitably lead to economic growth and development, adjustment in this period 
was thus primarily geared to the mitigation of outside shocks such as an oil price 
increase or a drop in international agricultural prices. The adoption of these neo-
liberal policy directives by the IFls was widely known within the deVelopment 
community as the 'Washington Consensus' (Williamson 1990) Comprising a mixture 
of policies for getting prices right, liberalising trade and achieving macro-economic 
stability, these policies formed the basis of the objectives contained within the World 
Banle's SAPs of this period. The unrivalled success of the East Asian economies in 
in the wake of the Mexican debt crisis, and (iii) other creditors found it in their interest to reinforce the 
policies of the IMF. Whereas in the 1970s developing countries had been able to pick and choose their 
source of [mance (hence other Banks had acted in competition with the IMF) the 1980s saw the IMF 
become, in some senses, a monopolistic international creditor. The IMF was thus, through the 
interaction of these various reasons, able to enforce stabilisation policies. 
7 The 'Berg Report' (World Bank 1981) was one of the fIrst policy statements by the World Bank 
which actually used the term Structural Adjustment in terms of outlining its emergent development 
strategy. Named after the main author of the report Elliot Berg, the report is offIcially known as World 
Bank Report (1981) Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington D C: World Bank). 
8 Neo-liberalism as an ideology is derived in large part from tenets drawn from neo-classical economic 
theory. Based on the concept of rational individuals with perfect information making decisions which 
maximise their utility, neo-classical economics posits the existence of feedback systems which allow 
any ineffIciencies within a system, be economic or political, to be selected against through a process of 
adaptation. The empirical realities of the modem economic and political world fall far short of this 
ideal however. The appeal of market solutions is that they apparently appear to minimise the need for 
regulatory institutions - increasingly however they have been shown to be ineffIcient in terms of 
realising the potential of positive externalities. (Kitschelt et al 1999) 
22 
the post-war period was claimed as a victory by this neo-liberal non-interventionist 
school. (Balassa 1981; Friedman and Friedman 1980; Gilder 1984; Linder 1986) Yet 
even in this ideology the necessity of the role of the state in the attainment of 
economic growth was accepted (North 1981: 20), but restricted largely to the 
protection of "individual rights, persons and property" and the enforcement of 
"voluntarily negotiated private contracts." (Buchanan et a11980: 9) 
When excessive deflation occurred within developing countries in response to these 
balance-of-payments crises, however, questions arose as to whether or not these early 
structural adjustment programs were antagonistic, given that a key goal of structural 
adjustment programs, in particular, and development lending, in general, is that of 
increasing production and output whereas these earlier programs dealt only with 
issues of fiscal containment. So gradually over the period between 1985 and 1988 the 
adjustment programs came' to be constructed within a context of expansion not 
contraction. These developments were accompanied by a dramatic theoretical shift in 
the sphere of the comparative politics of development. 
The Development of the Statist and Developmental State Models 
The late 1980s witnessed the emergence of an influential new body of literature which 
straddled the worlds of comparative politics and development studies. Emerging, in 
large part, out of the growing number of critiques of the established development 
paradigms of the 1970s and early 1980s, the new developmental paradigm argued that 
there was a need to 'bring the state back' into discourse on development. (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985) Critical of the socially reductionist approach 
lauded by the then popular neo-Marxist and neo-Pluralist approaches, the statists 
contended, that too much focus had been placed on the society side of the state-
society nexus. (Alam 1989; Appelbaum and Henderson 1992; Haggard 1986, 1990; 
Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; White 1988) The inability of these earlier paradigms to 
explain the phenomenal rise of the East Asian economies in the 1980s was seen by the 
supporters of this new statist approach as proof that a strong, autonomous state was 
necessary in promoting successful economic development in the developing world.9 
9 These new 'statist' theorists claimed for example that theorists in the dependency tradition had 
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These statist theorists argued that the autonomous decision making ability of the state 
" had been the crucial variable in the success of the East Asian economies. The ability 
of the East Asian states to achieve a degree of autonomy, defined as the ability of the 
state to formulate policy independently from pressure from societal groups, was thus 
identified as the key factor in the shift from import-substitution policies and towards 
the more outward looking, export-focussed policies that had been at the base of tht5" 
East Asian economic success. (MacIntyre 1994a: 4) 
In the statist literature then, states were perceived to act on their own preferences, 
with those policy preferences being constrained largely by the state's own 
administrative and legal order. States were thus classified as strong, such that they 
were insulated from distributional pressures from societal sectors, and that they were 
sufficiently coordinated and coherent in organisational terms to allow for the effective 
implementation of state policy. (Doner 1992: 399) The behaviour of state officials 
was therefore analysed in terms of their own policy preferences rather than seeing 
them merely as tools of wider societal interests. In this statist tradition, emphasis was 
thus placed upon the degree of centralisation and extension of state power over 
society, and on the overall structure of the bureaucratic apparatus. This tradition 
borrowed heavily from Weber with his definition of state officials as careerists who 
identify closely with their vocation, and who were soCialised into those views within. 
the bureaucracy and hence only minimally influenced by wider society's interests. lO 
(Weber 1964, 1968) A state's ability to support markets and capitalist forms of 
accumulation therefore depended upon the bureaucracy being a coherent corporate 
entity through which the furtherance of corporate goals was seen as the best means 
through which individual members could maximise their own self-interest. ll The 
statists argued, however, that the maintenance of this coherent sense of corporateness 
required that individual members be insulated from the demands of the surrounding 
overemphasised international relationships to the detriment of domestic concerns and structures. 
10 In Weber's view, a prerequisite of the efficient operation of capitalist markets was the construction 
of a solid, authoritative, administrative framework. In this view, rent-seeking behaviour (corruption) is 
a feature of earlier pre-bureaucratic forms of social organisation. The bureaucratic state, with its 
meritocratic civil service thus provided a suitable environment in which to foster economic 
development. 
II Statists thus believe that the maintenance of political order, the creation of a stable legal order for 
market relationships, the use of macroeconomic policy (both fiscal and monetary) in order to curb 
inflation and dampen the business cycle and the fmancing of physical infrastructure projects such as 
roads and airports are important functions of the state. 
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society. This insulation was enhanced through the conferral of a distinctive status 
upon the members of bureaucracies. Statists also argued that to be effective in 
overcoming obstacles to development, states, while being 'strong' in the sense that 
that they have the ability to make and implement policies, also had to be 
'autonomous' in the sense of being able to ignore pressures from powerful interest 
groups. A state, in the statist tradition, therefore possessed both powerful political 
leadership as well as a trained technocracy in order to develop policy. Without this 
autonomy powerful interest groups would 'take-over' the state in order to promote 
their interests through the extraction of massive 'rents'. (Amsden 1979, 1989; Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985) 
State versus Society 
One of the chief early exponents of this statist theory in a non-East Asian context was 
Joel Migdal. Migdal (1988) argued that one cannot have a strong society and a strong 
state. The problem lay, he argued, in the realisation that state leaders must compete 
with local leaders for social control. Local leaders - whom Migdal termed 
'strongmen' (1988: 33) - have their positions based in the current structures of 
society. The major struggle within societies, especially those with fairly new states, is 
thus whether or not the new state will be able to displace other organisations in 
society that make rules against the wishes and goals of state leaders. (Migdal 1987: 
398) The important point for Migdal is that the state is only one institution among 
many that competes to exert control over society. Social structure, particularly the 
existence of numerous other social organisations that exercise effective social control, 
thus has a decisive effect on the likelihood of the state greatly expanding its 
capabilities (Migdal 1987: 397) Migdal's work therefore utilises a zero-sum 
conception of power, wherein a strong society necessarily means a weak state. In his 
work Migdal (1988: xiii) defined a state's capability as "the ability of state leaders to 
use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what they want." State 
capability was thus defined as the capacity of the state to perform tasks such as the 
regulation ,of social relationships and the extraction of resources. Strong states would 
be highly capable in completing these tasks while weak states would not. For Migdal 
state capability was linked to state autonomy, such that if the state was not 
autonomous enough it would be 'captured' by societal interests, and become little 
more than a vehicle for their them. His view, strongly typical of that characterised by 
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the statist school, can thus be sUl1ll11arised as a 'state versus society' viewpoint in 
which groups within society, including the state, constantly struggle with each other 
for dominance. 
Criticism of this statist approach began, however, to emerge in the early 1990s. 
Criticisms stel1ll11ed from the fact that the statist interpretation did not appear able to 
adequately account for the importance of state capacity in the achievement of 
economic development. The statists were thus accused of being too centred on the 
concept of state autonomy, thereby disregarding the influence of greater society on 
political outcomes. The writers in the state-market tradition had essentially ignored 
the fact that this relationship is itself embedded within wider civic relationships. In 
particular they were accused of being too concerned with leaders rather than the 
relationship between state and society, and of placing an inordinately large amount of 
theoretical weight upon state structures and political legacies in defining state action, 
with the result being that society, in their analyses, was all too often parcelled off as a 
redundant category. (Clark and Chan 1994; Doner 1992; Evans 1995; Moon and 
Prasad 1994; Remmer 1997; Weiss 1995, 1998; Weiss and Hobson 1995) 
Bringing Society Back In 
The development of these criticisms led theorists to· the realisation that as both the 
'state' and the 'market' are embedded within larger societies and cultures, social and 
cultural variables may well affect how states and market operate and, more 
importantly, how they interact to produce (or not produce) developmental trajectories. 
(Clark and Chan 1994: 339-340; Moon and Prasad 1994) Known variously as neo-
statism or developmental state theory, this new paradigm provided an innovative 
linkage between political institutions and economic performance. 12 Instead of 
assuming a zero-sum relationship between government involvement and private 
cooperative efforts, the developmental state literature argued that active government 
and mobilised communities could enhance each other's developmental efforts. (Peter 
Evans 1997c) Development state theory, however, still owed much to its statist 
predecessor. Similarly to the statists, the developmental state paradigm was based on 
12 The term 'developmental state' was first used by Chalmers Johnson (1987) in reference to the 
connections between the bureaucratic state apparatus and private business interests in Taiwan and 
South Korea. 
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the idea of a strong administrative state structure characterised by executive 
dominance. The success of the theory was also heavily dependant, especially in its 
earlier configurations, upon a high degree of bureaucratic unity and the political 
capacity to insulate economic decision-making and implementation from various 
contending political and social interests. (Moon and Prasad 1994: 360) However, 
while agreeing with the statists that the state plays a vital role in economic 
development the developmental state theorists disagreed with the statists claim that 
state autonomy on its own promotes state capacity. They insisted instead that it is 
precisely the connectedness of the state with society, rather than its autonomy, that 
was the reason behind the East Asian economic success. (Evans 1995; Weiss 1995, 
1998; Weiss and Hobson 1995) The difference between the statist and developmental 
state schools of thought is thus a striking one.13 One of the most sophisticated models 
to emerge out of this particular theoretical tradition is that of the sociologist Peter 
Evans with his notion of 'embedded autonomy'. 
Embedded Autonomy 
In his original work Evans (1989, 1994) challenged the theoretical base of the statists 
with the argument that the existence of a meritocratic Weberian bureaucracy was not 
enough in itself to generate effective economic development. The state, he argued, 
must also have close ties to societal interests. In order to be effective it must be 
'embedded' within the dense network of social relationships that compose civil 
society. The key to the effectiveness of this embeddedness is the existence of close 
ties between bureaucrats and the private sector in which, in line with the initial work 
of the statists, however, the bureaucrats retain their ability to formulate and act on 
their preferences autonomously. (Evans 1989, 1995) Embedded autonomy thus 
depends upon an apparently contradictory combination of Weberian bureaucratic 
insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding social structure. (Evans 1989: 
574) However, neither of these two elements works by itself, a state purely embedded 
within the structures of wider society would be prone to takeover by predatory, rent-
seeking social forces,14 while a state that was purely autonomous would lack both 
J3 Work by developmental state theorists has also served as a further basis for the refutation of the 
historical fatalism of the Dependency school. There thus are several 'pathways from the periphery' 
(Haggard 1990) that developmental states can follow, thus avoiding the structure of dependency 
situation that the neo-Marxist dependency school foretold. 
14 Without state autonomy, embeddedness would thus degenerate into a super-cartel aimed merely at 
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sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralised private sector 
implementation. Dense connecting networks without a robust internal structure 
would thus leave the state incapable of resolving 'collective action' problems and of 
transcending the individual interests of its private counterparts. (Evans 1995: 12) 
These two characteristics of embedded autonomy enable the state to both seek and 
define long term developmental goals through information acquired from society in a 
co-operative manner, while at the same time social forces act to constrain the state's 
policy choices so as to prevent the capture of the state by predatory self-interest. Thus 
only when autonomy and embeddedness are combined can a state be called 
developmental. Having successfully bound the behaviour of actors to its pursuit of 
collective ends through both formal and informal networks, the state can then act with 
some independence in relation to particularistic societal pressures. This form of 
autonomy characteristic of the developmental state is, however, of a completely 
different character from the aimless domination of the predatory state. IS The 
autonomy of the developmental state is thus embedded in a concrete set of social ties 
which bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies. (Evans 1992: 164) When officials 
are embedded within concrete sets of social ties that bind the state to society they 
allow for the capacity of the state to be increased through their facilitation of 
institutionalised channels for continual and information sharing. Evans' notion of 
embeddedness thus encompasses both the informal networks linking bureaucrats and 
capitalists as well as the internal formal organisational characteristics of the 
bureaucracy that give it its independence. In a similar vein, Maxfield and Schneider 
protecting its members and maximising their gains. Embeddedness is thus assumed to only have value 
in the context of a degree of autonomy of the state, in the absence of a coherent Weberian sort of 
administrative structure, embeddedness will almost certainly lead to clientalism. (Evans 1992: 179) 
Zaire in the 1970s and 1980s is an example of this type of state. 
15 A feature of development in Africa was the construction of predatory patterns of state leadership in 
which the resources of the state were used to build up domestic political support. This predatory 
behaviour was brought about by a combination of the frailness of the political legitimacy with which 
these state elites held power, combined with a wealmess of the state's institutional resources. The 
development policies of these elites thus had effect of not so much of redistributing the profits of 
economic growth (if this did in fact happen) as much as it was increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of the elite ruling classes. (Petiteville 1998: 118) Control of the state apparatus was vested within a 
small group of personally connected individuals. (Evans 1992: 149) "The [predatory] state fails to 
provide even the most basic prerequisites for the functioning of a modem economy: predictable 
enforcement of contract, provision and maintenance of infrastructure, and public investment in health 
and education." (Evans 1992: 151) The state is unconstrained by society, and is hence autonomous in 
the sense that it does not derive its goals from the aggregation of societal interests. "This autonomy 
does not enhance the state's capacity to pursue goals of its own, but rather removes critical social 
checks on arbitrary rule." (Evans 1992: 151) 
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(1997) argued that it is wrong in analyses of the developing world to simply equate 
state-business relations as corrupt forms of patron-client networks. Instead, they 
argue that the co-existence of cohesive and well disciplined business associations and 
a professional Weberian bureaucracy mean that state and business can work together 
synergistically in the achievement of economic development without collapsing into 
simple rent-seeking behaviour. The developmental state approach, partiCUlarly as 
exemplified in the notion of embedded autonomy, thus allows theorists to move 
beyond the zero-sum state versus society framework of earlier analyses and into a 
more realistic conceptual framework, a framework which is able to appreciate the 
intricacies of the often positive relationship between the state and society. This idea 
that the use of civic links can expand the 'effective' capacity of the state is thus the 
key conceptual variable in the developmental state literature, which can best be 
summarised as a state-in-society approach. 16 
State-in-Society 
Evan's work on embedded autonomy demonstrated that the empowerment of social 
forces does not necessarily weaken the power of the state to govern society. In fact 
the development of the connectedness of the state with the social infrastructure may 
even enhance the capacity of the state to achieve its goals. The notion of 
'Embeddedness' thus provides a solution to the problem of capacity which had 
plagued the statists. Embeddedness is necessary because government policies must 
respond to the problems of actors within society. The existence of a concrete network 
of external ties also allows the state to assess, monitor and shape private responses to 
policy initiatives, and by extending the state's intelligence it enlarges the prospect that 
policies will be implemented. Connections of the state to civil society thus become 
part of the solution rather than part of the problem. 17 (Evans 1992: 179) 
16 In its original formulation Evans (1989, 1992, 1995) acknowledged that the notion of embedded 
autonomy was concerned not with links between the state and broader civil society but rather with the 
specific links between the state and industrial capital. In State-Society Synergy (Evans 1997a) he dealt 
with this weakness by demonstrating that embeddedness does not necessarily only take the form of ties 
between the state and business elites, and instead demonstrating (as did the other authors in the book) 
that the notion of embeddedness could be successfully applied to ties between any group in society and 
the state in the successful achievement of developmental goals. The expansion of the notion of 
embeddedness to include a broader range of social groups thus allowed for the creation of a much more 
theoretically robust version of embedded autonomy. 
17 While Evans (1995) had earlier claimed that a well-developed professional bureaucracy was an 
essential part of embedded autonomy this recent work by Chazan (1994) and Shue (1994) demonstrates 
that state-society empowerment can begin, in certain cases, on the side of civil society. In these cases 
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Connectedness thus means increased competence, not capture. (Evans 1995: 50) In 
this developmental state approach then, while it is accepted that state agencies have a 
degree of autonomy in the development of policy preferences, it is also argued that 
these same preferences are far more likely to be achieved if the state works with 
society rather than against it. In the developmental state literature power is thus no 
longer conceived purely in zero-sum terms. Instead, the literature argues that states 
and societies can combine synergistically to mutually empower eachY (Evans 1997; 
Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994) Interestingly enough, however, while this revolution 
was occurring in the theoretical sphere of comparative politics, a similar, and related, 
revolution was occurring in the realm of developmental policy. 
Changes in IFI Developmental Policy 
There has been a resurgence of interest, in recent years, in the development 
community in the notion of civil society and its potential for improving both political 
and economic governance in the achievement of developmental outcomes. (Cohen 
and Arato 1992; Hirst 1994; Putnam 1993) Development theory up until the 
emergence of the developmental state literature had largely marginalised the 
importance of informal norms and networks of social relationships in the achievement 
of developmental goals. Yet, recent work in both the developed (Gerlach 1992; 
Hamilton and Biggart 1988) and developing world (World Bank 1993) has shown that 
some of the most competitive firms, regiohs and nations are in fact grounded in 
precisely these forms of coordination and cooperation. Recent studies in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Pacific, for example, have shown that improvements in non-state 
capacity can improve state capacity. (Bratton 1989; Taafaki and Oh 1995; Owusu 
1997) 
Empowering Civil Society 
Michael Lipton (1991: 21) linked the failure of many structural reform programs to 
what he called the 'state-market dilemma'. In simple terms this dilemma resolved 
around the idea that in the early stages of economic development both state and 
the development of a strong civil society played a positive role in helping the state overcome problems 
of parochialism and localised protectionism. 
18 The notion of the developmental state thus opened up the realisation that the relationship between 
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market must increase in power. This process is, however, very much often a zero-
sum situation wherein the growth of the state or market tends to weaken or subvert the 
growth of the other. In overcoming this dilemma Lipton has argued that the active 
use of the institutions of civil society - to provide a network through which 
information and the like may be exchanged by individuals without going through state 
or market channels - may act to circumvent, or at least inhibit, the possibly 
destructive effects of early state-market interactions. Similarly, Pierre Landell-Mills 
(1992) has argued that the empowerment of civil society and the systematic 
reconstruction of society through the empowerment of a variety of interest groups 
including community organisations, business associations and other women's groups 
could be the key to successful economic development and the achievement of 'good 
government.' Claiming that Africa would only emerge from its current difficulties if 
it progressively remodelled its institutions to be more in line with the traditions, 
beliefs and structures of its component societies Landell-Mills argued that "the 
nurturing of civil society through the development of its associational life will both 
deepen and broaden popular participation in, and control of, its institutions." (Landell-
Mills 1992: 545) However, while theorists have argued since the early 1980s (Cleave 
1980) that the harnessing of non-state resources increased the likelihood of a program 
of policy reform or implementation being achieved, explanations of the mechanisms 
behind these processes before the emergence of the developmental state literature had 
been rudimentary at best. 
Improving Governance and State Capacity 
In recent years there has thus been much debate within the development community 
about the topic of 'governance', as opposed to 'government'. While the latter is 
identified with the traditional system of political institutions, the former is connected 
with various types of self-government through networks of informal and formal 
norms. Governance is thus not only the sole province of governments as community 
organisations, business owners and church groups can all play significant parts. (Oh 
1995: 9) This governance literature is thus characterised by a movement away from a 
state and society could allow for the emergence of a positive-sum conception of power. 
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unilateral focus, where state and society are treated separately, and towards an 
interactionist focus, where the state is seen to act with society, although not always 
necessarily in concert. (Kooiman 1993: 35) Governance is thus concerned with "the 
institutional environment in which citizens interact among themselves and with 
government agencies/officials." (ADB 1995: 2) This notion is itself intricately linked 
to the notion of capacity, as the capacity of the institutional environment determines 
the ability of governments to effectively implement policies for development and 
reform. 
In the developmental community, state capacity has long been identified as a 
necessary aspect of successful programs of structural adjustment. Three dimensions 
of state capacity are especially crucial to the reform process, these being: 
Policy Formulation - the capacity to deal with the international dimensions 
of the policy environment - political, social, economic and technological; 
Policy Execution - the capacity to manage the ongoing policies and 
programmes in the country; and 
Management of Reform - the capacity to design, introduce and sustain 
capacity building programmes for the management of the affairs of 
government. (Corkery 1997) 
Similarly, Joan Nelson (1988) has argued that there are three sets of inter-dependent 
factors which directly affect the political sustainability of an economic stabilisation 
effort, and by extension a program of structural adjustment. The three factors being: 
the strength of political leaders' commitment to the program; 
the government's capabilities; and 
the political response the program evokes from influential groups. 
Thus, for the maximisation of conditionality and structural change key elites must be 
allied to the agent of change, be it an IFI or a bilateral aid donor. Elites groups 
generally find it in their interest to maintain the status quo unless they are sure that 
change will act to improve their current situation. Non-elite groups are also prone to 
be suspicious of change as the initial stages of growth often require that the general 
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population makes sacrifices. The task of initiating and continuing economic growth 
therefore requires careful coordination. Leaders must persuade both elites and non-
elites that the fruits of this growth will flow down to them - and hence provide the 
impetus for societal groups to undertake the various restrictions and sacrifices needed 
in order to actuate economic growth. 19 Consolidation of reforms is therefore most 
likely to be achieved where governments have constructed relatively sturdy bases of 
political support, encompassing major private sector representatives and beneficiaries 
within wider society, as well as having secured at least the acquiescence of the major 
political forces competing within the political system. Without such taciturn or 
definite alliances between politicians, elites and those most affected from the policy 
changes, reform attempts will necessarily falter. (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 20) 
Political order in this sense is thus no longer conceived as something external 
imposed by the government or the state. Instead, political authorities work through, 
and with, a plurality of other actors and cannot be sharply distinguished from them. 20 
(Larmour 1995a: 17) 
The East Asian Experience 
The World Bank Report The East Asian Miracle (1993) asserted that the state had 
played an important 'market facilitating' role in the development of the East Asian 
economies, in establishing (i) a good macroeconomic management (thereby providing 
a secure framework for private investment); (ii) banking policies which enhanced the 
banking sectors integrity as well as increasing national savings; (iii) an emphasis on 
19 The World Bank thus concluded, in the East Asian experience anyway, that a major reason for the 
economic success of these economies was the establishment of specific mechanisms that 
operationalised the principle of shared growth - mechanisms including the provision of public housing 
in Singapore and Hong Kong and deliberation councils in Japan in order to demonstrate the reality of 
shared growth. (World Bank 1993: 188) 
20 In the organisational literature, three mechanisms of governance - markets, hierarchies and 
communities - are generally seen to explain the majority of cases. (Colebatch and Larmour 1993) 
Markets are defm~d as domains in which actors holding separate property rights in different resources 
engage in free and legally enforceable contractual exchanges. Hierarchies, in contrast, are defmed as 
domains in which certain actors wield authority over others due the institutionalisation of property 
rights within a formal organisational framework to which both categories of actors belong. (Williamson 
1985) Communities, on the other hand, are defmed as formally or informally joined sets of individuals 
or organisations through which transactions are conducted on the basis of mutual trust and confidence 
sustained by stable, particularistic and legally unenforceable relationships. (Streeck and Schmitter 
1985) In the modem world, the state provides the institutional context and legitimation through which 
markets and hierarchies exist. This, however, is not to say that these forms of organisation cannot exist 
outside the confmes of the state, for they have done so before the existence of modem states, and 
continue to do so around the world. Communities, on the other hand, are much more independent of 
the state, although some forms of community, such as the nation, are intricately intertwined with the 
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education; (iv) fiscal regimes where price distortions were kept to a minimum; (v) 
policies which enhanced agricultural productivity; and (vi) an openness by the 
respective societies to foreign ideas and technology?l (World Bank 1993: 5) The 
report concluded that state interaction in selective industrial targeting, accompanied 
by heavy investment in education and solid plan of macroeconomic management had 
led to economic growth and equitable levels of wealth distribution. (World Bank 
1993) The World Bank's East Asian miracle project (World Bank 1993) thus marked 
a dramatic turning point for developmental thinking. It signalled the acceptance by 
the IFIs of the theoretical arguments put forward by the Developmental State school 
for the success of the East Asian tiger economies. Similarly, the World Bank's (1997) 
world development report The State in a Changing World argued that the quality of a 
country's institutions are as important a factor for economic development as are sound 
economic policies and human capital. (cf Granovetter 1985, 1992; Polyani 1957) In 
this dramatic move away from its former purely free-market prescriptions the World 
Bank formally acknowledged with this report that polities such as the state, various 
other social networks of interaction and the actual act of governing are all embedded 
in a larger institutional context. Thus in real life the 'free market" is always bounded 
by sets of norms, values and mutual assumptions such that all economic process must 
be understood as socially embedded. (Granovetter, 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 
1992; Polyani 1957; Scott 1995; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990) The report argued that 
state effectiveness can be improved, in part, if the state matches its role to its 
capabilities. What the state does should thus reflect the resources available to the 
state. More importantly, however, the report also argued that states can improve their 
capabilities by reinvigorating their institutions - which meant not only the 
strengthening of administrative or technical capacity, but also the strengthening of the 
connection of the state with other societal organisations and institutions. The release 
of this report thus heralded a dramatic shift in the thinking of the World Bank away 
from the more extreme forms of neo-liberal policies characterised by the Washington 
consensus and towards a more moderate form of developmental thinking, drawing 
heavily from the state-in-society approach expounded by the developmental state 
theorists~ The World Development Report 1997 (World Bank 1997) thus 
demonstrated the World Bank's acceptance that the quality of a country's institutions, 
development of the modem state. 
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not just economic policies and human capital, determined developmental outcomes -
a view made explicit in the presentation of the post-Washington consensus in late 
1998. 
The Post-Washington Consensus 
The public acknowledgement of this move towards a new developmental policy 
paradigm known as the Post-Washington consensus signalled a decisive change in the 
way that the World Bank, and by extension the other IFls, approached the issue of 
development The Washington Consensus had advocated the use of a limited number 
of policy instruments - micro-economic stability, liberalised trade and privatisation -
in order to achieve the relatively narrow goal of economic growth. However, macro-
economic stability and long-term development require sound financial markets - and 
the Washington consensus, in its focus purely on restraining inflation and relieving 
budget deficits, could provide no more than a quick fix. The post-Washington 
consensus, by contrast, argued for a widening of the goals of development to include 
improved living standards as achieved through sustainable, equitable and democratic 
development processes. (Stiglitz 1998) The new consensus also argued for a 
concomitant widening of the policy instruments to be used in the attainment of these 
broader goals. Thus, Stiglitz argued "the key issue [in development thinking] should 
not be liberalisation or deregulation but construction of the regulatory framework that 
ensures an effective financial system." (Stiglitz 1998: 14) 
The post-Washington consensus therefore signalled a change in the thinking of the 
developmental community. It sent a clear signal that the pre-requisites believed to be 
necessary for a successful capitalist economy, and hence a successful program of 
structural adjustment, needed to be widened to include such values as trust and 
reciprocity, values which were themselves embedded in social institutions such as 
communities, networks and associations. (Granovetter 1985, 1992; North 1990; 
Polyani 1957; Putnam 1993) The true basis of SAP's, in concert with such 
sentiments, should thus not be merely the manipulation of macro-economic 
aggregates, but should instead lead to the construction of an efficient regulatory 
system which can provide the contextual framework from which human development 
21 The miracle talked about was the achievement of high levels of economic growth with equity. 
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can occur. The real significance of this document then was the realisation by 
economists, and by extension the IFIs, that governments need to govern, and that this 
can only occur if states work with the societies within which they are embedded. 
Conclusion 
According to current developmental thinking, the state requires both a degree of 
internal strength and a degree of embeddedness in societal structures in order to 
efficiently manage the process of economic development, and by extension the 
process of structural adjustment. The relationship between the state and civil society 
is thus potentially synergistic. Traditionally, state capacity has been defined in terms 
of the ability of the state to bring about political outcomes through the coercion or 
manipulation of wider society. In this respect state strength is traditionally viewed as 
existing along two key dimensions: capacity and autonomy. In general, the more 
autonomous the state the greater its latitude in setting policy goals, and the greater the 
capability of the state the easier these goals will be achieved. A high level of success 
in the ability to define and achieve political outcomes meant a strong state, whereas a 
low ability to conceive of, and then achieve political outcomes meant a weak state. In 
this approach then, state capability is defined in terms, highly reminiscent of early 
Pluralist approaches, such that lack of state autonomy would lead to the capture of the 
state by societal interests, thereby becoming little more than a vehicle for their 
interests. (Migdal 1988) Highly simplistic in its approach, this theoretical framework 
was open to critiques from a number of quarters, the most compelling of which is that 
this form of definition effectively positions the state in a zero-sum relationship with 
society wherein the existence of a strong state necessarily precluded the existence of a 
strong society. The realisation, however, that a high degree of connectivity between 
the state and wider society can actually improve the effective capacity of the state 
naturally leads to the conclusion that a high degree of social connectedness can 
actually positively enhance the strength of the state, a conclusion in direct contrast to 
the earlier 'state versus society' approaches. Similarly Hollingsworth, Schmitter and 
Streeck (1994) argue that networks and associations assume coordinating functions 
that decrease the 'load' on state officials and reduce market uncertainties. In this new 
perspective government performance can thus be perceived as much a function of 
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civic ties as it is a function of institutional design.22 (Lannour 1998: 10) Most Pacific 
Island cultures have a long tradition of gift exchange and property redistribution, ties 
of reciprocity which are at the base of the development of such civic connections. 
The cultural principles of reciprocity that undergird the developmental state in East 
Asia thus also undergird the 'traditional' social structures of Melanesia and Polynesia. 
To what extent this means that the state-in-society approach to the construction of 
developmental policy, as popularised by the developmental state theorists, is a valid 
basis for the construction of a successful developmental model for these areas is still 
to be explored. The following case studies thus provide an opportunity to explore the 
role that state-society linkages have had in the successful achievement of 
developmental objectives in the Pacific. 
22 The positive sum interpretation of state-society interactions that this approach enables can be seen as 
a way of overcoming the apparent inefficiency and weakness of states in the developing world. Indeed 
this synergistic effect has meant that in some cases weak states within the developing world have been 
able to enact some extraordinary instances of economic reform. (Dauvergne 1998; Migdal, Kohli and 
Shue 1994) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE COOK ISLANDS 
Crisis Leads to Refonn 
Comprised of fifteen islands, the Cook Islands are situated in the middle of the Pacific 
Ocean between Tonga to the west and the Society Islands to the east. Like many 
other South Pacific countries, economic development in the Cook Islands has been 
hindered by a number of factors including a lack of readily exploitable natural 
resources and geographical isolation from foreign markets. Yet despite such 
impediments to development, the economy of the Cook Islands expanded at a rate of 
about 6 percent per annum throughout the 1980s and early 1990s due, in large part, to 
good perfonnances in the tourism industry. This high rate of growth, combined with 
the high percentage of labour employed by the Public Sector and the accessibility of 
aid loans from foreign governments, meant that the popUlation of the Cook Islands 
enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Pacific Basin. Throughout this period the 
Cook Islands government under the leadership of the Cook Islands Party (CIP) 
promoted a modified fonn of Keynesian thinking, where big government was seen as 
a necessary conduit for the circulation of money throughout the economy.l In line 
with this fonn of economic thinking, large monies were invested in domestic 'think 
big' projects such as NZ$15 million on the construction of the Sir Geoffrey Henry 
Cultural Centre and NZ$20 million on the construction of a new four-star hotel, the 
Vaima'anga Resort. As early as 1991, however, regional institutions had begun to 
question the ability of the Cook Islands to maintain such large rates of capital 
expenditure and continue to manage its growing debt obligations. (Brown 1991: 68-
69; Keith-Reid 1991: 16-19) Signs were becoming apparent in the early 1990s that 
there was a growing need to both reduce the size of the public sector and to encourage 
the growth of the private sector in order to expand the country's economic base, if the 
Cook Islands wanted to continue to maintain its high domestic standard of living. 
1 In fact even after the onset of the fiscal crisis of 1996, the then Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Henry 
argued that the removal from employment of large numbers of the Cook Islands popUlation from the 
public service would not help the economy and would in fact lead to the initiation of a recessionary 
spiral due to a large sector of the Cook Islands purchasing community ceasing to spend. (Dreaver 1996: 
22) 
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(ADB 1994: 171-172; ADB 1995c) The onset of a recession in 1994 seemed to 
confirm these fears. 
The 1994 recession resulted from a number of endogenous and exogenous factors 
including, amongst other things, a drop in tourist numbers, a reduced level of 
confidence in the domestic currency following the release by the government of large 
amounts of unbacked currency, and a general drop in economic confidence following 
the Letters of Guarantee scam.2 (Crocombe and Crocombe 1996: 174; Wishart 1995) 
During 1995 the decline in revenue associated with the recession continued unabated, 
with the Cook Islands officially entering a state of recession in the second quarter of 
that year. Indeed, output continued to decline in almost all sectors throughout this 
entire period. However the reduction in revenue over this period was not matched by 
a reduction in expenditure. (see Figure 3.1) The reason for this slow decline in 
expenditure can be traced to the continued rise in salaries, wages, grants and welfare 
payments paid out by the government over this period, which amounted to 83 percent 
of total government expenditure by March 1996. (MFEM 1996: 1) Rather than 
initiating funding cuts or tax increases the Cook Islands government responded to the 
country's economic downturn by 'borrowing' funds from government-owned entities 
and government pension funds. 
2 A flow on effect of the Cook Island governments attempts to mediate the effects of the recession was 
the June 1994 reversion back to the New Zealand dollar as the sole monetary unit. An attempt by the 
Cook Islands government to relieve fiscal pressure through the release of an increasing amount of 
unbacked currency had brought the government under pressure from domestic exporters and banks -
pressure that forced this reversion back to the New Zealand dollar in order to salvage business 
confidence. 
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Figure 3 .1. (Source: Cook Islands Statistics Office) 
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The country's worsening financial situation led the Cook Islands government to seek 
advice from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in order to help resolve the 
continuing deterioration of the country's economy. A June 1995 fact finding mission 
by the ADB identified the existence of a number of key structural problems within the 
Cook Islands economy that had contributed to the deleterious effects of the 1994 
recession? As a result of extensive talks a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
was thus signed in June 1995 between the Cook Island government and the ADB 
which enabled the bank to finance a reform program of in-depth restructuring and 
capacity-building to begin in March 1996.4 However, an ADB Country Programming 
Mission in December 1995 raised concerns that, while the earlier MOU had identified 
key strategic objectives that needed to be addressed in the medium to long term, a 
pressing need remained for something to be done in the immediate future concerning 
debt and other fiscal constraints if the country's worsening economic situation was to 
be abated. 5 (ADB 1995b) Yet, before any action could be taken, the concerns of the 
latter ADB fact finding mission were confirmed when, in March 1996, it became 
apparent that the Cook Islands was facing a severe fiscal crisis, although the full 
extent of the problem was unclear at that time due to serious weaknesses in the public 
3 These problems included a crowding out of the private sector by govemmentand the existence of 
inadequate public accounting systems. 
4 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which emerged form this mission provided the 
foundation for the later Economic Reform Program (ERP). (ADB 1995a) 
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sectors bUdgeting and accounting systems. Over NZ$120 million in debt and barely 
able to maintain payments of the fortnightly public payroll, the Cook Islands 
government moved in March 1996 to resolve the immediate fiscal crisis through the 
adoption of a program of reform aimed at reducing debt levels and stabilising its 
financial operations in the short-term - with the long term goal being the total 
restructuring of the Cook Islands economy. 6 In order to help alleviate the immediate 
I 
fiscal crisis all overseas diplomatic posts, except that in Wellington, were shut down 
and funding for planned international events was reduced or cancelled. Plans were 
also introduced at that time to sell off a number of government assets in an attempt to 
reduce government non-personnel costs. These early stages of reform prompted the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Management (MFEM 1996) to issue a report in an 
effort to predict potential outcomes of a major reform program. The report envisaged 
that structural reforms would lead to an increase in subsistence food production by the 
people displaced from the cash economy by the reform program. The surplus 
production of food from this process would then enter the market, thereby acting as a 
domestic substitution for imports. The report also argued that a possible increase in 
migration levels of people from Rarotonga to the outer islands could also occur. The 
report argued, that in the short term at least, there was more than likely going to be an 
increase in the numbers of Cook Islanders migrating to New Zealand and Australia, 
although the report argued that in the medium to long term this migration effect may 
be reversed, especially in light of a growing Cook Island economy in the near future. 
Causes of the Crisis 
The main cause of the crisis appeared to be due to a chronically oversized and 
unproductive public sector which had crowded out the private sector. 7 (Wichman 
1999) There were several reasons why the Government payroll had become so large 
over the years. On the Outer Islands, for example, the public service payrolls became 
the main source of monies in the communities, but this continued resource allocation 
depended upon the granting of political favours. (Rasmussen 1999) Positions were 
5 Indeed, rising concerns over shipping caused Cook Island importers and traders to fonn an Importers 
Industry Council within the Cook Islands Chamber of Commerce in February 1996. (CIN 7/211996: 1) 
6 The arrears owed by the Cook Islands government included loan repayments, funds borrowed by the 
government from the Cook Islands Savings Bank, amounts owing to donor funded aid projects and sub-
loans diverted from sinking funds. 
7 The declining activity of Cook Islanders in the Agricultural sector over the 1980s and 1990s provided 
clear evidence of the crowding out of the Private Sector by the Public Sector. 
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thus often created to ensure electoral support. Political and family patronage can thus 
be seen as the main engine behind civil service growth in the pre-reform area. 
Similarly, various protectionist policies of earlier governments had resulted in a 
private sector which was more import-orientated than export-orientated and was 
heavily dependent upon government expenditure - both directly and indirectly -
through the consumption expenditure of people employed by the public sector. 
(MFEM 1996: 2) By 1996 the private sector was inefficient, heavily burdened by tax 
and kept afloat largely through artificial protection measures including an extensive 
framework of price controls and tariffs. The emergence of the fiscal crisis in 1996 
can also be partly traced back to a long history of fiscal mismanagement. 
Government budgetary statistics were traditionally compiled on a cash accounting 
basis and as times grew hard these accounting practices became increasingly murky. 
In order to maintain fiscal balances the government resorted at various times to less 
than transparent means of fiscal management, including: shifting transactions between 
budgeted and off-budget accounts, deferring payments to employees, creditors and 
suppliers and even spending foreign currency assets that were supposed to back the 
circulation of the domestic currency. This occurred despite the supposed existence of 
legal requirements, including parliamentary scrutiny, which were meant to safeguard 
the accounting of public funds. The breakdown of the checks and balances that 
normally govern public finances in a parliamentary democracy can be identified as a 
key reason behind the fiscal crisis in which the Cook Islands found itself in 1996. The 
inadequate state of the country's public accounting systems had allowed government 
overspending to continue long past its point of sustainability. Over the three-year 
period from 1995 to 1997 real GDP had contracted at an average general rate of about 
3 percent, yet throughout 1995 and early 1996 high levels of government spending 
had continued unabated. (See Figure 1.) The fiscal and economic crisis thus revealed 
both major structural problems in the Cook Islands economy, as well as serIOUS 
weaknesses in public financial and economic management systems 
The Reform Program 
Path to Recovery - The Reform Agenda 
Facing a severe economic and financial crisis the Cook Island government presented a 
report to bilateral and multilateral aid donors at an ADB Consultative Group Meeting 
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in Suva in early 1996 outlining a possible reform agenda focusing on: Public Sector 
Reform; improvements in financial measurement; and measures to promote Private 
Sector led economic growth. The document produced, entitled 'Path to Recovery -
The Reform Agenda', outlined the economic reform program that attainment of these 
objectives entailed. Once presented, the report occasioned wide international support 
for the reform program. (Consultative Group 1996; New Zealand Government 1996) 
Following the meeting in Suva another ADB mission visited the Cook Islands, this 
time to help prepare an action plan for the proposed bank loan. Working in 
conjunction with representatives from the ADB, the Cook Islands government 
developed a program to restructure the economy. These objectives, with the help of 
the ADB and the NZODA, were then transformed during the latter half of 1996 into 
an Economic Restructuring Program (ERP). Involving three key objectives, the ERP 
sought to radically alter the role of the government in the Cook Islands economy, in 
aiming to: 
i) achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability; 
ii) promote private sector-led growth; and 
iii) develop strategies to alleviate social hardships and minimise economic 
restructuring risks, especially for target groups. (ADB 1996a: 7) 
The loan to fund the restructuring program outlined in the ERP was to be released 
over a one year period in two tranches following the fulfilment of various conditions 
such as the maintenance of a balanced budget, the sale of assets and the introduction 
of various pieces of new legislation ensuring transparent financial management 
practices.8 (AusAID-NZODA 1997: 10) 
ERP Objectives 
The Economic Reform Program (ERP) sought to facilitate the transition of the Cook 
Islands economy from one in which the public sector was dominant, productivity was 
low and market signals were weak, to one which was led by a competitive and 
growth-orientated private sector. Importantly though, the attainment of these 
objectives were themselves nested within a concern to limit the negative social effects 
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that could arise from the reform process. Closely modelled on New Zealands 
experiences (ADB 1998) the reform process entailed a complete redefinition of the 
state's role in the economy accompanied by a concurrent transformation of the key 
decision making structures of the Cook Island state (Root 1996: 2), a commitment 
made clear in the publication of the key reform document 'Path to Recovery: The 
Reform Agenda.' 
Priority in the ERP was given to the reduction of the public service. The goal of the 
Public Sector reform program was to create a more efficient and effective Public 
Sector with clearly defined goals and objectives. The first phase of the reform 
program was thus to consist of a substantial down-sizing of the public sector, 
extensive cut-backs in non-personnel spending by government and the introduction 
and implementation of measures to restore fiscal responsibility and discipline in the 
Government's budgetary operations. The public sector downsizing was expected to. 
release much needed resources to the private sector at the same time as a policy 
environment was created that enabled private investment and encouraged 
employment creation and export-led growth. In constructing the ERP the realisation 
was made that not all sectors of the Cook Islands economy were suited to export-led 
growth. Three key sectors, were however, earmarked as having high potential to 
expand export markets enough to turn the economy around. The three sectors were: 
Agriculture; Marine Resources; and Tourism. Growth in these three sectors were thus 
included as key objectives of the reform process.9 
8 Funds from the loan were to be used to retire short term liabilities to domestic private sector creditors, 
to promote business ventures and to inject equity into the Cook Islands Development Bank. 
9 The ERP itself consisted of a matrix of 110 objectives broken down into three larger sub-groups, 
these being: Public Sector Reform; the Promotion of Private Sector Growth and the maintenance of 
Social Equity and Sustainability. These sub-groups were then further broken down into sub-goals, with 
each sub-goal comprising a number of the 110 policy objectives. For a list of these sub-goals see 
Appendix One: Cook Islands ERP Objectives. For a fuHlist of the 110 policy objectives of the ERP 
consult the Cook Islands Program completion report ADB (1998). The macroeconomic reforms were 
thus planned to involve extensive improvements in public sector fmancial management, the overhaul of 
the national tax system and the adoption of prudent debt management policies (including debt 
retirement, re-fmancing and re-negotiation policies with creditors). Similarly, the encouragement of 
private sector-led economic growth required a complete redefmition of the government's role in the 
economy, the removal of fmancial and economic practices which stood in the way of the operation of 
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The Initiation of the Reform Process 
The actual initiation of a program of stabilisation and reform pre-dated the creation of 
the ERP. In an attempt to stabilise their steadily deteriorating fiscal position the Cook 
Island government had already engaged on a number of fiscal cut-backs, some of 
which, such as the closing of the majority of the country's consulates, have already 
been noted. Thus, in March 1996, in the wake of the fiscal crisis and, in an attempt to 
further reduce fiscal pressure, the Cook Islands government announced an immediate 
temporary 15 percent pay cut across the entire public service, effective immediately. to 
While this evoked soine initial concern within the Public Service Association (PSA) 
the realisation of the extent of the fiscal crisis helped assuage the PSA's resistance to 
the reforms. The PSA was thus actually in support of the reform process right from 
the very beginning. rv aiimene 1999) In the national summit held in March 1996 the 
PSA had helped draft the 'Public Service 2000' document - a document in which it 
was agreed that it was in the best interests of the country to reduce the public service 
by over 1000 people over the next four year period. The PSAs 'Public Service 2000' 
concept entailed an orderly reduction of the public service coupled with a 
simultaneous increase in the skill level of the remaining employees. Under the ideals 
of 'Public Service 2000' the number of public servants would thus be gradually 
reduced over a four year period with those individuals phased out of the public service 
being picked up by the private sector. Thus, while the Public Service Association 
supported the governments reform program they nonetheless argued that the 
downsizing of the public sector should be accompanied by a corresponding growth in 
the private sector. 
The wider Cook Islands community was also involved in the reform process right 
from the beginning through national retreats comprising representatives from the 
government, public service, private sector and the wider community.1l Following in 
the wake of the fiscal crisis, two such national retreats were held on 4-6 March and 12 
market forces, and the creation of a stable regulatory environment that encouraged investment by the 
private sector. 
!O Down-sizing of Cabinet was aired as an alternative to the 15 percent pay cut for government 
employees by senior Cook Island Party officials but nothing ever came of this idea. (CIN 4/3/96: 1) 
Jl This involvement was widely lauded by the Donor community as a welcome initiative, both in 
mediating the adverse social impact of the reforms and in creating a high degree of ownership of the 
reform process by the Cook Islands popUlation. 
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March 1996. Specific recommendations made at the retreats were used as the basis 
for the creation of the 'Path to Recovery' document produced by the Cook Islands 
government for the Consultative Group meeting in Suva. 12 Many of the Cook Islands 
Churches also played a vocal role in the development of the reform process.13 In 
March 1996 when calls began to be heard for the Prime Minister and Cabinet to step 
down, a large number of the country's churches rallied to the government's aid. 
Organising prayer meetings, and paying for radio and newspaper advertisements 
various churches, particularly the Apostolic church, reminded people that they had 
received help from the government and now it was time for them to help the 
government. 14 Similarly, the impending bankruptcy of the government galvanised the 
Private Sector into supporting the proposed reform measures of the ERP (Root 1996: 
6) although certain elements within the private sector initially opposed the reform 
process. Those who initially opposed the reform process were those who were 
dependent upon the old pre-ERP system, however, when they realised the extent of 
the government mismanagement of the economy and the need for the enactment for 
reforms they too lent their support to the reform program. (Porter 1999) 
Legislative Reforms 
Amongst the first of the ERP reforms to be enacted was the passage of a key piece of 
legislation - the Public Service Act 1996. Passed on the 31 May 1996 the Public 
Service Act 1996 established the basis for the civil service reforms. The intent behind 
the enactment of the Act was to free senior managers from undue political 
interference. This was achieved by clearly defining in legislation the powers and 
12 The outline consisted of seven key headings, these being: 
- Reducing Government's non-personnel costs; 
- Reducing Government's personnel costs; 
- Privatisation of Government functions; 
- Mobilisation of revenue; 
- Revitalisation of the Tourism sector; 
- Revitalisation of the Agricultural sector; and the 
- Mobilisation of Marine resources. (MFEM 1996: 7-10) 
13 The period immediately before and during the reforms also witnessed the growth of membership of 
US-derived fundamentalist, evangelical churches (characterised by some commentators as a move 
towards 'quick fIx' religions). (Crocombe and Crocombe 1996: 178) 
14 The reason behind this vocal support for the government of the day can be attributed to the long 
history of collusion between the state and the churches. Church buildings would be constructed by 
government workers, with government equipment, and even sometimes with government monies. The 
unspoken price behind all of this being collusion. (Crocombe and Crocombe 1997: 224-225) By 1999, 
however, even the churches were questioning the continued rule of the Cook Islands Party with some 
church leaders vocally airing their intent to act as a social watch-dog over the conduct of the Prime 
Minister. (R. Crocombe 1999) 
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responsibilities of Heads of Ministries (HOMs), and devolving the power and 
responsibility to staff and manage their departments to the HOMs in order for them to 
achieve clearly defined outputs as agreed to in their yearly performance contracts. 
Under the auspices of the Public Service Act HOMs now sign a performance budget 
with their minister and are thus directly responsible for the budget and outputs of their 
departments. In real terms this means that the HOMS are able to draft their budgets 
based on output delivery and the resources needed, included staffing levels, to achieve 
those outputs. The Act also led to the reduction of the former 52 government 
ministries to 22 and the re-appointment of the HOMs on a competitive basis. The 
wide-scale round of redundancies was also accompanied by a merging of government 
departments in attempt to increase efficiency and limit overlap, thus formerly separate 
departments such as Immigration and Customs were merged into one new functional 
unit. Similarly, following the restructuring of the Public Service an executive review 
committee was set up to assist in the selection process for HOM's. The selection 
process was designed to be open and fair with the committee stating that if the 
government chose to ignore the recommendations of applicants forwarded to them 
and make political appointments then the committee would not take the blame for 
this. In the first round of final selections involving 12 departments, all HOM's 
selected by the Minister's were people whose names had been forwarded by the 
committee, although some of the appointed people were not on the 'preference' list 
originally put forward. In the second round of selection for the remaining three 
positions, however, some political manipulation did occur as the people appointed for 
the Departments of Justice and Education were not on the list forwarded by the 
committee for selection. (Okotai 1999) The implementation of the Act also meant a 
reduction in the role that the Public Service commission played since it no longer held 
the power of employment. However, while the Public Service Act devolved power 
away from the Public Service Commission for general hiring and firing of Public 
Servants, the commission still monitors the performance of the HOMs. The 
Commission is now primarily directed towards a more advisory role over issues of 
human resource development rather than the specific human resource management 
role that it played in the pre-reform era. 
Additionally, in June 1996 the Cook Islands government enacted the Public 
Expenditure Review Committee and Audit Act thereby establishing the Public 
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Expenditure Review Committee (PERC) and the office of the Public Expenditure 
Review Committee and Audit (PERCA). The main function of the PERC committee 
- composed of two lawyers and two accountants drawn from the Private Sector and 
appointed by the Prime Minister - was to act as a watchdog organisation ensuring 
adequate public accountability. IS Its primary function was thus to assure both 
transparency and accountability in the operations of the country's Ministers and 
HaMs. The committee has broad-ranging powers to investigate any civil servant 
dealing with public funds and make official reports to parliament and the Minister of 
Finance regarding the outcome of their investigation. Replacing the older Audit 
Office the PERCA office, while continuing to fulfil its earlier functions (as set out 
under Article 71 of the Cook Islands Constitution), has also being mandated to 
investigate charges of misappropriation of government funds. The enactment of the 
PERCA Act thus allows for an independent review of the government's financial 
administration while simultaneously strengthening public expenditure review and 
audit arrangements. 16 
The last of three key pieces of ERP-derived legislation to be enacted by the Cook 
Islands government in 1996 was the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management 
(MFEM) Act. Enacted on 26 July 1996, and closely modelled on the New Zealand 
Fiscal Responsibility Act, the MFEM Act provides legislative force to the promotion 
of fiscal responsibility in government spending in requiring government to pursue 
policies which promote revenue predicability. In presenting the budget, for example, 
the Cook Islands government must now present fiscal limits that shall apply to current 
and future financial needs. Any departure from a balanced budget must therefore be 
explained. The Act also led to the creation of the new Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Management to oversee the day-to-day running of the country's economic 
environment. The MFEM Act also introduced stringent requirements on financial and 
economic policy construction and implementation. ,Through the introduction of 
15 The PERC committee members do not hold any other public office and are independent of, though 
formally accountable to, Parliament. The committee has been operational since July 1997. 
16 The PERCA system has already proved its worth in maintaining accountability in the public sector a 
number of times already. PERCA investigations into allegations of impropriety and misuse of funds 
into two Ministries have led to the suspension of one HOM and the dismissal of another. (Parliament of 
the Cook Islands 1998, 1998b) Similarly improper accounting practises has led to the investigation by 
PERC of the operation of the Transition Service by a high level public servant. (Parliament of the Cook 
Islands 1998a) How effective PERC's powers actually are in Parliament is however a question that 
will only be answered over time, 
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standard commercial accrual accounting processes and the creation of a national 
balance sheet, the Act has thus acted to increase both accountability and transparency 
within the Cook Islands public sector. Requiring the development and publication of 
clearly defined financial policy the Act establishes a commitment to fiscal 
responsibility. Detailing the accounting practices to support this objective the Act 
requires the Cook Islands government to state what it will be involved in, how it will 
allocate its resources and what outcomes it expects to achieve. Each of these 
objectives must be made public on a rolling three-year basis. The key attribute of the 
MFEM Act is thus that it requires the Government to maintain operating expenses 
within the limits of the Government's current internal revenues until debt levels are 
reduced. Specifying in detail the process through which budgets are to be formulated 
the Act forces the Government to publish statements of its economic and fiscal 
position and future strategy in advance of budgets being drawn up. The MFEM Act 
strengthened treasury fiscal controls, mandated balanced budgets on an accrual basis 
and outlined standards for more transparent fiscal reporting. The budgetary process is 
now much more transparent, with the PERCA Act providing the legislative power to 
maintain this transparency and accountability within the public sector. 
Another aspect of the reform program which was dealt with in the first phase of the 
reform process had to do with changes in the way in which government accounts were 
dealt with. Over the period of a year from 1995 to 1996 the Public Service was 
introduced to a new, output-based budgeting system, moving away from a cash 
accounting system and towards an accrual system similar to that used in New 
Zealand. 17 The Cook Islands government adopted these new output based budgeting 
and accrual based accounting systems on July 1 1996 in tandem with the introduction 
of statutes which delegated greater budgetary responsibility and accountability to the 
HOMs through performance contracts. The introduction of this new system was thus 
heavily intertwined with the passage of the three key legislative acts enacted during 
1996. 
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Redundancies and Restructuring 
The initial tool of the restructuring process was to be the reform of the public sector 
and, as noted previously, the publicly agreed upon document 'Public Service 2000' 
set out a timetable whereby these reforms were take place. The severity of the fiscal 
crisis, however, led the government to realise that three years would be too long and 
that the cuts would have occur within a one year period. While public consultation 
had been a defining point of the reform process right from its inception, only a select 
few knew the full extent of the fiscal crisis. (Epati 1999)Thus when the Cook Islands 
government approached the PSA with plans to downsize they were met with 
resistance at first as the governments plan for downsizing entailed retrenchment at a 
greater rate than the PSA thought equitable. Once the government explained the full 
extent of the fiscal crisis to the PSA, however, they became more receptive to the 
need for restructuring and downsizing - although with the added proviso that 
measures should included in the reforms that would prevent any future politicisation 
of the public service. I8 (Root 1996: 6) In contrast to the immediate retrenchment and 
redundancies that the government had called for, however, the PSA brokered a deal 
wherein less people were made redundant immediately and government personnel 
took a 50 percent cut in pay of the period May and June 1996 on the belief that the 
extra 50 percent would be paid back later in the year when the immediate financial 
crisis was over. I9 (Vaiimene 1999) Ensuing public sector retrenchments thus 
occurred at an unprecedented pace, with years of reform condensed into a matter of 
months. The most dramatic phase of the entire reform process thus occurred over a 
period of three months in late 1996, with the majority of the job losses in the public 
service occurring within the three month period from July to November 1996. The 
downsizing of the Public Service operated within two clear domains. The retirement 
of retirees, and those people eligible for early retirement, and those people who were 
not due for early retirement. Those eligible for retirement were paid their normal 
retirement entitlements which averaged about NZ$3 500 each. Those who were not 
eligible for retirement were processed through the office of the Transition Service in 
an attempt to re-skill them such that they could efficiently transfer from the Public 
17 Additional assistance was provided by the New Zealand Audit office in the implementation of the 
necessary standards and procedures required for the introduction of an accrual accounting system. 
18 Whilst legislation such as the MFEM Act and Public Service Act were enacted towards the 
achievement of this aim, only time will tell if the civil service will once again become highly 
politicised. 
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Sector to the Private.2o Phantom workers were also removed from the payroll. 
Throughout the Cook Islands a total of 1 445 public sector jobs were lost, however, 
while Rarotonga lost 757 jobs (44.5%), the Northern Group lost 207 jobs (53.7%) and 
the Southern Group lost 480 jobs (61%). (Corydon Consultants 1997: 49) The Outer 
Islands were thus hit hardest by the reforms. (see Table 3.1) 
Cook Islands 
Rarotonga 
Aitutaki 
Mangaia 
Atiu 
Mauke 
Mitiaro 
Manihiki 
Penrhyn 
Rakahanga 
Pukapuka 
Nassau 
Palmerston 
Suwarrow 
Geographic Breakdown of Public Sector Downsizing 
(June 1996 - June 1997) 
June 1996 June 1997 Jobs Lost 
2883 1438 1445 
1699 942 757 
284 114 170 
192 76 116 
143 54 89 
144 45 69 
64 28 36 
95 46 49 
137 54 83 
45 21 24 
102 53 49 
6 4 2 
2 1 1 
... ... ... 
% Reduction 
-50 
-45 
-60 
-60 
-62 
-61 
-56 
-52 
-61 
-53 
-48 
-33 
-50 
. .. 
Table 3.1. (Source: Corydon Consultants (1997) and WIlkmson (1998)) 
Mediating the Reform 
The PSA attempted to help manage the retrenchments in a way so as to soften the 
impact of the reforms on their members, but the magnitude of the reforms meant that 
some social hardship was unavoidable. (Vaiimene 1999) A New Zealand Overseas 
Development Aid (NZODA) initiative, however, did much to mediate the social 
impact of the reforms.21 This assistance came in the form of a transition agency 
19 The deferred wages were paid back by December 1996. 
20 The transition package included: 
severance payment of up to three months' salary or wage paid in fortnightly instalments; and 
re-training courses to up-skill the participants in areas such as budgeting and small-business 
acumen. 
21 The New Zealand government provided focused development aid throughout the course of the 
reform process, although levels were kept to a minimum as a key objective of the reforms was to 
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which was set up in order to alleviate the immediate impact of the mass redundancies 
associated with the Public Sector reform program and to help facilitate the movement 
of these former Public Sector employees into the Private Sector. The NZ$7.4 million 
of funding provided by the New Zealand government specifically for this transition 
process went towards providing fmancial assistance, credit facilities, retraining, 
business advice and personal counselling for retrenched personnel - representing a 
social safety net provision for those retrenched during the reforms. As such, the 
importance of the Transition Service can not be underestimated as the support it 
provided was important to the success of the reform process. (Wilkinson 1998: 12) 
The Transition Service was set up in September 1996 and following the completion of 
the majority of its goals, it was disbanded in June the following year.22 During this 
initial period of reform lasting from about March to September 1996 ten assistant 
ministerial positions were aiso eliminated. (ADB 1999a: 29) Apart from this initial 
move, however, no political reform was undertaken at any stage of the reform, 
although later calls for the initiation of large scale political reform later became quite 
strident. 
The Initiation of the Second Phase of the Reforms 
A five point economic strategy was released by the Cook Islands Government in 
September 1996 outlining the ways in which the further goals of the ERP were to be 
achieved. The key objectives of the reform process that the strategy paper noted 
were: 
1) Public Sector Reform; 
2) Strengthening Financial and Economic Management; 
3) Stimulating Private Sector-led growth; 
4) Reforming-the Lead Sectors (Agriculture, Marine Resources and Tourism); 
and 
5) Achieving Sustainability and Equity Issues. 
reduce the economic dependency of the Cook Islands on the New Zealand government, especially in 
terms helping fund recurrent budget deficits. 
22 Continuing New Zealand Overseas Development Assistance (NZODA) has focused on management 
training for senior Civil Servants, and the creation of opportunities for continued Private Sector growth 
such as funding for the creation of a small business centre. 
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A number of these processes, such as public sector reform, were well underway by 
this stage whilst others, such as the stimulation of private sector growth, were still to 
be initiated. The second phase of the reform program that was announced in 
September 1996 thus involved, amongst other things: the sale of public assets; the 
retirement of public debt; an improvement in the policy environment to promote 
private sector-led growth in income generating sectors; and the creation of a reserve 
fund for investments in social sectors and the management of other risks. This new 
phase of reforms were intended to consolidate the progress already made by previous 
reforms by helping create an environment to promote more sustainable growth. In 
timely fashion, the initiation of the second phase of the reforms coincided with the 2 
October 1996 release of the first loan tranche of US$3 million from the ADB for the 
ERP. The achievement of the eight reforms of the second phase would then lead to 
the release ofthe second tranche of the loan in July 1997?3 
Continued Community Involvement 
The wider Cook Islands community was continually involved in the evolution of these 
reforms. In late 1996, in an attempt to institutionalise the consultative process, the 
National Development Council (NDC) was established. Comprising eleven 
community members representing the private business sector, non-government. 
organisations and churches, the creation of the NDC was a key mechanism in the 
facilitation of consultation of the reform process at the national level. 24 The NDC was 
created to review government legislation and national budgets to make sure that they 
23 The eight conditions to be fulfilled by the Cook Islands government to enable the release of the 
second tranche were: 
compliance with the Finance and Economic Management Act; 
the drafting of a Public Sector Investment Program acceptable to the ADB; 
the enactment of amendments to the Income Tax and Turnover Tax Acts; 
the enactment of the Act establishing the Development Investment Board; 
the completion of an agriculture policy and strategy statement; 
the completion of a marine resources policy and strategy statement; 
the completion of a tourism policy and strategy statement; and 
the decentralisation of a large measure of political and economic power to Vaka and 
Island Councils and where appropriate village-level bodies. 
The second tranche of US$2 million was expected to be released on 31 July 1997 but a number of 
factors meant that the loan was released slightly later on the 29 September. 
24 Comprising representatives from the churches, NGOs, the private sector, youth, women and 
traditional leaders the NDC met to consider issues and relevant legislation as well as annual budget 
appropriations to the various ministries. 
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were in line with the spirit of the reform process. Throughout the remainder of the 
reforms the NDC thus played a vocal part, mediating government expenditure and 
scrutinising government legislation. Another group which played a key part in the 
reform process was the Cook Island Chamber of Commerce (CICC). Made up of 
members of the Cook Islands private sector, the CICC lobbied government and played 
a key part in informal discussions with the public sector. Whilst initially hesitant at 
the onset of the reform process the CICC later came to publicly supported the reform 
process. (CIN 20/1111996: 1) The passage of certain key pieces of legislation and 
other non-legislative reforms to streamline the investment climate helped sway the 
CICC to supporting the reforms. In addition, public seminars were held on a weekly 
basis in 1997 by the team of international consultants attached to MFEM for the ERP. 
(CIN 23/3/1997: 3) Exploring issues such as business and capital development, the 
seminars were conducted to raise public involvement in the reform process, to raise 
public awareness of developmental issues and to help facilitate private sector 
development. 
Facilitating Private Sector Development 
During the second phase of the reform process a number of key reforms were initiated 
to facilitate the development of the private sector within the Cook Islands economy. 
One of the first to be enacted was the passage of the Development Investment Act in 
199625• The Act itself led to the creation of the Development Investment Board 
(DIB), an organisation with the express aim of promoting and facilitating investment, 
both foreign and local, in an apolitical environment. Run by a secretariat working 
under the auspices of an independent board comprising leading members of the Cook 
Islands private sector, and one state appointee, the primary function of the DIB is thus 
to encourage and promote foreign and domestic investment. A number of incentives 
are now offered by the DIB to businesses wishing to invest in the Cook Islands. 
These include exemptions on customs duties and import levies for all equipment 
needed to establish or expand a capital venture and a complete 100% depreciation 
write-off in the first year of business operation. The DIB is also active in the 
development of new markets for the export of local products, as the expansion of non-
traditional exports was seen as a necessary ingredient in creating sustainable 
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economic growth and development. (Cook Islands Government 1996: 12) Recent 
work has thus seen the DIB working with the Ministry of Agriculture in order to 
promote the development of a Pawpaw export market. (Ellis 1999) The DIB is 
designed to operate as a 'one-stop ·shop' to help foreign investors to manoeuvre 
through government regulations in a clear and transparent manner and thereby 
increase investor confidence. It has had some success in recent years, and there is a 
small but growing body of support in the local population behind its operation. 
(Wichman 1999) However, some problems are still to be dealt with and the lack of 
advancement on the production of a new Investment Code is one such cause for 
concern. Similarly, the continued existence of a list of activities reserved solely for 
indigenous businesses, including commercial ventures such as copra production, small 
retail shops, garment manufacturing for local sale and the commercial harvesting of 
pearl shell, shell fish and other reef and lagoon products goes against the principles of 
trade liberalisation espoused in the ERP matrix. Likewise, the continued reality of 
price controls on a limited range of essential commodities, principally foodstuffs, 
demonstrates that a number of ERP trade liberalisation objectives have been achieved. 
Another of the trade liberalisation goals of the ERP was the complete restructuring of 
the domestic banking and tax environment, but unlike the lack of movement on the 
topic of reserved activities and price controls, much progress has been made in this 
area. 
A key objective of the reform process was the creation of a stable environment for 
private sector growth and development26• One of the major tools to be used in 
achieving this broad objective were reforms of the local tax environment. The 
reforms were intended to reduce distortions of market signals and were designed so as 
not to drive up the cost structures of the export sector by keeping the costs of 
investment as low as possible and reducing the barriers for domestic and inwards 
foreign investment. These goals were achieved through the creation of lower 
marginal tax rates and a neutral tax treatment of all sectors. (MFEM n.d.) The tax 
regime was thus simplified from over three hundred tiers to only three, with the 
creation of a value added tax regime accompanying a three-band income tax structure 
25 However, while the Act was enacted in 1996 the DIB itself only came into operation in 1997 due to 
some initial start up problems. 
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with a 30 percent ceiling and zero deductions excluding a universal exemption of the 
first $6 000 earned by all tax payers. Similarly, the top rates for personal and 
company income taxes were also reduced in an attempt to spur further domestic and 
foreign investment within the Cook Islands. Amendments were also made to the 
Income Tax and Turnover Tax Acts in 1997 in order to broaden the tax base, reduce 
the number of taxes, reduce average income tax rates, eliminate tax on taxes, allow 
the immediate deductibility of new capital expenditure and eliminate double tax on 
dividends?7 These steps, combined with the introduction of a Value-Added Tax 
(VAT) of 12.5 per cent in July 1997, have thus acted to reorient the tax regime 
. . 
towards taxing consumption rather than income.28 The recent introduction of these 
changes, however, means that their long-term effects on economic development 
within the Cook Islands is still to be felt. The movement of the tax regime away from 
an income base and towards a consumption base should, however, help in the long 
term delivery of revenue to government coffers, providing as it does a broader and 
more consistent tax base from which to collect revenue. 
Whilst tax reform has done much to enable and facilitate increased private sector 
development within the Cook Islands, another of the originalERP objectives was the 
promotion of key sectors of the local economy. Three major areas of local industry 
that the Cook Islands government had hoped to stimulate through the reform process 
were the agriculture, marine aquaculture and tourism sectors. However, a number of 
constraints in the development of the three sectors had been identified in the ERP. A 
lack of flights is the main constraint for the Tourism industry, whereas Pearl farming, 
with its necessarily long time horizon, involves considerable capital risk. (T. 
Crocombe 1999) The key constraint for the development of the agricultural market is 
26 Access to capital for private sector investment was facilitated through the strengthening of the Cook 
Islands Development Bank (CIDB), which was merged with the Cook Islands Savings Bank. 
27 The current tax brackets are as follows: 
First US$4 182 Tax Free 
US$4 182 - US$6 970 20% 
US$6 970 - US$20 910 25% 
US$20 910 and over 30% 
28 The Value Added Tax Act 1997 provides for certain commodities and services to be either subject to 
VA T taxation at a rate of 0% or else be totally exempt from VAT payments. Included under these 
schedules are things such as resources to be used by the Rarotongan base of the University of the South 
Pacific and equipment to be used by outside donor agencies for aid guidance to the Cook Islands. The 
V A T thus covers almost all normal goods and services. The 0% rating means that while a supplier 
does not have to charge VAT on the supply they are still able to claim a deduction from all input tax 
relating to making the supply. 
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that prices of agricultural exports are prone to extreme variation - especially in the 
luxury tropical fruit market which is where the Cook Islands would be focusing. The 
problem with these constraints is that they are all primarily exogenous in origin. 
However, whilst long term policy and strategy statements were constructed for these 
three sectors in order to help resolve these exogenous constraints, additional 
endogenous barriers to the growth of these sectors still remain. One such barrier is 
the continued existence of certain tariff anomalies. Orange Juice was once produced 
on Rarotonga for export in the 1970s and tariffs were introduced to protect the 
domestic market. Orange Juice, however, has not been produced commercially 
anywhere in the Cook Islands for nearly twenty years yet the tariffs still exist and 
continue to provide a fiscal burden on domestic operations such as hotels and bars. 
(Ellis 1999) The archaic tariff system in existence today is therefore adversely 
affecting the growth of both the tourism and agricultural sectors providing as it does 
disincentives for investment. The establishment of a Tariff-Reduction Committee to 
analyse how to overcome existing anomalies has yet, however, to provide answers to 
removing such negative factors. The hurricane of 1997 also acted to set back progress 
in the marine aquaculture and agricultural sectors, although the freeing up of the 
formerly over-regulated private sector has helped in their development. However, 
progress is slow as some concerns have also recently arisen in the last year regarding 
the effect that economic development in certain sectors will have on the environment. 
One of the most well-known cases emerging from the ERP program was the proposal 
by the CIP-Ied government in early 1999 to establish a major black pearl farm in the 
Suwarrow lagoon. (Syme-Buchanan 1999: 38-39) Declared a national park by the 
Cook Islands government in the early 1980s, this decision was never given legislative 
force. Discussion of the possibilities of developing a Pearl Farming industry in the 
lagoon has thus met with resistance from both the islands population as well as 
environmental groups. Another concern of interest to environmentalists surrounds the 
issue of land tenure - an area where there is still a vital need for reform of the current 
system if the country's economic development is to be maximised. 
Traditional communal land tenure systems have long been an impediment to 
economic development within the Cook Islands. High levels of population growth, 
coupled with high levels of immigration and low levels of return migration have led to 
the fragmentation of land titles. (Crocombe 1987) This severe fragmentation has 
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made attempts to acquire land rights and leases for aspiring businesses very difficult. 
Indeed, the importance of this issue meant that a land commission was set up in late 
1995 by the government in order to investigate how the state could overcome such 
impediments to development while balancing traditional landowners concerns with 
commercial developmental needs. Reporting back in March 1996 the commission 
recommended amongst other things that: the maximum lease should be shortened 
from 60 to 30 years, that stricter requirements should be introduced on usage in order 
to retain land title, that land laws and decisions should be realigned with Maori 
custom and that steps be taken to reduce the extreme fragmentation of title that is 
. . 
occurring. However, emerging as it did, just as the full onslaught of the 1996 
financial crisis hit, the government is still to act on its recommendations. One of the 
conditions of the ERP loan, however, was that new legislation on land tenure would 
be introduced that would seek to make traditionally owned land more accessible for 
economIC development while still accommodating the legitimate concern of 
traditional land owners. In enacting this objective wide public consultation was 
undertaken through the use of Parliamentary Select Committee hearings. Computer 
hardware was then purchased with the goal being to create a comprehensive land 
ownership database so as to formalise land trust management arrangements. 
(Rasmussen 1999) While the hardware was purchased, no database has yet appeared. 
Thus, while a number of advances have been made in the facilitation of the private 
sector within the Cook Islands, some other areas, such as the clarification and reform 
of the current land tenure system, still require greater levels of commitment from the 
government. Moreover, while the government is, due to economic necessity, 
committed to the economic objectives of the ERP, it is less inclined to support reform 
within the political sphere. 
The Question of Political Reform 
In early 1997 the government of the Cook Islands funded a national retreat, 
comprising members of various societal groups to review the progress of the ERP. 
While a general consensus was reached that progress on the ERP, to that point in time, 
had been good, one particular issue was targeted for increased focus, that being the 
need for political reform to accompany the economic reform program, and the desire 
for political responsibility to be devolved to the communities inhabiting the outer 
islands. (MFEM 1997) Operating under a Westminster-style system of parliamentary 
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government, the Cook Islands' parliament consists of 25 members29 and elections are 
held every five years. At the initiation of the reform program in 1996 the ruling party, 
the Cook Islands Party, had been in continuous power for seven years.30 However, 
concerns had long been raised that 25 MPs was more than a country of less than 
twenty thousand needed, or could sustain. Thus, while there has been wide support 
for the need for the reform process there was always been a desire that the reform 
process should include the reform of Parliament and the political system in general. 
John Herrmann, director of the Rarotonga campus of the University of the South 
Pacific, has been one of the main proponents behind the call for political reform, with 
his argument that political reform in the Pacific should accompany the process of 
economic reform. (CIN 9/8/1997: 5) 
Political reform was not, however, included in the original program matrix for the 
ERP. Concerns with governance and the democratic process, however, have brought 
the need for political streamlining to the attention of the Cook Islands public. (Mellor 
1997: 22) In fact, the public sector attempted throughout 1997 to introduce a paper to 
Cabinet entitled 'Streamlining Government'. The paper suggested, amongst other 
things, a possible reduction in both the number of, and the emoluments available, for 
Ministers. The paper called for the reduction of the number of ministries to 10, the 
number of Ministers from 9 to 6 and the reduction of the total number of Members of 
Parliament from 24 to 17. In November 1997 in support of these ideals, the NDC 
began to publicly argue for the establishment of a 'Political Reform Commission' in 
order to canvass public opinion on the topic of political reform. (CIN 28/1111997: 1) 
While not much progress was made at that point in time on the problem of wider 
political reform, much progress was, however, made on the topic of devolution. 
Devolution 
One of the conditions placed upon receiving the second loan trariche was the legal 
decentralisation of a large measure of political and economic power to Vaka and 
Island Councils. Revisions were thus enacted to the Local Government Act in 1996 to 
enable the devolution of greater power to local 'Vaka' councils, with the Vaka Act 
29 With one member representing Cook Islanders living in Australia and New Zealand. 
30 At 1996 the seats in parliament were distributed amongst the Cook Islands Party (CIP), with twenty, 
the Democratic Party (DP), with three, and the Democratic Alliance Party (DAP), with two. 
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itself being passed on 27 May 1997. The main purpose of the Act was to legally 
decentralise a large measure of political and economic power to Vaka and Island 
councils and, where appropriate, to village-level bodies. The Ministry of Outer Island 
Development (MOlD) took on a role as coordinator and facilitator of the devolution 
process. Civil society (the third sector of voluntary and non-profit organisations) was 
seen as being a key factor in the devolution process, government policy envisaged that 
civil society would play an increasingly significant role in the provision of services at 
the local community level as power was devolved to the local councils. (MOlD 1997: 
8) Increased focus was thus to be placed on community development as a means to 
support individual and families, with the end objective being self-reliant communities. 
This devolution of decision-making responsibilities to the local level was seen as an 
effective method to ensure community participation and ownership of reform 
outcomes as well as eliminate to the dependency mentality that had been built up in 
the Cook Islands amongst the general populace. (ADB 1997: 3) Traditional leaders 
actively supported this devolution process, claiming that devolution would allow 
Ariki (traditional leaders) to have more say in the decision-making process. (CIN 
30/9/1998: 1) The vocal support of the Ariki for the devolution scheme once again 
highlighted the continued interaction of non-state groups in the reform process. 
Wider Cook Islands society thus played a vocal and vital role in supporting and 
helping to shape the entire reform process. This was particularly evident in the role 
that the NDC played as government watch-dog. As an example of this active role in 
the reform process, in late 1997 the NDC submitted a report to government 
recommending a reduction in the size of the projected 1998 national Budget. They 
insisted that increases should only be allowed in two of the thirty-four items on the 
Budget - fiscal audits and Outer Island development - and that more Cook Island 
government functions needed to be privatised in further efforts to remedy the 
imbalance between government revenue and expenditure. Privatisation was thus seen 
as another key aspect of the reform process. 
Privatisation 
A Cabinet sub-committee was formed in 1995 to identify agencies of the government 
that could be privatised. As a result of the report from this sub-committee, Cabinet set 
up a Privatisation Committee in 1996, in line with the objectives of the ERP, to 
oversee the privatisation of state assets. The assets to be privati sed included all four 
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national hotels, the Cook Islands Liquor Supplies Ltd and a number of government 
trading departments including the Printing Office and the Survey Department. In 
order to further this privatisation program, the Cook Islands Investment Corporation 
(CIIC) was established in 1998 through the enactment of the Cook Islands Investment 
Corporation Act. Controlled by a board of directors drawn from the private sector the 
CIIC's role included administering and managing the property and shareholding 
interests of the Cook Island government as well as facilitating the sale of government 
assets. In attempt to live up to the spirit of the ERP, the CIIIC Act 1998 provides that 
the CIIC, and therefore the government, will not be involved in trading activities 
where the private sector is willing and able to undertake those activities. 31 
Thus far, in the process of privatisation, the government liquor monopoly has been 
abolished and opened up to competition and the Rarotongan Resort Hotel, the Aitutaki 
Lagoon Resort Hotel, the Government Printing Office and the Cook Islands 
Broadcasting Corporation have all been fully privatised. In addition the Cook Islands 
electrical utility (Te Aponga Dira), the Rapae Hotal and the Vaima'anga Hotel are all 
in various phases of the privatisation process. Difficulties have arisen, however, with 
the privatisation of the Vaima'anga hotel. With construction of the hotel still only 
partially completed, unpaid land rentals has meant that landowner Pa Ariki claimed 
ownership of the partially constructed Vaima' anga Hotel and the land upon which it 
lies. Such problems led to the CIIC expressing doubts over the government's 
handling of the sale of national assets, requesting closer scrutiny be paid to the 
privatisation process. (CIN 26/5/1997: 1) Additional problems with the privatisation 
of these government assets have also highlighted generic difficulties inherent in the 
privatisation process in small countries, the most notable being that of the creation of 
natural monopolies. For example, in order to clear an existing debt on the Rarotongan 
Hotel to prepare for private sale the Cook Islands government sold off 20 percent of 
its holdings in Telecom (Cook Islands) Ltd to Telecom (New Zealand) Ltd, thereby 
increasing their holdings to 60 percent and reducing the Cook Islands government to 
the status of minority ownership. The sale of the country's sole telecommunications 
supplier has not, however, led to efficiency gains for the consumer. Prices are still 
well above international benchmarks. Part of the problem at least lies in the fact that 
31 Under private sector control, however, the CIIC had been seen by some as being just as corrupt and 
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Telecom (NZ) received majority ownership without any regulatory framework being 
put in place first. A very real problem which the Cook Islands government needs to 
address in the very near future, therefore, is the construction of clear regulatory 
frameworks in order to minimise the risks to the population of the creation of 
privately controlled natural monopolies. Questions have also been raised concerning 
the transparency of the sale of one of the formerly Government owned hotels to a 
local businessman. A PERCA report issued on the sale concluded that the 
Government could not claim that the transaction was carried out in a fully transparent 
and contestable manner. (Parliament of the Cook Islands 1998c) The Hotel was sold 
for NZ$3.25 million with the attached condition that the money does not have to be 
paid for 10 years. This sale occurred despite the fact that larger offers were made for 
the hotel title by interested foreign investors. The lack of transparency in the sale of 
the Rarotongan once again raised issues of political manipulation in the private sector 
and by extension, the problem of political reform. While the public sector had been 
thoroughly restructured, the accountability and transparency of political decisions 
remams 
dubious. 
Political Reform on the Agenda Again 
Support for the need for greater political reform at higher levels increased as the 
program of economic reform continued. As the harsh economic reality of the post-
reform environment began to emerge in the wake of massive redundancies in the 
public service, the political superstructure remained untouched. (Crocombe and 
Crocombe 1998: 192-193) Politicians' allowances had remained intact throughout the 
reform process, except for the temporary 15 percent pay cut in early 1996. The 
growing unrest at the lack of movement of the political reform front meant that in the 
middle of 1998 the country's daily newspaper, the Cook Island News, ran a series of 
articles where various models of political reform were proposed by members of the 
public. Following these articles, wide public support for greater political reform 
became increasingly vocal, with traditional leaders adding their voices to the calls for 
such reform to be undertaken. (CIN 20/8/1998: 1) The growing unrest led to the 
establishment of a commission in August 1998, at the bequest of the Cook Islands 
inefficient as any institution under the previous pre-ERP regime. 
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Parliament, to examine the effectiveness and appropriateness of the current political 
system. Delivering their report in November that year, the Commission offered a 
number of recommendations for political ,reform. The major reforms proposed 
included a reduction in both the length of term, and levels of remuneration available 
to Members of Parliament as well as a reduction in the total number of seats available 
in Parliament. (Commission of Political Review 1998) This report, however, came 
under vociferous attack in Parliament. (CIN 4112/1998: 1) Parliament strongly 
rejected the report's findings and declared votes of no confidence in two of the 
report's authors. The public reason given for the refusal of the report by Parliament 
was that too little consultation had occurred. (CIN 24/12/1998: 1) As, however, the 
commission had held extensive and wide-ranging public consultation throughout the 
drafting of the report, self-interest appears to be the real reason for the lack of political 
support for the recommendations of the report. In highlighting the continued 
existence of almost autocratic political self-interest within the Cook Islands, the 
1998/1999 budget was sent back to Parliament by the NDC for not complying with 
the governments official budget policy statement. With Crown Revenues for 1999 
being budgeted at NZ$39.1 million and Crown Expenditure being budgeted as 
NZ$42.9 million the NDC claimed that the budget was fiscally irresponsible. (CIN 
26/6/1998: 1) After debates within chambers by Parliament the budget was still 
passed anyway, with Parliament claiming that they would fix any anomalies through 
the passage of a supplementary budget - which they duly did in December 1998. The 
passing of this budget in spite of the opposition of the NDC meant, however, that by 
the end of 1998 public confidence in government dropped to a new low. (Porter 
1999) 
Conclusion 
The implementation of the Cook Islands' ERP can, in general, be termed a success. 
The majority of the objectives set out in the initial ERP matrix have either been 
achieved or significant progress has been made on their implementation. The most 
dramatic changes wrought by the reform process were witnessed in changes in the 
Public Sector. From a high of 3 153 in March 1996 the number of people on the Cook 
Islands public payroll has dropped by May 1999 to 1 319, a total drop of 58 percent. 
Service delivery, however, appears not to have been compromised by the reduction in 
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Public Service numbers. Moreover, the various legislative Acts passed by Parliament 
in 1996 have reduced political interference in the bureaucracy. Clear program 
objectives and associated practices of strict budgeting application have institutionally 
cushioned HOMs from pressure for additional spending objectives by their Minister's. 
Similarly, private sector confidence is on the increase, with a recent national survey of 
business expectation demonstrating that a high level of optimism exists within the 
domestic business community. (National Policy Division 1998) However, certain 
concerns still exist. A recently released survey showed that optimism for continued 
growth is contingent upon the government continuing to honour its commitments to 
the reform process, and the ability of the government to maintain a stable economic 
and political environment in both the immediate future and in the longer-term. 
(MFEM 1999) Additionally, a number of events over recent years, including the 
passage of a 1998-1999 budget that was not in compliance with legislative 
requirements and that relied on unspecified asset sales to fund current expenditure, the 
lack of transparency and contestability in the sale of the Rarotongan Hotel and the 
failure of Parliament to seriously consider the implementation of reforms to the 
current political system have raised lingering reservations over the continuing 
commitment of the Cook Islands government to the ongoing nature of the reform 
process. The sustainability of the reforms implemented thus far is also questionable 
to some degree. The continued existence of a still· fragile fiscal situation and the 
continued problem of access to markets - both domestic and international - are key 
problems that are still to be worked out. Similarly, the existence of a public service 
consisting of 22 Ministries and 1 319 public servants may still too great a number for 
a country with a population of less than twenty thousand. Several ministries with a 
total staff of 700-800 may appear to be a more appropriate target. (ADB 1999a: 44) 
The implementation of the new accrual based public accounting system also raises 
doubts about the capacity of the public service to effectively maintain these new 
systems. Thus, while the general prognosis for the reform process so far has been 
favourable, enough concerns exist to warrant caution over the chances for continuing 
reform success within the Cook Islands. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Background 
Situated in the South West Pacific, Papua New Guinea is endowed with a rich natural 
resource base, which includes major gold and copper deposits, large oil and natural 
gas reserves, vast expanses of agricultural land, and extensive forests and maritime 
fisheries. Yet, despite this apparently abundant wealth Papua New Guinea struggles 
to achieve sustainable economic growth, and with a Gini coefficient of 0.46 it has one 
of the highest levels of income inequality in the region. Thus the quality of life for 
the majority of the country's popUlation is no better, and in many cases worse, than 
for those living in an average low-income country, with access to public services such 
as health and education severely limited. Increasing the standard of living of the 
majority of Papua New Guinea's popUlation largely depends upon the achievement of 
successful economic development. However, the peculiar physical and social 
characteristics of Papua New Guinea present many formidable barriers to the 
achievement of this goal. 
The exploitation of Papua New Guinea's resources has been hampered by the rugged 
nature of the country's terrain, the extreme heterogeneity of the population and the 
high cost of developing modern infrastructure. Economic development has therefore 
been constrained by the difficulties of establishing transportation and communication 
between popUlation centres which are separated by rugged terrain on the mainland 
and by large distances between the islands. Moreover, the domestic market is highly 
fragmented due to the isolation of most medium and small-sized communities in 
Papua New Guinea - adding significant costs to any commercial venture as well as 
inhibiting the development of private capital. (Fairbairn 1993a: 2) There is also a 
chronic shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers. Of the 20 percent of the 
population who hold formal employment, the majority are unskilled. Development 
capital and other forms of human capital are thus in short supply, resulting in a heavy 
dependency upon external sources of skilled input and labour. (Fairbairn 1993a: 2) 
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The economy is still largely mixed subsistence based. Moreover, about 80 percent of 
the country's population of working age engages in subsistence agriculture or small-
holder cash crop production and does not form part of the country's cash economy, or 
does so only sporadically.i The majority of Papua New Guinea's highly heterogenous 
population of four million therefore still live in small villages. 2 Most of their time is 
devoted to subsistence and customary activities, although the desire for increasingly 
sophisticated material possessions, and the associated penetration of these areas by a 
cash economy, means that Papua New Guinea has been characterised recently by 
increased levels of rural-urban migration. (Connell and Lea 1993) These 
circumstances provide the foundation for a markedly dualistic economy in which a 
dynamic capital-intensive minerals sector dominates, while 85 percent of the 
population derive their livelihood from low-productivity labour-intensive agricultural 
work. Thus, while agriculture provides a subsistence livelihood for the majority of 
the population, the mining and petroleum sectors account for over 60% of the 
country's export earnings. It is this ongoing emphasis on one narrow economic 
sector which has caused many of Papua New Guinea's economic woes. 
Background to the Crisis 
The shock closure of the Panguna mine on Bougainville in 1989 caused a complete 
revaluation of the expected revenue base for the 1990 national budget, resulting in 
major budgetary reductions for the upcoming financial year.3 The loss of the revenue 
associated with the mine meant that an expected budget surplus was quickly 
transformed into a deficit. And although favourable conditions on the international 
mineral markets in the early 1990s quickly restored the government's revenue base 
and produced sufficient income to offset the loss of the mine, the fall in the ratio of 
gold derived revenue resulting from the closure of the Panguna mine meant that 
I The 1990 popUlation census showed that 39 per cent of the population over 10 was employed, at least 
partially, in the cash economy compared to 22 per cent in 1971. (UNDPIILO: Table l.7) 
2 There are over 700 distinct languages in the country. 
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goverrunent revenues became increasingly reliant on oil royalties. The rapid growth of 
the Papua New Guinea economy in the early 1990s was thus powered almost 
exclusively by a very narrow resource sector. 
The 1993 national Budget focused on an expansionary fiscal policy and reliance on 
supply side measures (especially tax reform) in order to stimulate both non-mining 
private sector investment and trade liberalisation. 4 New policies introduced during 
this period also included labour market reforms, increased expenditures on social 
service and increased support for the agricultural sector. Brought in due to the 
inability of the non-mining sector to expand and generate jobs for a rapidly expanding 
labour force (Fairbairn 1993a), the implementation of these policies was enabled by 
the revenues generated by the growth of the mining and petroleum sectors. The key 
principles of the 1993 Budget therefore included: 
1) revitalisation of the private sector (mostly to be achieved through supply-
side forms of assistance); 
2) the reordering of government expenditure to favour agriculture, health, 
education and law and order; 
3) an increase in the emphasis on sectoral diversification and broad-based 
growth (in order to reduce the heavy dependency on the mining sector); 
and 
4) a shift in emphasis from direct to indirect forms of taxation. (Fairbairn 
1993a: 16) 
The reforms introduced by this Budget were to have laid the groundwork for an 
increasingly export orientated approach in domestic industrial policy. (Fairbairn 1993: 
21). These reforms were also intended to improve the country's stock of human 
capital as they placed considerable emphasis on improving access to education. 
(Gannicot 1993) Thus, as 1993 saw real GDP grow by a staggering 16%, the 
resulting boom led to school fees being abolished, commodity prices supported and 
public service salaries increased. Personal and corporate taxes were also heavily 
3 The situation on Bougainville, while leading to the loss of the one of the country's main sources of 
revenue, also made additional inroads into the country's annual expenditure with defence spending 
rising from K40 million in 1988 to K92 million in 1991. 
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reduced over this period and wages were deregulated in an attempt to ostensibly 
stimulate employment. The boom, however, barely made an impact on 
unemployment levels, and despite an initial program of budget reduction combined 
with favourable international markets the early 1990s were still characterised by 
growing budget deficits, with the country's fiscal deficit growing over the period from 
1991 to 1993 to about 5 percent ofGDP. This serious fiscal imbalance, coupled with 
a dramatic slump in international mineral and petroleum markets in late 1993 and 
early 1994 meant, that by March 1994, rather than facing an economic miracle the 
Papua New Guinean government was in the midst of a growing fiscal crisis. 
The Crisis 
The fiscal crisis which faced the Papua New Guinea government in 1994 emerged 
from both endogenous and exogenous factors. In early 1994 international oil prices 
fell significantly below figures projected by government planners the previous year-
figures on which budget income estimates had been prepared for the 1993/94 financial 
year. Rather than seeking to finance their growing debt with an international loan the 
Papua New Guinea government chose to finance their deficit from the domestic 
banking sector. Without foreign currency backing the Papua New Guinea banking 
system inevitably drew down from the country's foreign reserves in order to finance 
the governments growing deficit. Recognising that change was needed, the 
government undertook urgent budget revisions in March 1994, releasing a revised 
mini-budget in an attempt to alleviate the country's fiscal burden. . Expenditure 
reduction measures coupled with increased export taxes on forestry products and 
revised personal income tax regulations were also undertaken in an attempt to limit 
the growing budget deficit. Yet these measures proved insufficient and the underlying 
fiscal imbalances continued to grow throughout the first three quarters of 1994. 
(AusAID 1996) The country's fiscal deficit rose to over 10 percent of GDP 
(including grants and on commitment basis), foreign exchange reserves fell from 1.8 
months of non-mining imports at the end of 1993 to only half a month by the end of 
September 1994 while domestic public debt increased to Kl.4 billion (or more than 
4 In line with Papua New Guineas accession in 1993 to full membership ofAPEC. 
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30 percent of GDP). 5 Poor economic management during 1993-94 had, therefore, led 
the country into a severe macro-economic crisis characterised by a widening fiscal 
deficit, declining reserves and ever increasing pressure on the exchange rate. 
In August 1994 a change of government saw former Finance Minister, Sir Julius 
Chan, take over the leadership of the country. The new government responded to the 
news of the growing liquidity crisis by devaluing the Kina by 12 percent in 
September. However, large outflows of foreign capital continued unabated and in 
October the Chan government abandoned the long-standing 'hard kina' policy and 
. . 
floated the currency. (PC 5/10/1994: 1) The adoption of the floating rate strengthened 
the effectiveness of the monetary policy, but major capital flight out of the country 
continued and the contractionary fiscal policy of the mini-budget began to disrupt the 
country's population with hospitals and schools having to be closed due to lack of 
funds. Thus one of the key problems resulting from the fiscal clampdown resulting 
from the crisis of 1994 was that public spending on both the country's social and 
physical infra-structure suffered a disproportionately hard decrease. (Chand 1996: 5) 
Throughout this attempt at stabilising the economy the opposition had given its full 
backing to the government, but the opposition went one step further in calling for the 
stabilisation effort to be accompanied by a sacrifices at the political level, including 
abolishing members' and Ministerial allowances and a 20 percent cut on members' 
and ministers' salaries. (PC 17/811994: 4; Kavanamur 1998) Before such drastic 
political measures could be forced upon the government, however, the Australian 
government allocated Papua New Guinea A$111 million in loans in September 1994 
to be used over the next year in response to the worsening macro-economic 
environment within Papua New Guinea.6 However, the continued deterioration of the 
country's fiscal position caused the Papua New Guinea government to once again 
approach the Australian government, the IMF and the World Bank for money to fund 
its budget shortfall. (Gupta 1995) This proposal met with public denunciation, with 
5 In June 1994 the President of the Manufacturers Council of Papua New Guinea warned the 
government of the need to address, even in the face of the growing fiscal crisis, the issue of domestic 
production outside of the natural resource sector. Papua New Guinea Manufacturers felt there was a 
growing need in the face of declining employment trends in small to medium enterprises to develop 
Papua New Guinea's manufacturing and downstream processing industries with a program embracing 
both the private and public sectors. (PC 1/6/1994: 21) 
6 Yet, despite this, by June 1995 all government funds for health, education and infrastructure projects 
had been spent. 
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the General Secretary of the Public Employees Association (PEA), Jack Kutal, 
arguing that the interests of the Bretton Woods institutions and Papua New Guinea 
were not necessarily the same. (PC 24/10/1994: 5) A strike by 18 000 teachers in 
March 1995, the first ever by public employees, also demonstrated the depth of public 
feeling against the economic hardship brought on by the government's 
mismanagement of the fiscal crisis. (Hayashida 1996: 155) 
Resistance to loans from the World Bank and the IMF emerged from a number of 
sources within wider Papua New Guinea society, with the NGOs being particularly 
vocal against the imposition of any structural adjustment program. (Brunton 1999; 
Sepoe 1999) Nonetheless, in April 1995 agreement was reached between the Papua 
New Guinea government and the Bretton Woods institutions over the establishment of 
a standby facility, and the release of an SAP loan (provided the Papua New Guinea 
government complied with 27 key conditions of an accompanying program of 
structural adjustment).7 The agreement was followed by the immediate release of the 
first US$25 million tranche of the SAP loan.8 And although the agreement between 
the government and the Bretton Woods institutions occasioned much rancour, the 
structural adjustment program did receive support from some of the country's most 
senior politicians. (Namaliu 1995) 
The Reform Program 
The structural adjustment program included objectives such as the liberalisation of 
trade and investment policies, the creation of sustainable development of the forestry 
sector, an improvement in government planning capacity and the better delivery of 
public services. The five major components of the Papua New Guinea government's 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) were thus: 
restore and maintain a stable economic environment by sharply lowering 
fiscal deficits and improving fiscal management 
7 For a complete list of these 27 conditions see Appendix Two: Papua New Guinea SAP Objectives. 
8 The World Banks SAP loan was to be provided in two tranches of US$25 million each. Release of 
the second tranche required the completion of a number of the key objectives of the SAP including 
satisfactory preparation of the 1996 budget and.an assessment of the impact of the new Organic Law on 
Provincial and Local Level Government (OLPLLG). 
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implement a series of structural reforms to enhance Papua New Guinea's 
competitiveness (by liberalising trade and investment regimes and 
privatising key government assets) and restore business confidence - thus 
bringing about a recovery in private investment 
promote sustainable, environmentally-sound natural resource development 
through implementation of effective forestry conservation and revenue 
policies 
substantially Improve public service delivery through restructuring of . 
public expenditures, significantly increase public investment, and initiate 
new non-governmental mechanisms to complement the public funds across 
regions by recognising the differences in per capita incomes and increase 
transfers to poorer provinces 
support measures to improve project and program implementation 
including emergency relief programs. (Chand and Stewart 1997: 62; 
Proctor 1996: 109-110) 
Problems were apparent, however, in the implementation of the SAP right from the 
beginning ofthe reform process. In presenting the 1995 budget the government failed 
to begin restructuring the country's agricultural sector, promising instead to review 
current arrangements with a view towards phasing out the expensive, and extensive 
commodity price support scheme. Additionally, in October 1995 the head of the 
National Forest Authority, Jean Kekedo, was sacked over allegations of not acting fast 
enough to approve legitimate logging projects and for failing to produce a new 
forestry plan. Anecdotal evidence, however, claims that Kekedo was sacked for 
refusing to endorse logging projects of interest to certain powerful national 
politicians. (Brunton 1999) The Papua New Guinea Government also refused to 
abolish its so-called 'Slush Fund' (the Electoral Development Program (EDP» and 
programs of price support as advised by the IMF and the World Bank, with the 
government arguing that the EDP and price support schemes were necessary to the 
country's social well being as they allowed money to be introduced into rural areas. 
(PC 9/1/1995: 3) In reality though, the circumstances provided by a political and 
electoral system based on patronage ties meant that politicians were loathe to modify 
systems, such as the price support scheme, which provided many rural producers, who 
also happened to be voters, with their only definite source of income. For the same 
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reason, the call under the SAP to phase out the Electoral Development Fund, which 
provided each MP with K300 000 for 'developmental' projects within their own 
electorates, also met with widespread political opposition. Elections in Papua New 
Guinea are dependent upon local and not national level issues. Parliamentary seats 
are won by mobilising parochial interests and kinship ties rather than policy concerns 
or party loyalties. Politicians are thus more dependent upon the support of 'big men' 
and their 'wantoks' than they are on parties.9 The traditional role of distribution in 
Melanesian societies therefore means that 'traditional' Western conceptions of 
corruption do not quite fit with Papua New Guinea praxis. 
In Papua New Guinea the link between politics and material gain, otherwise known as 
corruption, has been institutionalised by the Electoral Development Fund (EDF).l0 
Corruption is a major problem in Papua New Guinea, and is one of the main 
impediments to the country's economic development. The sorry state of the country's 
accounting of public finances is one of the key constraints in the battle against 
corruption. Over the years, the misuse of the country's accounting system, which 
appears to be a mixture of cash and accrual accounting systems, has contributed 
greatly to the country's problems of fiscal mismangement. 11 The apparent arbitrary 
assigning of payments received to earlier periods by some departments (when they 
should be accounted for as part of the current period) is a practice which has 
contributed to the destabilisation of the Kina. This arbitrary accounting practice and 
others like it have enabled expenditure and revenue records to continue to be 
classified incorrectly, thereby reducing any transparency in the management of public 
finances. The Public Finances (Management) Act is the main piece of legislation 
governing the management of public finances in Papua New Guinea. While the 
passing of the Public Finances (Management) Act in 1995 in line with the goals of the 
SAP should have led to the creation of a more accountable and transparent public 
service, the lack of any subsequent enforcement of its guidelines, such as requiring 
9 'Wantokism (nepotism, favouritism) is prevalent in all walks of life, and goes hand-in-hand with the 
"Ah! samting b'long gavman" attitude.' (PC 3/1111994: 10) 
. 10 The EDF is allocated to each member of the national Parliament, and is operated by them for the 
direct provision of infrastructure and services in their electorate. 
11 In a cash accounting system the concept of matching rules directs that cash receipts and payments 
that occur within a period are reported in that period. In an accrual accounting system by contrast the 
concept of matching dictates that revenues earned (but not necessarily received) in a period are 
matched with expenses incurred (yet not necessarily paid) within the period. 
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annual accounts from departmental heads, means that its value as an agent for change 
for increased accountability within the public service has been lost. Thus although 
one of the main achievements of the Public Finances (Management) Act was the 
creation of the Public Accounts Committee in order to oversee the management of 
public funds, recent years have seen this committee fade away into obscurity. Related 
to the issue of corruption and public financial management, the issue of political 
reform is also a key strategem of the SAP process. This has been most conspicuous in 
the reform of the former Provincial Government system in 1995. 
The New Organic Law (Political Reform) 
At independence the task of nation-building had to begin from a frail base in terms of 
administrative capacity and human resources. In addition to the central government, 
provincial parliamentary governments were established and given responsibility for a 
number of public services, including education, health, and local infrastructure. 12 
These provincial governments were supported by financial and staff resources from 
the centre, but a general lack of capacity combined with high levels of corruption 
meant that many did not function very efficiently. In June 1995, however, the 
enactment of the new Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government 
(OLPLLG) meant that this entire layer of government was removed. While the 19 
provinces remained in place, the five hundred salaried provincial level politicians lost 
their positions with their powers devolved both downwards to local governments and 
upwards to the national assembly. National Parliament MPs became members of 
provincial assemblies and presidents of their electorates local-level assemblies. 
Additionally, regional MPs took on the responsibilities of Governor of their respective 
provinces, while assembly members of the 267 local-level governments would also sit 
in the provincial assemblies. The creation of this new bipartisan model gave national 
MPs considerably more power over the distribution of resources within their 
electorates. Thus, while the reforms were decentralist in intent, their end result may 
be the increased centralisation of power in Waigani. The linking of local and national 
12 The initial establishment of these provincial governments had more to do with placating the 
seccessionist tendencies of the North Solomons Province, but despite this the Provincial Governments 
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level politics through the new membership requirements of the provincial assemblies 
may thus have done little for local-level development, and instead merely created a 
new opportunity for corruption and patronage-based politics. (May 1997) While the 
old pre-1995 provinces were bureaucratic, corrupt and provided little room for public 
participation they did, however, provide alternative sites of power and to some extent 
acted as a check on the excesses of the central government. (Ghai and Regan 1992) 
Indeed, some commentators have argued that successive national governments gave 
provincial governments little chance to improve, and that the politics of patronage and 
corruption that existed at the national level led to the disregard by national level 
politicians of the spirit of co-operation and consultation that underlay the original 
Organic Law. (Ghai 1997: 321) The new Organic Law could therefore be viewed as a 
vehicle that was created to ensure that funds remained with politicians at the national 
level, as the provincial governments were long seen by many national 
parliamentarians as possessing too much power and too much money. The singularly 
large vote in the national Parliament supporting the amendment underscored this 
belief (Hayashida 1996: 153) - a belief also voiced by Manus Governor, Stephen 
Pokawin, in his claim that the new Organic Law was nothing but an administrative 
extension of the national Government as powers once vested with the provinces have 
disappeared and are now vested in the national Government. 13 (PC 13/2/1998) 
The intent behind the amendment of the original Act had been to eradicate provincial 
mismanagement through the removal of administrative fragmentation and thereby 
remedy the chronic lack of accountability and coordination between provincial and 
central governments. (Larmour 1995b) Decentralisation was therefore supposed to 
increase government participation at the community level, improve service delivery 
levels and distribute funds more evenly, as the extensive system of provincial 
did help spread the country's administrative load through the administration and provision of basic 
services and resources. 
13 The establishment of the National Monitoring Authority (NMA) under section 110 of the Organic 
Law on Provincial Government and Local-Level Government does signal a commitment by the 
government of Papua New Guinea to increased accountability and transparency in the governance 
process at the local and provincial levels. Drawing its members from government agencies and wider 
civil society the NMAs major role is to monitor the implementation of government policies, especially 
as to how they pertain to sub-national levels of government in the new provincial government system. 
The NMAs mandate does not, however, extend to the monitoring of the use of state funds by elected 
officials, an oversight which effectively halves the ability of the NMA to render government spending 
fully accountable. Another key problem with which the NMA is faced is the lack of clear guidelines on 
74 
government had long placed a great strain upon the country's governance capacity. 
(May and Regan 1997; Standish 1983) The implementation of the provincial and 
local-level reforms have, however, faced serious infra-structural, financial and human 
resource constraints of their own. (Yala and Levantis 1998: 14) The distribution of 
funds to the provinces and local-level governments has been irregular at best,and the 
distribution of responsibilities between the various levels of government has been 
problematic due to a combination of ill-defined objectives and low levels of 
coordination. Thus far then, the implementation of the new organic law in 1995 
appears to have done little to alleviate the problems of low capacity and chronic lack 
of infrastructure which have long bedevilled development at the local and district 
level in Papua New Guinea. (Gupta and Ivarature 1996) One of the key problems that 
has emerged in the system is the inability of many local governments to fill their 
public sector positions. The imposition of a fixed salary structure for civil servants 
across the country may have something to do with this predicament, as many of the 
more remote provinces, with limited amenities and opportunities for advancement, 
have a very hard time attracting staff. (Aloi 1999) 
The new system also suffers from a lack of legislative and infrastructural support. 
Lack of legislative support for the reforms is characterised by the 14 'new' acts, 
referenced as 'to be enacted' in the new Organic Law, which are still outstanding. 
(Sause and Kinkin 1997) Similarly a legislative vacuum exists at the provincial and 
local levels as large numbers of laws are yet to be amended to be brought in line with 
the legislation. Inadequate infrastructure development has also meant that many 
district staff have remain confined at provincial headquarters. Yet, despite these 
problems, the transfer of former provincial level functions to lower levels of 
government has occurred at a startling rate. 14 These very real problems of inadequate 
legislative, infrastructural and administrative capacity at the local government level is 
further compounded by the fact that funding levels in the form of provincial grants 
have actually dropped in recent years (see Figure 4.1), falling 22 percent in the 1998-
1999 financial year alone. A situation made even worse by the fact that many 
how it is to be funded and resourced, a problem which could directly impact on its ability to demand 
the improvement of performances by government agencies. (Au sAID 1997) 
14 In the 1999 budget alone, unfunded transfers included village courts, fIre services, agricultural 
extension services and sections of police and regional prison administration. 
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provinces are receiving their funds late into the year, with the Eastern highlands 
Province not receiving its 1997 allocation until October of that year. 
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Figure 4.1 (Source: Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury 1999) 
Other Developments in 1995 
The second phase of the SAP was presented in late 1995 in the 1996 budget. Aimed 
at further stabilising the country's macroeconomic position it built and expanded upon 
the reforms initiated in the previous year, including the introduction of policies aimed 
at deregulating investment, removing price controls, and liberalising trade (especially 
the tariff regime). Other areas of the policy agenda which were to be deepened in 
1996 included the review and rationalisation of the public sector, including the 
financial management systems currently in use, in order to improve the efficiency of 
the public sector and to create room for the private sector in the economic arena. 
Policies were also to be introduced in order to reverse the continuing decline in the 
delivery of basic economic and social services to the majority of the population. 
Under the adjustment program, fiscal and monetary policies in 1996 were geared 
toward maintaining an overall fiscal deficit of 1 percent of GDP in order to reduce the 
country's over-reliance on commercial borrowing. Maintaining fiscal discipline was 
thus seen as the key to improving the macroeconomic environment in Papua New 
Guinea. 
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Amidst vociferous political opposition, the Electoral Development fund was also 
finally abolished in the 1996 budget. It was replaced, however, by the Rural Action 
Program, a move supported by the World Bank as it promised more stringent levels of 
accountability on spending. The overall aim of the second phase of the reforms was 
thus based upon the need to review and rationalise the public sector in order to both 
improve its efficiency as well as open up possibilities for private sector growth, 
coupled with the need for the creation of sound policy frameworks in order to reverse 
the continuing country wide decline in basic social services. In doing so the reforms 
would continue along the path set by the earlier initiatives. This process did not, 
however, get off to a good start despite all this talk of fiscal rectitude, in January 1996 
civil servants received a 10 percent pay rise, 6 percent higher than that announced in 
the budget. 
Despite a mixed year of success in the implementation of the SAP, by the end of 1995 
the country's macroeconomic environment was looking decidedly healthier. Thus, in 
spite of an overrun in recurrent expenditures, particularly on wages and salaries and 
interest payments, a small budget surplus was achieved in 1995 through a substantial 
cut in essential services and the public investment program. Economic activity was, 
however, estimated to have declined by about 5 percent in 1995 due to declining 
activity in the agricultural and industrial sectors and particularly in the mining, 
construction, and service industries. Similarly, non-mining GDP declined more than 
3 percent in 1995 because of weather-related shortfalls in log and coffee production 
and lower than expected public investment outlays. Moreover, after showing initial 
signs of improvement, performance under the adjustment program suffered another 
setback in late 1995 and early 1996. While the fiscal accounts registered a marginal 
surplus in 1995, an improvement over a target deficit of 1 percent of GDP, the low 
level of expenditures on priority areas led to a further deterioration of service delivery 
levels. 
Problems with the Loan 
In early 1996 talks between the World Bank and the Papua New Guinea government 
over the delivery of the second instalment of the SAP loan broke down oyer Forestry 
and Logging Code amendments. The World Bank argued that it would not release the 
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second tranche of the SAP loan unless evidence was presented that there had been 
progress on the reforms outlined under the initial SAP agendaY (Hayashida 1997: 
201) Matters appeared to be resolving themselves when the government agreed with 
World Bank representatives that amendments to the Forestry Act would be limited to 
technical matters only. Tensions reached boiling point in July, however, when 
parliament passed amendments to the Forestry Act altering the respective roles of the 
Minister for Forests and the Forestry Authority Board. 16 The World Bank raised 
concerns over the way in which the power to appoint members of the Forestry 
commission was vested with the forestry Minister rather than the National Forestry 
Authority itself. (PC 30/7/1996: 1) Assertions by the World Bank that the entire SAP 
loan would be cancelled, unless the amendments to the Forestry Act were repealed 
and proposed new import duties and the planned reintroduction of certain price 
controls were cancelled, were met by defiant claims of non-compliance by the Papua 
New Guinea government who argued that the World Bank was directly interfering 
with their sovereignty. (PC 1/8/1996: 1) In the end this deadlock led the World Bank 
to force a 90-day ultimatum on the Papua New Guinea government to enact legislative 
amendments in order to meet the nine outstanding conditions of the SAP. Desperate 
meetings between the Papua New Guinea Finance Minister and World Bank staff in 
Washington DC were thus carried out throughout September in order to ease tensions 
between the two organisations and, as a result of these talks, on 8 October 1996 the 
Papua New Guinea parliament finally passed the Forestry (Amendment) Bill 1996 
although four of the nine conditions still remained unfulfilled. In the end, however, 
the President of the World Bank recommended a waiver on the remaining four given 
that steps had been taken by the government towards resolving them. (Kavanmur 
1998) With the major impediment to the delivery of the second tranche of the SAP 
loan having been removed the second payment of the loan was finally released in 
early 1997. However, some of the conditions that the release of the second tranche 
called for were extremely politically sensitive. One such sensitive condition, and one 
which provoked widespread protest, was the call for nationwide land reform. 
15 The issue was not resolved until December of that year. 
16 The amendments to the act acted to undermine the independence of the National Forestry Authority 
Board and enhanced the powers of the then Minister for Forests, Andrew Baing. 
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Land Reform 
Land tenure issues in Papua New Guinea are a formidable barrier to investment. 
Existing government land policies remain contradictory and complex, and revisitation 
of land compensation many years after settlement has given rise to land disputes and 
undermined investor confidence in the security of land titles and leaseholds. Land 
disputes are endemic throughout Papua New Guinea due to both the communal nature 
of land tenure and the lack of established systems of land registration in most areas. 
The customary nature of the land tenure system means that investment is a very 
uncertain business with high levels of risk involved. (Crocombe 1968; Crocombe and 
Hide 1987) Such problems with land tenure have long been an impediment to private 
sector development. (Institute of National Affairs 1981) While official sources state 
that 97 percent of the total land area of Papua New Guinea remains in the hands of 
customary land owners, unofficial estimates place the amount of alienated land at 
closer to 1-2 percent. (Wolfers 1999, Barker 1999) One of the key objectives of the 
SAP had been the reform of the country's land registration practices, a process to be 
codified in the passage of the proposed Land Mobilisation Act. However, as has 
happened countless times before, the problems surrounding modification of land 
tenure issues in Papua New Guinea have often prompted instances of vocal protest or 
violent dispute. Thus, when university students set fire to five government vehicles in 
protest of the proposed legislation, and the law firm drafting the proposed Land 
Mobilisation Act had to cut short a fact-finding mission in Enga when protests 
became increasingly violent, an indefinite freeze was put on the legislative 
investigation by the government. I7 (Wesley-Smith 1996: 431) The timing of the land 
reform legislation, however, may have greatly contributed to its failure to gain 
popular support as it followed immediately in the wake of the reforms on Provincial 
government - itself a piece of legislation widely perceived as being railroaded 
through Parliament against the majority of public opinion. (PC 16/6/1995: 2; 
Kavanamur 1998) 
Despite certain difficulties such as those that arose from issues of land reform, a 
number of positive developments in the implementation of the SAP did emerge during 
1996. Thus, under the auspices of the 1995 SAP, the Papua New Guinea government 
79 
introduced a new forestry tax regime designed to increase forestry derived revenues as 
well as enhancing the prospects for sustainable forestry activity. While certain 
aspects of these reforms were later amended at the insistence of the World Bank:, the 
majority of the reform were retained. A substantial change was introduced on export 
taxes for round logs in order to improve rent capture, financial support to the sector 
was maintained through budget allocations to the National Forestry Authority and a 
sustainable cutting policy was introduced as was a logging code of practice with its 
associated improved enforcement of technical, environmental and conservation 
requirements. Policies were also implemented to prevent forest clearance on a large-
scale and measures were undertaken to further strengthen and maintain the integrity 
and independence of the Forest Board. While these reforms helped provide clearer 
signals for the private sector, additional factors still constrain investment 
opportunities. One of the most difficult of these factors is the problem of law and 
order. 
Law and Order 
Peace and law and order are basic necessities for sound economic development, and 
there is little doubt that the fear of crime has become a significant impediment to the 
country's economic growth. In fact law and order, or its lack, has been claimed to be 
the single biggest obstacle to private sector development in Papua New Guinea. 
(Chand and Levantis 1998; Institute of National Affairs 1994) A recent report thus 
estimated that it resulted in K300-K400 million per year of lost revenue. (Institute of 
National Affairs 1999) 
17 The Papua New Guinea government at the moment continues to register land under clan ownership 
in an attempt to avoid future land disputes, and to facilitate land sale if that is what the clan desires. 
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Figure 4.2 (Source: Budget Documents 1995-1998) 
The law and order problem is to some extent linked to the migration of dissatisfied, 
unemployed youth to urban centres in search of jobs and money, although a long 
history of endemic violence and the relevance of a wide spread cultural tradition of 
'payback' revenge violence can not be discounted. These dissatisfied youth often 
band together in large groups, and the majority of the country's criminal activity is 
carried out by these 'Raskol' gangs. These 'Raskols' often justify theIr actions 
through reference to corruption amongst those in power and their lack of 
accountability to the populace at large. (May 1998) In recognition of this escalating 
criminal problem, the Papua New Guinea government launched a major anti-crime 
initiative in 1996 and increased resources for police and security forces substantially 
(see Figure 4.2). However, despite this initiative crime rates have continued to rise 
and private sector representatives from the agricultural sector have warned that unless 
the law and order situation improves in the immediate future then its is possible that 
the entire tea and coffee producing sector could be wiped out. (Islands Business 1999: 
16) 
Other Developments in 1996 
Also in 1996, in an attempt to further refine its planning capacity, the Papua New 
Guinea government released its Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) for the 
ensuing five year period. IS Designed as a rolling five-year strategy, the MTDS acts to 
18 The country had developed an MTDS as early as 1985 but various events lead to it lapsing. 
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provide clearly defined long term priorities for government expenditure. The MTDS 
is focused on four priority areas: health, education, infrastructure and private sector 
development. In planning to develop those areas the MTDS is based on seven key 
components, these being: 
1) Adhering to, and strengthening the policies begun under the 1995 
Structural Adjustment Program; 
2) Focusing program and budget expenditures on priority areas; 19 
3) Strict application of productive and priority criteria for projects to be 
funded; 
4) Enhancing the resources available to Government; 
5) Redefining the roles and functions of government; 
6) Repositioning the private sector as the engine of economic growth; and 
7) Carrying through the provincial reforms begun in 1996. 
The MTDS thus provided discrete goals through which Papua New Guinea could 
achieve social and economic development. 20 Thus, all. in all, while 1996 had not 
been as successful as the previous year, a number of advances were made in the 
country's restructuring efforts. However, this positive trend was not to last. 
A Year of Troubles 
The problems that had emerged throughout 1996 were further compounded in 1997. 
In March of that year military Commander-in-Chief Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok 
challenged the government over their hiring of mercenaries to put an end to the 
continuing troubles on Bougainville. During the next two week period the country 
was shaken by a period of considerable civil unrest with looting and rioting occurring 
19 These priority areas are: health, education, infrastructure, private sector development, and 
governance and law and order. 
20 However, a key problem in this public planning and budgeting process in Papua New Guinea is that 
there only exists limited domestic capacity for the state to effectively implement and then monitor its 
policy plans and public investments. 
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in many parts of the country. In the wake of mounting pressure over the incident the 
then Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, and two of his leading Ministers stepped aside 
in lat~ March pending an inquiry into the role in the affair. While the Prime Minister 
was later cleared of all charges, in the July national elections Sir Julius lost his seat, 
and Bill Skate was sworn in as the new Prime Minister. The Sandline affair revealed, 
amongst other things, the continued lack of accountability and high-levels of 
corruption that permeated the country's political system. One of the worst cases 
emerging out of the Sandline incident was the revelation that the Finance Minister had 
deliberately disregarded set procedures outlined in both the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Appropriation Act in order to obtain funds to help pay the 
mercenaries. (Kavanmur 1998) Anecdotal evidence also pointed to the fact that 
officials, fearful for their jobs, had provided advice on how the Minister could best 
manoeuvre around the various· legislative and procedural blocking his way to 
accessing further public funds. (Wolfers 1999) Following in the wake of the 
Sandline affair, the 1997 general election saw 2371 candidates stand for the 109 seats 
in the national Parliament. Only 51 or 48 percent of standing MPs were re-elected.21 
The fact that 36 of the 109 elected were independents demonstrated the deep feeling 
of disenchantment felt by the electorate about the performance of political parties in 
general, and the performance of the past government in particular, in dealing with the 
country's macroeconomic and social woes. (Manning 1997: 3) Early 1997 also 
witnessed the destruction of much of the country's yearly copra and cocoa crops as 
parts of the island continent were severely damaged by tropical cyclones. The 
damage caused by the tropical storms was then compounded by the onslaught of one 
of the worst droughts in the country's history. Lasting from mid-1997 until early 
1998 the drought crippled agricultural production, caused the closure of the Ok Tedi 
and Porgera mines and left more than 250 000 people in a state of near-starvation. In 
1997 the main impact of the drought had been on smallholder and subsistence 
production as many commercial tree crops were still able to be harvested. In 1998 
this situation was reversed with levels of coffee, copra and cocoa exports falling 
dramatically (see Figure 4.3). The biggest source of contraction in GDP in 1997 was, 
however, due to the mineral sector failing to maintain its previously high levels of 
production, due mainly to the closure of the Ok Tedi and Porgera mines during the 
21 Only 40 percent of standing MPs retained their seats in the 1992 election. 
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drought. However, the drought may have been even more damaging to Papua New 
Guinea's long term economic prospects than these figures may suggest as it is 
generally considered that significant progress in terms of Papua New Guinea's 
economic development will depend upon on growth within the agricultural sector. 
(AusAID 1998: 7) The onslaught of the cyclone and drought severely disrupted the 
country's agricultural production, possibly setting back its development as a growth 
sector for many years. The drought may also have indirectly contributed to an 
increase in the importance of revenue derived from the mining and petroleum sectors, 
thus further deepening the reliance of the Papua New Guinea economy on these 
sectors. 
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Despite all these difficulties, however, certain positive events helped mitigate the 
many political and economic failures of the year. January 1997 saw the establishment 
of the Papua New Guinea chapter of Transparency International, a move supported by 
a number of groups from both civil society and the private sector, including the 
National Council of Women and the Business Council of Papua New Guinea. (PC 
23/7/1997: 7) Transparency International had three key objectives in starting a Papua 
New Guinea chapter, those being: the promotion of honesty and transparency in 
public and private dealings involving government and business; the raising of 
awareness of the presence and adverse effects of corrupt practices; and the 
development and implementation of an effective anti-corruption program aimed at 
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key players in government and business. Despite its public statement of an anti-
corruption intent, the integrity of the new Transparency International chapter was 
questioned by some senior public servants who claimed that it had strong political 
connections, and so was necessarily complicit in the wide web of corruption which 
encircled Papua New Guinea political life. (PC 25/6/1997: 6) 
1997 was therefore characterised by a lack of progress in the reform process. Groups 
within civil society, however, maintained their commitment to the reform process and 
their desire to reform their country's underlying governance structures, with groups 
such as the Business Council of Papua New Guinea calling for the abolishment of the 
Rural Development Fund, arguing that the funds would be better spent if redirected 
through the new provincial system. (PC 1/9/1997: 2) And, in one of their last actions 
of the year, the incoming government instituted a one-year freeze on employment and 
wage increases for public servants from 19 November 1997, in an desperate attempt 
to limit the potential for a fiscal blow-out. However, the continuing existence of high 
levels of corruption and the unforseeable destruction of much of the country's 
agricultural production seemed to lead, in many respects, to a step backwards for the 
country's macroeconomic environment. 
A New Year and a New Beginning? 
The severe strain placed on the country's economic and socio-political infrastructure 
in 1997 led the World Bank to support a request by the incoming government to delay 
the presentation of the national Budget until March 1998 in order to allow the 
incoming government to formulate priorities on expected reviews of civil service and 
public spending.22 (PC 4/11/1997: 2) The emergence of such severe strain had also 
led to an outburst of vocal criticism against the interventionist policies of the Skate 
administration. Business Council of Papua New Guinea President, Mel Togolo, said 
that the private sector had been worried about the number of recent Government 
decisions, and that development initiatives based on annual budget assumptions were 
not really promoting development in the country. (PC 21/1/1998: 4) In an attempt to 
22 When it fmally emerged, the 1998 budget was based on revenues of K2 411 million and expenditures 
totalling K2 500 million. The deficit of approximately 1 percent of GDP was to be funded by external 
borrowing. 
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dispel such criticisms the Government hosted a two-day national economic summit in 
February 1998 aimed at pooling ideas from public and private sector organisations 
and Non-Government Organisations to form long-term policies to restore 
development. In the wake of the summit a Consultative Implementation and 
Monitoring Council (CIMC) was created in order to make sure that the 
recommendations which had been made at the summit were actually presented to 
government. The CIMC, which is funded by AusAID through the INA, is composed 
of representatives from the government, the private sector, NGOs, churches and wider 
civil society.23 Unfortunately, in spite of a continued commitment by such groups 
within civil society to the reform process, the same could not be said of the Skate 
government. 
In the wake of the scandal surrounding the Sandline incident, which implicated the 
Finance Minister in numerous cases of manipulation of the law, the Skate 
government's breaches of statutory law requirements with regards to central bank 
financing also raised serious questions as to the true commitment of Papua New 
Guinea's governments to the rule of law. Although the Central Bank Act places 
restrictions on Central Bank finance to the government there were serious breaches of 
this restriction by various governments following its implementation. Such political 
manipulation led, in 1998, to the Central Bank exceeding its statutory limit on 
government debt and government advances, an occurrence supposedly impossible 
under the aegis of the Central Banking Act and its various amendments. However, 
despite the intent of the act, overriding control of monetary policy is still held by 
Cabinet. In a similar case, while the Industrial Development (Incentives to Pioneer 
Industries) Act was repealed by the Skate government in 1998 the government 
nonetheless granted pioneer status to three separate companies within weeks of the 
passage of the new legislation.24 Claiming that the granting of the pioneer status to 
the companies was legitimate as the new legislation would not come into effect until 
the beginning of 1999 the government nevertheless failed to observe the 60-day 
23 The INA is a privately funded think tank with strong connections to the private sector. The CIMC 
has very high level membership with Sir Mekere Morauta a former chairman and Sir Rabbie Namaliu a 
former deputy Chairman, although the CIMC is primarily a private sector lobby group. 
24 The Industrial Development (Incentives to Pioneer Industries) Act was repealed in order to stop the 
ad hoc extension of income tax incentives by Ministers to new companies. 
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public posting period required under the Act. The government, while not breaking the 
law as such, had still violated the spirit of the law. Likewise, the massive decline in 
1998 in both international forestry prices and international demand for forestry 
products following the Asian Financial Crisis led to massive pressures being brought 
to bear upon the Papua New Guinea government by private sector interests within the 
forestry sector to rescind the changes of 1996. Responding to these pressures the 
Papua New Guinea government reverted to the previous forestry tax regime. 
Reversion to the older tax regime resulted in an almost immediate increase in log 
export levels yet government revenue from this increase in log sales was negligible. 
All gains from the new tax regime had been lost due to the Papua New Guinea 
government bowing to pressure from private sector interests within the forestry sector 
to revert to the older tax regime whereas a moderate form of tax relief may have been 
a better decision. (Levantis and Livernois 1998: 67) These government moves were, 
however, met by protest from a number ofNGOs, especially Greenpeace, who argued 
that the reduction in log export taxes did nothing for the country or the environment, 
and acted only to improve the profits of log exporters and their political cronies. 
(Vulum 1999a) These events were not aberrations, however, as under the Skate 
administration many issues of public policy became increasingly orientated towards 
vested political interests. A large number of civil service and agency heads were 
replaced under the Skate government and a fair number of departments were 
downgraded, converted to statutory authorities or amalgamated, all signals of 
increased political intervention in the bureaucracy. (Yala and Levantis 1998: 13) 
Indeed, over the period from July 1997 to the end of 1999 the Papua New Guinea 
government dismissed 3 Central Bank Governors, 15 Departmental Heads and 38 
Heads of Statutory and constitutional agencies. Moreover, the negative impacts of 
such heavy-handed political intervention were compounded by a lack of progress in 
another SAP objective - that of trade liberalisation. 
Trade Liberalisation and Private Sector Development 
Through its membership of APEC the Papua New Guinea state has committed itself to 
a process that aims to eliminate all barriers to trade by 2020. Additionally, under the 
SAP, barriers to trade such as price controls were also to be removed. At the 
inception of the SAP price controls were in effect for a number of consumer goods, 
mainly food products. The 1995 SAP stated that most of these forty or so items then 
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under price control were to be deregulated by the end of 1995. By July 1999, 
however, only about one third of the items, mainly domestically produced food items, 
had had their price control removed. While there have been statements from various 
governments re-stating their intention to remove the remaining price controls, only a 
few of the remaining items, such as rice, flour and milk powder, have actually been 
rescheduled for price deregulation. (Manning 1999) The majority of items, including 
telecommunications, shipping and petroleum stevedoring, remain under price control 
and it appears that they will remain so in the near future. 
Trade liberalisation was also one of the key objectives of the 1995 SAP, yet despite 
Papua New Guinea's membership of organisations such as APEC tariff levels in 
Papua New Guinea have continued to creep up. In November 1994 the government 
raised the middle band of Papua New Guinea's single column tariff schedule to 40 
percent in an attempt to raise revenue. Import duties were also increased on special 
import items such as alcoholic beverages at the same time as government departments 
became liable for import duties at commercial rates. Additionally, in the March 1995 
budget all existing trade bans were replaced with tariffs, initially set in most cases at 
40 percent. (Wesley-Smith 1996: 430) The introduction of the 1.5 percent drought 
levy on imports announced in 1998 was just another example of this process. 
As part of the reform of indirect taxes as specified under the 1995 SAP the Papua 
New Guinea government proposed to introduce a simpler set of tariffs on imports.25 
With help from the World Bank the government thus conducted a review of the tariff 
system then in place in late 1995. After the tabling of that report in November of that 
same year the then government announced that a major reform of both the tariff and 
indirect taxation systems would occur. This commitment to reform was reconfirmed 
in the 1996 budget. A green paper on tariff reform was subsequently released in 1997 
and was followed by a further white paper in 1998. The Papua New Guinea 
government's White Paper on Tariff Reform made explicit the linkages between tariff 
reform and the commitment of the Papua New Guinea government to its continuing 
membership of APEC and the WTO. The tariff structures presented in these various 
papers then became the basis of the tariff reforms passed by Parliament in September 
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1998. The tariff reforms with their associated reduction in tariffs levels will be 
gradually introduced over an eight year period.26 Thus, while there has been 
improvement on the trade liberalisation front, the extended time period over which 
these changes are to come about effectively dilutes the original intent behind their 
dismantling. 
The Papua New Guinea government has, however, made a public commitment to 
trade liberalisation as exemplified through their continued membership of APEC. 
This public image was further reinforced by the establishment of a National 
Investment Policy in August 1998 in order to make the government's investment 
policy consistent with both the MTDS and the country's continuing commitment to 
APEC. (Peter 1999) The policy designed regulatory restrictions for investment and 
promotes greater transparency for the foreign investor. These goals were to be 
achieved through the strengthening of the IP A and the consolidation of its role as the 
co-ordinating agency for investment within Papua New Guinea?7 Yet despite such 
apparently positive steps towards attaining true trade liberalisation, in reality the 
Papua New Guinea economy actually became increasingly regulated over the 1998-
1999 period. The implementation of policies of liberalisation under the SAP were 
delayed under the Skate administration, including a two year delay in the 
implementation of the VAT and the extension of the tariff reform program from five 
years to eight. Moreover, the implementation of modified policies, such as the 
25 The introduction of a simpler tariff system is also consistent with its position as a member of APEC. 
The broad end objectives of the World Bank SAP are very similar in their nature to those of APEC. . 
26 The tariffs are now set (as of 1 July 1999) at: 
- Industry Inputs and Life Necessities 
- Intermediate Inputs 
- Finished Products 
- Luxury Items (including some agricultural products) 
0% 
30% (will drop to 15%) 
40% (will drop to 25%) 
50%+ 
There will be a 5% drop in the tariffs applied to items every two years until they reach their fmallevels. 
27 The IPA is one of three government agencies which act to coordinate private sector investment 
within Papua New Guinea. Set up in 1992, in an attempt to facilitate increased levels of foreign 
investment, the Papua New Guinea government replaced the poorly performing National Investment 
and Development Authority (NIDA) with the Investment Promotion Authority (lPA) through an act of 
Parliament. The main functions of the IPA were to facilitate all non-mining investment by certifying 
all eligible foreign investments and establishing clear regulations for the registration process thereby 
streamlining the process of foreign investment. Also established in 1992 was the Small Business 
Development Corporation (SBDC) with its primary role being the promotion of the establishment and 
development of small businesses throughout the breadth of the country. In a similar vein the Industrial 
Centres Development Corporation (lCDC) was set up by the Papua New Guinea government in 1993 to 
manage and operate industrial centres around the country. 
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introduction of a needs based tariff in 1998, may actually have done more harm than 
good in diluting or even negating the positive effects of earlier structural reforms in 
many cases. Additionally, though some positive advances were made in 1998 through 
new developments such as the enactment of a new Fisheries Management Act (which 
established an up to date legal framework for the management of the countries fishing 
resources achieving full utilisation of its fishing resources which could earn the 
country up to Kl billion per year. (Vulum 1999: 35)), much of the government's 
policy making was questionable. Indeed, in open criticism of such lack of policy 
direction, private sector representatives began to speak of their lack of confidence in 
the Government in late 1998. Expressing concern and frustration about the general 
state of the economy, private sector leaders argued that present economic conditions 
were not conducive to business growth. (pC 29/8/1998: 3) Dissatisfaction with the 
direction of government policy was also expressed by other groups within wider 
society, with one of the most vocal being the Trade Unions. 
Budget Troubles 
When the 1999 Budget was finally tabled the Budget deficit for 1998 was found to 
have grown to K187 million, close to 2.6 percent of GDP and well past the expected 
deficit of 1 percent of GDP. The reasons behind this Budget blow-out can be traced 
to a number of questionable budgeting practices conducted by the government 
throughout the previous year including the unbudgeted expenditure of substantial 
amounts through the transfer discretion of the Minister of the Treasury and the 
accompanying accumulation of a large number of arrears over the year. Forecasting 
an overall Budget deficit of K80 million the new Budget was, like its immediate 
predecessor, overly optimistic in its outlook. With its stated objective being the 
substantial redirection of government spending towards certain priority areas, this 
objective was to be achieved through across the board recurrent spending reductions 
and the utilisation of substantial offshore financing. This overly optimistic 
forecasting of government revenues including the 12 percent drop in recurrent 
expenditure forecast in the 1999 Budget was to be achieved through the retrenchment 
of 6 500-7 000 employees. However, by August 1999 only 1 181 civil servants had 
been retrenched while a further 2 693 had been. declared redundant but were still 
awaiting their redundancy payments. This undesirable situation was made worse by 
the fact that, of those 3 874 civil servants, only 574 had actually been removed form 
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the public payroll. Moreover, the ironic nature ofthe situation is made apparent when 
one realises that in spite of this retrenchment program 3 000 new employees were 
actually added to the public service payroll in 1999, a situation highlighting the 
extreme problems of coordination and integration existing within the Papua New 
Guinea state in terms of personnel and business management. Additional problems 
with the 1999 Budget also arose from the fact that tax receipts were forecast to 
increase by 11 percent, yet recent evidence shows that tax receipts for 1999 are about 
K60 million less than budgeted. In a similar vein, in order to reduce government 
expenditure, provincial governments were assigned new functions and responsibilities 
. . 
but were not granted additional funds to perform these new functions. In late 
February 1999 the government launched an initiative to privatise a number of state 
assets yet by July this had not progressed beyond the planning stage despite the fact 
th~t government expenditure in 1999 had being based upon the receipt of K65 million 
from privatisation sales. Thus, by the end of June 1999 the fiscal deficit stood at a 
massive K200 million, already K120 million over that forecast for the entire year. 
The retrenchment plan of the 1999 Budget came under almost immediate attack from 
the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Council (PNGTUC). (Paska 1999) The 
PNGTUC was specifically opposed to the plans to scrap 15 government statutory 
bodies, agencies and committees. The wide ranging nature of these planned cuts led a 
number of other unions to join with the PNGTUC, with many of them declaring 
strikes in late 1998. Thus, what began as a Communication Workers Strike in 
October over payment of their superannuation fund ended with a day's stop work 
action by the Air Traffic Controllers' Association in November and further threats of 
nation-wide strikes. (Pacific Islands Monthly 1999: 32) Public dissatisfaction was 
made most evident when a number of women's groups, representatives ofNGOs and 
many members of the general public joined forces with the trade unionists in a march 
on Parliament in November 1998. Sepoe 1999) Whilst the unions agreed to return to 
work the following month, the underlying tension remained. This tension was further 
exacerbated when the government increased the level of MPs District Support Grants 
from K300 000 to K500 000 a year in December 1998. Indeed, the rising levels of 
public dissatisfaction eventually led to the adjournment of Parliament in December 
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1998 for seven months in order to prevent the casting of a no-confidence vote28• The 
adjournment of Parliament did not, however, stem the high levels of civil unrest 
which continued to be expressed through various labour strikes and demonstrations as 
government spending on social services decreased. 
A New Beginning 
The first few months of 1999, like those at the end of 1998, were characterised by 
wide public dissatisfaction with government mismanagement and corruption, with the 
Catholic Archbishop of Port Moresby, backed by the Papua New Guinea Catholic 
Bishop's Council, publicly announcing his lack of support for the Skate government 
and calling for a change of government. (PC 114/1999: 1) Political machinations 
meant that by July 1999, the Bishop's call had been answered. With,the Skate 
government ousted, Sir Mekere Morauta took over the reins as Prime Minister. The 
new government immediately set about trying to ameliorate the damage caused in the 
first six months of 1999, and to provide some stability to the country's ailing 
macroeconomic environment. In August, in an attempt to ease fiscal pressure, a 
supplementary Budget was passed in which the new government committed itself to a 
number of objectives including focusing government expenditure on fewer priorities, 
stabilising the currency, containing inflation, removing various barriers to investment 
in order to promote private sector growth and restoring the integrity of public 
institutions. The new Budget thus committed Morauta's government to a number of 
discrete objectives including increased fiscal discipline, the de-politicisation of the 
Public Sector, the stabilisation of the currency, and the construction of a 
macroeconomic framework conducive to private sector development. 
Not all that occurred under the Skate administration in early 1999 was, however, 
necessarily detrimental to the reform process. Developments, such as the passing of 
the Privatisation Act in early 1999, were decidedly positive. This move expressed a 
renewed commitment by the Papua New Guinea government to the privatisation 
agenda though subsequent legislation may be needed to empower the Privatisation 
commission and to clarify its role. However, despite the fact that there isa long post-
28 A 1991 constitutional amendment guarantees an 18-month period before a vote of no-confidence is 
permitted. In an attempt to avoid a no-confidence vote, as their 18-month grace period came to an end, 
the Skate administration orchestrated this adjournment of Parliament. 
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independence history of a push for privatisation by both domestic and international 
interests (Trebilcock 1982, 1983), public protest against the privatisation process is 
extremely vocaL Thus a strong and competent CEO will also be needed to steer the 
commission if it is to achieve its goals and not be consigned to the 'too-hard to 
implement' category. The 1 July 1999 also witnessed the enactment of the National 
Value Added Tax Act. The introduction of the new Value Added Tax (VAT) at a flat 
rate of 10 percent was accompanied by the phasing out of the old provincial sales tax 
system. Certain goods and services, however, were exempted from the new V AT tax 
- including education services, medical services and public road transport - in an 
effort to protect certain vulnerable groups such as the rural poor from the price rises 
associated with its imposition. The introduction of the VAT has so far led to a 
number of different positive outcomes, it has broadened the tax base, provided a 
stable and reliable form of revenue for the state, and it has begun a shift away from 
taxing of income towards the taxing of consumption. 
Conclusion 
In general terms then, the implementation of the 1995 SAP has been an abysmal 
failure. The swift containment of the fiscal deficit, the redirection by the government 
of expenditure on social and economic priorities and the partial liberalisation of the 
economy, most notably in terms of the removal of price controls and the 
rationalisation of the existing tariff structure were among the few successes. 
Similarly, some good progress was also made in the rationalisation and restructuring 
of policies concerning the forestry and fisheries sectors. However, after the initial 
stabilisation of the economy the Papua New Guinea government once again became 
lax in their commitment to staying within fiscal constraints, with many of the 
improvements that had initially been gained under the 1995 SAP later being lost under 
the Skate administration. 
The SAP was originally implemented in order to restructure the country's governance 
structures in order to create a more resilient economic base. However, growth in the 
Papua New Guinea economy continues to be powered by the mineral and petroleum 
sectors, effectively masking weaknesses in other sectors such as agriculture. 
Likewise, Papua New Guinea's progress on trade liberalisation has been poor. For 
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example, it achieved none of its 14 commitments to trade liberalisation in 1997 that it 
set out in its 1996 APEC Individual Action Plan. This inaction meant that it was rated 
the worst performing APEC country in terms of furthering free trade in the region by 
2020. In addition to the failure to address these issues of an economic nature, 
problems of administrative and political governance still abound. Frequent sackings 
of departmental heads have eroded the already tenuous independence of the country's 
bureaucracy, as have constant changes in the heads of statutory bodies and the 
questionable appointment of political cronies to various public bodies. Additionally, 
the 1995 SAP has done little to improve the living standards of Papua New Guinea's 
poor. The majority of the population are still generally illiterate and have low levels 
of access to safe drinking water, health facilities or public transportation and, by the 
end of 1999, Papua New Guinea was once again facing severe macroeconomic 
problems. Foreign exchange reserves had dropped to the level of only being able to 
provide one months worth of import cover, inflation was increasing and interest rates 
were running at over 20 percent. Large unbudgeted expenditures in 1999 had placed 
increasing fiscal pressure on the government and had led to the further devaluation of 
the Kina. In 1998 the budget deficit had risen to 1.8 percent, and would have reached 
4 percent of GDP if new arrears had been included and the Central Bank had been 
paid market interest rates on the monies owed to it by the Papua New Guinea 
government. The 1999 budget under the Skate government had set a deficit of K80 
million, but overly ambitious revenue assumptions combined with drastic 
underestimation of expenditure levels had resulted in a deficit of over K200 million in 
the first half of 1999 alone. Crises such as that which occurred in 1994 acted to 
expose the weaknesses inherent in Papua New Guinea's governance structure. The 
SAP was intended to address these weaknesses, but the resurgence of macroeconomic 
problems in 1999 signal that these same structural faults have not yet been overcome. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES 
Initial Impressions 
The Cook Islands has weathered a severe financial crisis and emerged from a painful 
period of reform with a more transparent and accountable system of governance. 
Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, is in many ways no better off now then before 
the initiation of the 1995 SAP program, and in some ways, if one considers the issue 
of bureaucratic morale and capacity, Papua New Guinea is now in an even more 
precarious position. How is it then that such similar programs of reform have led to 
such different outcomes? This chapter analyses the reasons behind these disparate 
reform outcomes in respect to the information presented in the two earlier chapters. 
While some of the justification for these events can be traced to issues such as 
sectoral dominance in Papua New Guinea and small absolute size in the Cook Islands, 
the majority of the responsibility for these disparate outcomes can be traced back to 
the broader issue of interaction - interaction between both state and society and 
between various societal groups. Whereas in the Cook Islands state and society 
worked cooperatively throughout the entire period of reform, in Papua New Guinea 
state and society were often at odds over the methods to be used in the reform process 
and, in fact, even over the very nature of the reform program itself. 
Sectoral Diversification 
One of the key issues in each country's program of reform, and in fact one of the key 
ideas behind the implementation of any program of structural adju~tment, is the issue 
of sectoral diversification. Both reform plans contained explicit statements 
concerning the need to modify the sectoral characteristics of the country's economy 
through diversification and the promotion of certain 'new' sectors. However, if we 
compare breakdowns of the countries' GDP by Sector in both the pre- and post-
reform periods we find startlingly different outcomes. In the pre-reform Cook Islands 
(see Figure 5.1) public administration constituted a quarter of the country's GDP, 
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while agriculture and fishing contributed only 17 per cent. Yet by 1998 the 
contribution made by the public administration sector to GDP had dropped by over a 
fifth, and agriculture and fishing had grown to the point that it now contributed nearly 
a quarter of the country's GDP (see Figure 5.1). A comparison between the two 
figures graphically demonstrates the radical sectoral transfonnation that the refonn 
program wrought. 
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Figure 5.1 (Source: Cook Islands Government 1999) 
The comparative analysis of the breakdown of Papua New Guinea's GDP by Sector in 
both the pre- and post-refonn periods, however, presents an entirely different picture. 
Comparing the breakdowns of GDP by Sector in pre- and post-reform Papua New 
Guinea dramatically illustrates the failure of the SAP to bring about any real change 
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in the composition of the country's economy (see Figure 5.2). The minerals, mining 
and petroleum industries still contribute a quarter of Papua New Guinea's GDP, and 
while the agriculture and forestry industries have not shrunk: as a proportion of the 
country's GDP, they also, however, have not experienced appreciable levels of 
growth. 
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Figure 5.2 (Source: Department of Treasury and Planning 1999) 
Part of the reason behind Papua New Guinea's lack of success in diversifying their 
economy may be attributed to a specific form of state~society interaction termed 
sectoral resistance. 
Sectoral Resistance 
The fact that certain groups, especially those with powerful positions of political or 
economic leverage, often acquire a stake in the continued existence of inefficient 
institutions is often a prime factor behind the failure of programs of reform to achieve 
the economic diversification that they set out to accomplish. For as a strong state is 
able to redistribute income and limit access to markets, economic elites may, in their 
own interest, prefer a weak state with an inefficient economy to a strong state with an 
efficient economy. (Bowles and Gintis 1996: 309) In a similar vein, a state's capacity 
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for economic restructuring can thus depend in large part on the nature of the country's 
leading economic sector. The autonomy and capacity of the state can thus be a 
function of prior sectoral development. 
When large capital-intensive firms dominate the export sector, as in those countriys 
where the mining and forestry industries dominate, states are likely to develop 
specialised expertise and taxing capacity relating to this sector such that the state has 
little capacity to restructure or diversify the economy.l (Shafer 1990, 1994:13) The 
state then becomes locked into a certain form of development trajectory. Papua New 
Guinea is a perfect example of this form of sectoral-led developmental trajectory. 
States are weakest when sectoral characteristics facilitate collective action by leading 
sector interest groups and limit the number and strength of alternative groups with 
which the state may ally itself. Conversely states are strongest when sectoral 
characteristics limit leading sector interest groups' capacity for collective action and 
generate alternative interest groups that the state can ally itself with. Sectoral traits 
thus determine opportunities for gain and the type of risk faced. Each sedor 
generates characteristic patterns of lobbying and support which help determine the 
main paths open to the government in the re-allocation of resources and the 
reorientation of economic activity that the restructuring process involves. The 
sectorally determined domestic balance of power means, however, that the larger 
sectors are able to mobilise more support for their interests. Thus, when large capital-
intensive firms dominate the export sector, as in mining for example, states are likely 
to develop specialised expertise and taxing capacity relating only to this sector, the 
end result being that the state has little capacity to promote restructuring or 
diversification of the economy. (Shafer 1994:13) Sectoral characteristics therefore 
crucially limit the capacity of the state to restructure the economy.2 The problems 
encountered by the PNG state in attempting to restructure the country's forestry 
I In fact sectors in which a small number of large fIrms monopolise the market (oligopoly) then these 
fIrms can act collectively to make sure that the state preferentially directs resources to them over other 
sectors. (Shafer 1994: 13) 
2 Shafer argues that sectoral characteristics are a determinant of not only fIrms' preferences but also of 
their capacity for collective action. The lower the economies of scale in a sector the simpler the 
technology and skill-level used; and the lower the capital required for entry into that sector, the lower 
the capacity of the sector for collective action. For reasons not unlike those put forward by Olson 
(1982) states, however, are not just passive receptacles of sectoral lobbying. Some states develop the 
capacity to counter these sectoral preferences. State capacities are to some extent, however, still 
largely the result of earlier stages of sectoral development. 
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industry are classic cases in point. Shafer (1990, 1994) thus argues that the key to 
refonu success is the relative and absolute capacity of the state. States lacking such 
capacities will be unable to overcome opposition from business to the reform process. 
State capacity is thus, in some cases, itself partly a function of sectoral development. 
The political implications of each country's economic base are therefore an important 
determinant in considering the implementation ofprograrns of reform. In Papua New 
Guinea the characteristics of the mineral extraction and forestry sectorscontinue to 
confront any government with powerful business opposition to the restructuring of the 
economy. The role of the mining industry, both public and private, in the conflict 
over Bougainville and the more recent Sandline incident are merely contemporary 
examples of the influence that mining industry wields in Papua New Guinea. The 
absence of any such large capitalintensive finus in the Cook Islands, and the very 
different economic base that it possesses compared to Papua New Guinea mean that 
the Cook Island state is more immune to capture by sectoral interests. 
However, while the issue of sectoral resistance explains why Papua New Guinea 
failed to diversify its economy, it does not, however, explain why the Cook Islands 
were able to successfully diversify theirs. Instead, the success of the Cook Islands 
economic diversification program can be explained when analysed in tenus of a more 
general form of state-society linkages - known generally as business-state linkages. 
Business-State Linkages 
Business-state relations are particularly important to the understanding of economic 
development in the developing world. Both Alice Amsden and Peter Evans thus 
argue for the existence of diversified business groupings as an aid to the development 
of embedded autonomy. For, rather than favour particular sectors at the expense of 
others encompassing, multi-sectoral business associations are more likely to press for 
policies that promote growth throughout the broader economy. (Olson 1982: 48-53) 
Thus in her analysis of the growth of the South Korean developmental state, Alice 
Amsden (1989: 146) argued that the higher the levels of reciprocity that characterised 
state-business relations the higher the apparent speed of economic growth. Similarly, 
the multi-sectoral nature of large conglomerates means that the diversified nature of 
their holdings means that, in general, they are not strongly opposed to changing 
99 
sectoral priorities. (Leff 1978: 672-673) Additionally, encompassing associations can 
assist collaboration between government and business by resolving inter-sectoral 
disputes within themselves.3 (Fields 1997; Thorp and Durand 1997) Collective 
actions by 'business' associations in a self-regulatory manner can also act to prevent 
the collapse of business-state relations into simple rent-seeking behaviour. However, 
in the absence of these large business conglomerations the same role can be played by 
horizontal organisations such as business roundtables. These business associations, in 
general, act as a channels for the exchange of information, thereby helping to activate 
the various processes necessary for the creation of embedded autonomy. Business 
associations can also maximise the benefits of government-business relations by 
limiting the pursuit of particularist benefits through collective self-governance. As 
these business associations can reinforce reciprocity even where states are incapable 
of sanctioning business, associations can thus be crucial to the functioning of 
networks of reciprocity and embedded autonomy. This supposition was validated in 
the Cook Islands. The active participation of the ClIC throughout the entire reform 
process meant that the country's private and public sectors were able to combine 
synergistically in achieving the country's ERP's objectives. In Papua New Guinea, as 
the country's private sector were split up into a number of different sectoral camps, no 
single over-arching business association existed. However, although continued 
protest by much of the Papua New Guinea private sector in the latter period of the 
Skate administration demonstrates that these various business groups can come 
together over certain issues, their competition at other times effectively limits their 
ability to provide a united front to constrain government mismanagement. Thus, 
while these camps occasionally came together to oppose or support particular pieces 
of government legislation in general the level of liaison between the various sectors of 
the country's private sector was not very high. 
The importance of informal networks in this process should not, however, be 
overlooked, as Phillipe Schmitter's (1971) study of business associations in Brazil has 
demonstrated. There both the association members and Brazilian government 
officials regularly, in practice, ignored the associations. Similarly, in the Cook 
3 For developed world examples of this form of self-regulating behaviour see example Peter 
Katzenstein, (1984) Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics o/Change (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press). 
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Islands while the ClIC represented the public face of the country's private sector much 
of the real machinations behind the reform process occurred in informal meetings. 
(Epati 1999, Porter 1999) However, while these same informal networks operated in 
Papua New Guinea the lack of coherence at the macro-level meant that the positive 
effects of this form of interaction were dissipated. Thus while informal interactions 
definitely can act in a positive manner in the achievement of successful development 
outcomes, the absence of any institutional structure within which to operationalise 
these networks can lead to the loss of their effectiveness. Additionally, the small size 
of the Cook Islands played a positive role in the developmental process as it enabled a 
degree of trust to be fostered within both the private sector in particular, and between 
the various sections of Cook Islands society in general, which was necessarily lacking 
in the Papua New Guinea case. So while the existence of a tightly knit business 
community increased transparency in private sector-public sector interactions in the 
Cook Islands, the small absolute size of the country also played a role in its creation. 
Similarly, the small size of the Cook Islands population also played an important part 
in the success of the country's reform program. The reduction of positions in the 
Cook Islands civil service led to a massive exodus of the country's population to New 
Zealand and Australia. This decrease in population numbers actually then aided in the 
achievement of many of the ERP's objectives. The reduction in the absolute number 
of people for whom social services had to be provided for considerably reduced the 
fiscal pressure placed upon the Cook Islands state to provide social services. The 
dramatic drop in the country's population also helps provide at least a partial 
explanation for the dramatic rise in GDP/Capita experienced by the Cook Islands in 
the latter part of the reform program. (see Figure 5.3) However, while in the short-
term the dramatic population loss associated with the down-sizing of the civil service 
has had a positive impact on the success of the country's program of reform, the long 
term social and economic impact of the loss over 2 000 people in a country with a 
population of less than 20 000 is bound to be considerable. Thus, while some of the 
credit for this dramatic rise can be attributed to the country's success in implementing 
the ERP and it's associated program of structural adjustment some of the credit 
behind this phenomenon must be attributed to the ability of Cook Islanders to freely 
enter and exit New Zealand. 
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In comparison, an analysis of the change in GDP/Capita in Papua New Guinea 
presents us with a very different picture. The data provides us with a graphical 
metaphor for the entire reform process in that country. GDP/Capita rises during the 
boom years of the early 1990s and, following the crisis of the mid-1990s, slowly 
declines. (see Figure 5.4) This is in stark contrast to the data presented for the Cook 
Islands case where, as shown above, following an initial decrease in the wake of the 
financial crisis that led to the implementation of the ERP GDP/Capita again rises 
steeply following the implementation of the ERP's most austere cost-cutting 
measures. 
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Figure 5.4 (Source: Department of Treasury and Planning 1999; IMF 2000) 
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Reducing Fiscal Expenditure 
Another key factor in the success and failure of these countries' programs of reform 
was the reduction of fiscal spending. A comparative analysis of both country's 
revenue and expenditure over the period of the reforms once again presents startlingly 
different outcomes. In the Cook Islands revenue and expenditure were closely 
matched throughout the early 1990s as would be expected in a healthy stable 
economy (see Figure 5.4). Expenditure rose dramatically between the 1993/94 and 
1994/95 financial years as a direct result of the government's attempts to offset the 
effects of the recession through keynesian means. However, with the successful 
implementation of the ERP, by the 1997/98 financial year government revenue and 
expenditure were once again closely matched, even with the absolute reduction in 
levels of government revenue factored in. 
Government Revenue and Expenditure 
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Figure 5.5 (Source: Cook Islands Government 1999) 
--Revenue 
--Expenditure 
A totally different story was played out in Papua New Guinea. Government 
expenditure, even in the boom period of the early 1990s, always ran at considerably 
higher levels than government revenue (see Figure 5.5). However, while the rapid 
stabilisation of the economy following the introduction of the SAP in 1995 reduced 
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the disparity between government inflows and outflows somewhat, the stalling of the 
SAP program under the leadership of the Skate government meant that by the end of 
1998 the disparity between government revenue and expenditure had reached an all 
time high for the decade, in both absolute and relative terms. 4 
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Figure 5.6 (Source: Department of Treasury and Planning 1999) 
One of the key reasons behind the excessive levels of government expenditure 
experienced by both countries throughout this period was the high levels of recurrent 
costs resulting from the continued maintenance of a large and inefficient public 
service. However, while the Cook Islands was able to shed much of their excess civil 
4 Two notable points arise out of any analysis of Papua New Guinea's recent macroeconomic history. 
While the economy has proved relatively easy to stabilise, even in the face of extreme shocks, the same 
can not be said of attempts to implement programs of structural adjustment. Five inter-related features 
of the PNG economy help explain why stabilisation is so readily achieved. Firstly, as an economy, it is 
heavily dependent upon imports. Secondly, the population of PNG has a high propensity to consume 
out of their disposable income. Thirdly, a high proportion of government expenditure is directed at 
consumption. Fourthly, the country's mining and petroleum sectors continue to operate regardless of 
the country's macroeconomic situation. Lastly, and most importantly, Papua New Guinea has always 
been able to rapidly mobilise fmancial support form the wider international donor community. (King 
1997: 34-35) These various features mean that the manipulation of macroeconomic variables produce 
rapid results. 
While these factors mean that that the PNG economy automatically stabilises relatively quickly they 
also mean that programs of structural adjustment are difficult to maintain. The failure of structural 
reform programs within Papua New Guinea can be attributed to the operation of four inter-related 
features. Firstly, stabilisation is achieved relatively easily. Secondly, the country is characterised by a 
highly de centralised system of governance. Thirdly, the country's bureaucratic capacity is extremely 
limited. The fmal factor is the absence of an effective domestic lobby group in favour of reforms. 
(King 1997: 34-35) 
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servIce during the reform process, Papua New Guinea, due to problems of both 
coordination and capacity, was unable to achieve similar results. 
Public Sector Re-Structuring 
Along with fiscal containment, the public sector is always a prime target of structural 
reform programs, especially with regards acts of retrenchment and wage restraint, all 
of which, however, do nothing to promote public sector capacity and morale. 
Additionally, as skilled bureaucrats in developing countries are in under- not over-
supply, the implementation of stringent programs of cost-cutting and retrenGhment 
can actually lead to the paradox wherein the more comprehensive and complex the 
program of reform intended, the greater the management capacity required to 
implement it, and as the case studies demonstrated, a weak and less than capable civil 
service was a key factor in the failure of the PNG structural reform program. The 
realisation therefore needs to be made that a shift to more complex forms of budgeting 
and accountancy systems needs to be tempered and adjusted to conform to local 
resource and capacity constraints. Recent ADB and World Bank reports have 
demonstrated the existence of this particular deficiency in the implementation of the 
reform programs in both the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea. (ADB 1998) 
Thus, while it is important to learn from overseas examples, it is also vitally important 
to the success of programs of reform to consider a country's own particular 
indigenous environment. 
Resolving Political Interference and Devolving Bureaucratic Control 
In both the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea low levels of morale, resulting from 
high levels political interference within the public service have led to low 
performance outcomes. This interference was particularly marked in Papua New 
Guinea with political influence extending throughout the entire public service. It is 
thus quite normal in Papua New Guinea for Ministers to directly influence the 
dispersion of funds by the Departments (Pentanu 1995: 9) and for Ministers to hire 
and fire their departmental heads as the mood takes them. In Papua New Guinea the 
instability resulting from this continued political interference had a particularly 
deleterious effect on the ability of the country to implement its SAP objectives. In the 
Cook Islands, however, while political interference in the bureaucracy still exists, the 
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existence of the MFEM Act made this interference much more visible. This increased 
transparency therefore meant that informal checks and balances, such as public 
discussion and shaming, were now able to operate as a means of regulating the 
performance of government. The reforms in the Cook Islands have thus meant that 
whereas previously there was responsibility without accountability the new 
transparency of government means that now responsibility is necessarily coupled with 
accountability. A positive spin-off of this increased transparency is that the Cook 
Islands public service is now more meritocratic in nature. However, the necessarily 
small size of the civil service means that 'bottle-necks' still exist within the public 
sector. These 'bottle-necks' reduce the chances for promotion and thereby reduce the 
incentives for public servants to work hard in their jobs. Similarly, the devolution of 
control of the various departments to their HOMs has also led to a reduction in 
previously high feelings of esprit-de-corps within the Cook Islands public service, the 
long term effects of which on Weberian norms within the civil service remain to be 
seen. For while the broadening of the discretionary powers of managers was the main 
reason behind the success of New Zealands reform, the same process in the loosely 
controlled governance environment typical of most developing countries has in many 
cases only added to their already serious lack of accountability. The transferal of total 
fmancial control to bureaucrats could lead to bureaucrats building empires and 
undertaking rent-seeking activity, in precisely the same manner that corrupt 
politicians had once undertaken the same forms of activity. Anecdotal evidence 
concerning the devolution of power to local levels of government under the new 
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government in Papua New Guinea 
already points to the emergence ofthis form of activity. (Aloi 1999) In a similar vein, 
the use of performance agreements between governments and senior civil servants in 
developing countries can also act to displace these same Weberian public service 
ethics of trust and responsibility that are already scarce on the ground in much of the 
developing world. 
Reductions in public expenditures inevitably focus on the reduction of public service 
costs including salary costs. Problems arise, however, as a general goal of structural 
reform processes is the strengthening of policy management capacity. Reforms 
designed to improve this capacity have therefore generally included improved pay 
packages designed to attract and retain the 'best' professional civil servants. In 
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attempt to manage this problem the PNG government began usmg contractual 
arrangements for senior civil servants, but the process itself has been fraught with 
problems. The use of this contractual approach can unfortunately lead to the 
weakening of the already tenuous professionalism of the public service m the 
developing world. In Papua New Guinea many of the contracts between the state and 
senior public servants were negotiated outside of processes of the Public Service 
commission or the Department of Personnel Management and while they are all 
supposedly performance based this does not appear to be readily apparent. 
Remuneration of the contracts is extraordinarily high and stringent buyout clauses 
provide high levels of security to the appointees regardless of their performance 
standard. (Aloi 1999) Additionally, this movement towards high-level remuneration 
contracts for senior civil servants ran completely contrary to the Papua New Guinea 
Government's SAP inspired policy stance, since the floating of the Kina in 1994, of 
containment of public sector wages. Real wages of civil servants as a general group 
had thus fallen dramatically in the last six years at the same time as the placement of 
department and agency heads under contract has led to increases in the salary levels 
that these senior civil servants are receiving.5 Knowledge of the favourable salary 
rates that their departmental heads are receiving has thus led to the growth of a certain 
feeling of discontent amongst those lower level civil servants who see their pay 
steadily decreasing in real terms. (Aloi 1999; Hoot 1999) The high levels of 
remuneration available to high level civil servants thus acted to exacerbate already 
low feelings of morale within the general Papua New Guinea civil service brought 
about by the general policy of wage containment. This feeling of discontent has thus 
added to the general low feeling of morale currently present within the PNG public 
servIce. 
Taking the Endogenous Social Context Seriously 
The Public Sector reforms in Papua New Guinea and the Cook Islands were in large 
part based upon similar reforms carried out in New Zealand in the 1980s. These 
reform prescriptions were based on the premise that constraints and barriers to better 
5 Some of the remuneration packages that these departmental and agency heads are receiving are as 
high as K500 OOO-K600 000, levels which are comparable, even with unfavourable exchange rates, to 
their counterparts in OEeD countries. Knowledge of these extremely high salary rates has led to a 
certain feeling of discontent amongst lower level civil servants who see their pay steadily decreasing in 
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perfonnance were primarily systemic and the removal of these systemic constraints 
would allow for greater accountability and transparency in the operation of the public 
sector. However, many of the New Zealand refonns worked in New Zealand because 
the institutional mechanisms to mediate and support them were already in place. The 
Cook Islands' close links with New Zealand in both the colonial and post-colonial 
periods has subsequently meant that, relatively speaking, their civil service's 
institutional structure was initially closer to the New Zealand model than Papua New 
Guinea's. However, this systemic explanation alone is inadequate to explain the 
abysmal failure of Papua New Guinea's refonn program and the relative success of 
the Cook Islands' program. Thus, in analysing the Cook Islands' refonn process, even 
the ADB concluded that: 
models from developed countries are unlikely to be appropriate to island economies, so that 
their suitability needs to be investigated thoroughly, with special attention paid to domestic 
administrative capacity. (ADB 1999a: 49) 
Continuing on the general theme of public sector refonn, the general statement that 
public service capacity can be extended through strengthening of particular 
institutions so as to provide those institutions with the means whereby the resources 
available can be marshaled and sustained effectively to efficiently perform planning, 
policy fonnulation and implementation of tasks on any topic would appear none too 
contentious to the majority of those who create these programs of refonn. However, 
the general statement that the Public Service in any country functions in a specific 
economic and political context would appear to be much more contentious, as this 
simple fact appears to have been lost on the majority of 'experts' sent to help Pacific 
Island countries achieve Public Service refonn. This 'massive' oversight has led to 
the wasting of large amounts of time and money through experimentation with 
various administrative models which simply were doomed to fail in these Pacific 
countries' particular socio-political contexts. The simple realisation thus needs to be 
made that the context within which Pacific bureaucracies operate is very different 
from that in which the bureaucracies of the OECD operate. For while an independent 
bureaucracy is generally seen as a necessary prerequisite for successful refonns in the 
real terms. This feeling of discontent has added to the general low feeling of morale present within the 
PNG public service. 
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'good governance' mode, Weberian bureaucratic norms of impersonality may be 
regarded as 'ethically suspect' in societies and cultures where people are expected to 
help their friends and kin. (Larmour 1996: 4) In a similar vein Farrugia (1993) has 
argued that the social environment in many small island states mean that their senior 
civil servants are often required to act in multi-functional roles. The small size of the 
bureaucracies in these countries thus leads, so Farrugia (1993: 221) argues, to "the 
formulation of a particular social ecology composed of a closely knit, integrated but 
open community with highly personalised relationships." The existence of these 
communities, with their associated personalisation of the policy process thus 
inexorably leads to problems in the implementation of policy and to the apparent lack 
of professionalism or attendance to Weberian norms of bureaucratic conduct typical 
of small developing country bureaucracies. Communities, however, also played a 
major role in the success of the reforms in the Cook Islands, and in moderating the 
social upheaval caused by the reform process in Papua New Guinea. 
Moderating Mechanisms 
Two key mechanisms mediated the social upheaval caused by the reform process in 
the Cook Islands, the cultural institution of extended families and the fact of New 
Zealand citizenship. The existence of migration to New Zealand as an exit option of 
last resort did much to mitigate any strong adverse reaction to the reform program. 
Additionally, however, the special relationship that the Cook Islands hold with New 
Zealand was also a key factor in the success of the reform program. Cook Islanders 
are all automatically dual citizens of New Zealand and the Cook Islands. The 
economic and social benefits of this link are enormous. The ability to move freely 
between countries provides a natural safety valve to economic shocks. Economic 
benefits also accrue due to the fact that the New Zealand dollar is the Cook Islands' 
local currency, monetary stability is thus ensured despite fiscal instability. 6 
Throughout the Cook Islands much of the pressure of the social and economic 
pressure of the reform process was taken up by another moderating mechanism -the 
country's extended families. During the program of reform when members of an 
extended family lost jobs other members of the extended family who were still in paid 
6 A Monetary Board has been in existence since 1977. Among its responsibilities was the supervision 
of fmancial and banking services within the Cook Islands. Following the spirit of the reform process 
this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management. 
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employment helped care for those others of the family in positions of need. These 
social networks thus, through the operation of a form of the 'moral economy' 
popularised by the Political Scientist James C. Scott (1976), buffered the impact of 
the reform program through the operation of mechanisms of reciprocity and trust. A 
moral economy is one in which a subsistence ethos guarantees at least minimal levels 
of provisioning to all households. Concerned more with survival than with profit, 
individuals and groups within a 'moral economy' operate according to a 'safety-first 
principle', as for many ofthose throughout the developing world who live close to the 
subsistence level there is "little scope for the profit maximising calculus of neo-
classical economics." (Scott 1976: 4) Knowing that help from neighbours is likely to 
be needed at any time, even very poor peasants are thus willing to share their meagre 
resources with others when needed - a type of behaviour reinforced through socially 
institutionalised combination of social sanctions and 'norms of reciprocity'. Thus, 
under a 'moral economy' even apparently irrational non-profit maximising patterns of 
action are maintained, reinforced as they are by diffuse social norms of reciprocity 
and sanction. The existence of a 'moral economy' in the Cook Islands was thus one 
of the major reasons behind the success of that country's program of reform. In 
Papua New Guinea a similar form of 'moral economy' also functioned across the 
country to moderate the adverse affects of the reform process. Here the 'wantok' 
system prevented those thrown out of work from needlessly going without. For while 
the Melanesian 'wantok' system can act to constrain the reform process, making as it 
does demands on politicians and public servants that conflict with their formal roles it 
can also, however, provide a useful social institution for those. retrenched under a 
reform program. (ADB 1999a: 173) Cash incomes in poor households across Papua 
New Guinea are thus often supplemented by contributions by 'wantoks.' (McGavin 
1993: 71) 
Conclusion 
There were thus a number of reasons behind the success of the Cook Islands program 
of reform and the failure of the program of reform undertaken in Papua New Guinea. 
From problems of sectoral resistance to the advantages of small size the reasons 
behind these differing developmental outcomes were many. A single thread, 
however, can be traced weaving throughout these various explanations. Binding them 
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together it brought a sense of coherency to these disparate social outcomes. This 
binding principle was the operation of multiple variants of state-society forms of 
interaction. In the case of the Cook Islands state and society worked together 
throughout the course of the reform program. While disagreements did exist over 
certain policies, the overriding theme behind the Cook Islands ERP was one of 
consensus and mutual agreement. In Papua New Guinea, however, state and society 
were in almost constant disagreement throughout the entire reform process over the 
both the policies to be undertaken in implementing the reform and the very need for 
reform program itself. The forms of state-society linkages necessary for the 
successful functioning of the developmental state state-in-society paradigm was thus 
absent throughout the entire implementation of the Papua New Guinea SAP. Without 
these linkages to act to create an enabling environment for the functioning of the 
mechanisms of embededness and complementarity that characterise the success of the 
developmental states - a form of linkage present within the Cook Islands but sadly 
lacking in Papua New Guinea - the developmental successes of the East Asian 
developmental states were unable to be duplicated. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PACIFIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 
Reflections on State and Society in the Pacific 
As things now stand, the developmental state model thus appears most suited to 
countries with a relatively homogenous social makeup. The countries of Polynesia, 
and to a lesser extent, Micronesia, thus appear to all be prime candidates for its 
implementation. The heterogeneous character of Melanesia, however, would appear 
to preclude the usefulness of the current developmental state model as an instrument 
for developmental success in these countries. However, this is not to preclude its 
usefulness as a developmental model in Melanesia if it is suitably modified. As the 
previous chapters have shown, the realisation has now been made within the 
development community that, for better or worse, markets are always embedded 
within a social matrix where formal organisations and bureaucratic hierarchies are 
inextricably interlaced with informal networks and cultural understandings. There has 
thus been a recent resurgence of interest in the notion of civil society and its potential 
for improving both political and economic governance. (Cohen and Arato 1992; Hirst 
1994; Putnam 1993) Studies in sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific have shown that 
improvements in non-state capacity can improve state capacity if the reforms reduced 
reliance on state services or resources, or created community organisations capable of 
carrying out some state functions. (Bratton 1989; Taafaki and Oh 1995; Owusu 1997) 
Recent years have thus been witness to the re-emergence of civil society as an 
important variable in the analysis of state strength and capability. The emergence of 
this new developmental state paradigm has, therefore, offered up an entirely new area 
of research into the relationship between institutional design and economic 
performance. (Doner 1992; Haggard 1990; Hall 1986; Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth 1992; Katzenstein 1985; Olson 1982; Zysman and Tyson 1983) 
Drawing on the lessons of the Asian Miracle (World Bank 1993), the ideas of the 
Developmental Statists (and by extension the ideas behind the post-Washington 
consensus) are open to the importance of the development ofh1.¥llan and social capital 
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in the development process. The paradigm of the developmental state has thus 
provided an original theoretical alternative to the previously dominant neo-liberal 
paradigm. Providing an innovative linkage between political institutions and 
economic performance, the new paradigm has brought politics back into the centre-
stage of the development debate. Thus, where this thesis differed from other analyses 
of the role of the state in analysing programs of economic reform is in the way in 
which it posed the question: what constitutes a strong state? The key to this 
classification of state strength, the thesis argued, is the relationship of the state to 
wider society. State capacity is strongly dependent upon the relationship between 
state and society. Economic reforms, including those aimed at expanding the role of 
market forces, demand administrative and technical capabilities that are in short 
supply in developing countries. (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 224-225) The limited 
capacity of these states means that they have to look elsewhere for help in expanding 
their capacity. Thus as the state becomes more deeply involved in economic 
transformation, non-bureaucratic modes of interrelation among the parts of the state 
apparatus become increasingly important. The success of programs of reform may 
thus depend as much upon the structures and strengths of civil society as they do upon 
the structures and strength of the state. The capacity of the state may therefore 
paradoxically depend upon the structural position that it occupies within the networks 
of information and trust spanning the political domain.· (Broadbent and Ishio 1998: 
81) State capacity is therefore dependent upon the degree of social connectedness of 
the state. The transformative capacity of the state is thus dependent upon a 
combination of internal coherence and external connectedness that can be called 
embedded autonomy. (Evans 1992: 176). Development is "not just a matter of 
'governance', as the technicist illusion would have us believe: it is a matter of 
politics." (Leftwich 1993: 624) The problem, however, is how to prevent social 
connectedness collapsing into nepotistic or predatory rent-seeking types of behaviour? 
Rephrased in a positive sense the question can instead be asked: How can we connect 
the state and wider societal interests in a mutually beneficial way? As we saw in the 
case studies, however, this is a harder question to answer than it may at first glance 
appear. 
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Comparing Case Studies 
In general terms, the implementation of the Cook Islands ERP has been a success. 
With the majority of the objectives set out in the initial ERP matrix having been either 
achieved or progress made on their implementation, the Asian Development Bank 
concluded in their program completion report that the Cook Islands Economic Reform 
Program had been generally successful. (ADB 1998: 14) The structural reforms 
appear to have also worked at the fiscal level as recent years have been witness to 
budget surpluses with no aid money being needed to 'top up' the recurrent bUdget. 
The risk of another financial crisis occurring is still present but at an appreciably 
lower level of probability as the extreme budget imbalances that had led to the 1996 
crisis is no longer in existence. Thus while the capacity for fiscal crisis still exists its 
likelihood is much lower. Additionally, a number of individuals have raised concerns 
that the government is still too involved in the private sector. These various 
individuals fear that the culture of reform has not penetrated very deeply and serious 
concerns were raised that the reform process could stall. There is thus a growing 
feeling amongst certain sections of the populace, especially within the Private Sector, 
that the momentum behind the reform process is dwindling. Another problem to be 
faced by the Cook Islands, even in the wake of a successful program of reform, is that 
of how to deal with the reality of a constantly shrinking popUlation. With many of 
their best and brightest being lured away to the faster life and better money of life in 
Australia or New Zealand, one has to wonder as to the sustainability of current 
economic realities, as small domestic markets and remote locations present 
formidable obstacles to the development of a strong private sector in the Pacific 
Islands. l (ADB 1996: 28) While the loss of population associated with the civil 
service cuts of 1996 may have provided short-term relief to the country's fiscal 
problems the long-term consequences of this massive population loss may prove 
significant. Nevertheless, the structural reforms have provided a considerably more 
secure framework for the achievement of sustainable development through the 
creation of a considerably stronger private sector and politically insulated public 
sector. However, it was informal networks, between both state and society and 
1 In fact, Barrie Macdonald (1995: 23) has even cautioned that the geographical fragmentation and 
remote nature of Pacific Island economies from world markets might even mean that the preconditions 
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between different societal groups, that were the real driving force behind the reforms. 
These links between the state, the private sector and civil society were apparent 
throughout the entire reform process. Thus, while the reform process was driven by 
economic need, not by political will, a wide consensus existed throughout broader 
Cook Islands society of the need for the reform process. This combined with the 
public backing of the reform program by the PSA greatly reduced the political risk 
normally associated with similar reform programs, thereby allowing the Cook Islands 
government a mandate for reform not normally seen in the face of such far-reaching 
programs of reform. (Root 1996) 
In contrast to the relative success of the Cook Islands reform program, however, the 
implementation of the 1995 SAP in Papua New Guinea can generally be regarded as a 
significant failure. The reforms were only really successful in terms of the initial goal 
of macroeconomic stabilisation. However, despite the swift containment of the fiscal 
deficit, the redirection by the government of expenditure on social and economic 
priorities and the partialliberalisation of the economy this early promise never carried 
through to the remainder of the reform program. Exogenous and endogenous shocks 
throughout the 1996-1999 period, including the 1997 drought and the Asian financial 
crisis, acted to once again expose the serious underlying structural problems facing 
the PNG economy. Thus, while the SAP was intended to address the various 
structural weaknesses that had led to the emergence of the fiscal crisis in 1994, the 
emergence of macroeconomic problems in 1999 signalled that these same structural 
faults continued to exist within the country's governance systems. Why was this the 
case? Commentators tend to agree that Papua New Guinea has tremendous 
opportunities for economic growth and development. However, these same 
commentators also tend to agree that economic development and growth will only be 
actualised in Papua New Guinea when the country's human and physical resources 
are utilised both more efficiently and more intensively. (Fairbairn 1993b) What 
mechanism or process was it then that is behind the success of the Cook Islands ERP 
and the failure of Papua New Guinea's SAP? This thesis has argued that this vital 
ingredient was the existence of state-society linkages. When successfully utilised this 
resource promotes the achievement of developmental objectives. This point was 
for significant private sector development might simply not exist in the Pacific. This is an assertion, 
115 
made apparent in the case of Papua New Guinea where the social relationships 
necessary for the creation of the state-in-society forms of linkages popularised by the 
Developmental Statists never came into being. In contrast to this, in the Cook Islands 
these forms of linkages were able to be successfully mobilised in the achievement of 
the ERPs reform objectives. Why this is the case is the question that needs to be 
asked. The reason I would speculate is hidden in the very nature of these two 
countries socio-economic environments. The answer lies in the homogenous nature 
of the Cook Islands and the extreme heterogeneity of Papua New Guinea. The 
heterogeneity of Papua New Guinea, a heterogeneity present both within the country's 
cultural and economic make-up, may act to prevent the formation of wider horizontal 
linkages which may be a necessary pre-requisite to the creation of successful state-
society forms of linkage. In order to provide a more thorough explanation of the 
relative reform success and failure of the Cooks Islands and Papua New Guinea 
respectively, we therefore need to look more closely at the notion of socio-cultural 
context and the associated concept of social capital. 
Socio-Cultural Context 
The notion that a country or region's socio-cultural context plays an important part in 
any developmental program has recently received a renewed lease of life. While the 
notion of a socio-cultural context has long played a vital part in developmental 
thinking it has all too often been phrased in terms of its negative impact on 
developmental outcomes. The early modernisation theorists thus saw traditional 
culture as an impediment to political and economic development, arguing that 
countries needed to adopt modern institutions and structures if they wanted to achieve 
economic development. Recent years, however, have been witness to the emergence 
of a more positive view of a country or regions socio-cultural context in respect to the 
achievement of developmental outcomes. Developmental state theorists have thus 
attributed much of the success behind the creation and maintenance of the East Asian 
developmental states, and the economic networks which underpinned them, to social 
sources, such as Confucianism, which, they argued, permeated the societies within 
which these states were embedded. (Hamilton 1998; Hamilton and Biggart 1988; 
however, that will only be proved or disproved over time. 
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Woo-Cumings 1998) Theorists of the developmental state have thus argued that 
culture played a pivotal role in the organisational success of the East Asian 
developmental states. The rationale behind the emergence of this positive link 
between economic development and socio-cultural context can best be explained 
through reference to an emergent body of thought, particularly influential in the fields 
of economic and sociology, often known simply as neo-institutionalism. 
Neo-Institutionalism 
Neo-institutionalism, as a general theoretical model, maintains that institutions play 
. . 
an important role in mediating the socia1.2 Neo-institutional economics thus asserts 
that market development, and hence economic development, is contingent upon the 
establishment of the correct institutional structures. These institutions then act to 
provide the correct regulatory framework necessary for the operation of the free 
market. Neo-institutional work in economics is therefore concerned with rule and 
governance systems that develop to regulate and manage economic exchanges. The 
founding of this branch of economics, which a number of the developmental state 
theorists draw upon, can be traced back to the pivotal work of Ronald Coase. In his 
nobel-prize winning work Coase (1937) questioned why some economic exchanges 
were carried out within firms under a governance structure involving rules and 
hierarchical enforcement mechanism rather than being directly subject to the price 
mechanism of the free market. The reason this occurred, Coase concluded, was that 
there was a cost associated in the use of the price mechanism, these costs being those 
of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction that 
took place in the market. (Coase 1937: 389) Firms thus arise in order to provide a 
framework through which these 'transactions costs' were to be administered. Neo-
classical models of the efficient market would only apply when it was cost-less to 
transact, therefore when, as is normally the case in real-world situations, transactions 
cost, institutions act to mediate the costs of these transactions. (North 1995: 18) 
Transaction costs thus arise because information is not perfect and is generally 
asymmetrically distributed amongst the parties participating in an exchange. Neo-
institutional economics therefore focuses on the postulate that institutions, following 
2 In a brief note of defmition, institutions, ranging from fonnal arrangements such as constitutional 
provisions, statutes and judicial rulings to infonnal arrangements such as conventions and customs, 
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the seminal work of Ronald Coase, are formed to reduce uncertainty in human 
exchange. (Coase 1937; Coase 1960) 
In expanding upon this initial neo-institutional framework Oliver Williamson (1975, 
1985) argued that these transaction costs were a function of two paired conditions. 
When these two-paired conditions were met during a transaction then that transaction, 
be it economic or social, would then be transferred to an organisational framework 
such that it reduced the uncertainty within the transaction. These two conditions were 
a) when a situation of bounded rationality occurred during a transaction at the same 
time as there was a high level of uncertainty and risk associated with the transaction; 
and b) when individual opportunism in the transaction was paired with an absence of 
alternative exchange partners. Thus under the emergent neo-institutional paradigm, 
the emergence and persistence of social institutions such as wantok-ism, and the 
organisational bodies that bear them, can be explained as a means by which 
transaction costs arising from social exchanges can be reduced.3 Additionally, by 
using an organisational structure or system of networks, which are in general 
relatively stable through time, these transaction costs are then able to be further 
reduced through the introduction of stability to the process of exchange, as this 
stability reduces the degree of uncertainty in the exchange process.4 The social 
networks in East Asia mentioned before acted in precisely this manner, providing 
both stable frameworks for economic exchange and a basis upon which relationships 
of trust could be built up between senior bureaucrats and private sector leaders. 
These networks thus exist within the midst of all fonns of human social structure 
including markets and hierarchies, and like institutions can exist both fonnally and 
informally. Networks, as such, can be defined as patterns of identifiable interactive 
relations which link social units. Networks and the relationships inherent within can, 
critically affect decision making regarding resource use thereby directly affecting economic behaviour 
and performance. 
3 This argument should not be seen to reduce all human action to the calculating calculus of rational 
choice so beloved of many a Political Scientist. Instead the concept of transaction costs is used in this 
thesis merely as a useful lens through which to explore and analyse a certain form of human behaviour. 
4 It is necessary, however, to clearly distinguish the differences between institutions and organisations. 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints, both formal and informal, that structure human 
interaction (they are the rules of the game) whereas organisations, on the other hand, are groups of 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve common objectives (they are the players of the 
game). (North 1995: 23) 
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however, paradoxically function both as structures of opportunity and as sources of 
constraint. As shown above, in the case of the East Asian Developmental States these 
networks acted as structures of opportunity, combining synergistically with various 
structures of the state in the achievement of positive developmental outcomes. 
Similarly, in the Cook Islands, already existing social institutions and networks 
helped to both alleviate the negative impacts of the reform process as well as 
encourage positive and successful interaction between various aspects of Cook Islands 
society in the achievement of the reforms objectives. This was not the case, however, 
in Papua New Guinea. In Papua New Guinea these same forms of networks acted to 
undermine the reform process. In order to begin to explain these divergent outcomes 
we need to draw upon one other emergent body of theory within the social sciences in 
general and in development studies in particular; that of social capital. 
Social Capital 
A reading of the work of the political scientist Robert Putnam provides an initial 
starting point to an analysis of the notion of social capital. In his ground-breaking 
work on provincial government in Italy, Putnam asked 'how is it that norms and 
networks of civic eng'agement undergird good government?' (1993: 116) In 
answering this question Putnam argued that the act of involvement of individuals in 
civil associations leads to the production of civic communities, the members of which 
then engage in collective action for mutual benefit, simultaneously demanding 
government responsiveness. Putnam's work can thus be seen as a renewed form of 
the de Tocquevillian conception of civic engagement through associational life. 
Putnam's general theory, succinctly stated, was thus that where strong horizontal 
linkages occurred, as opposed to strong forms of vertical relationships, social capital 
was produced which could profitably be used in order to undergird and support the 
construction of further social, political and economic relationships. In expanding 
upon this initial theorising, Putnam argued that social institutions constitute a form of 
this social capital, which he defined as "features of social organisation such as 
networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit." (1996: 292) Social capital can thus be defined as dense networks and 
norms of trust and gener~lised reciprocity which bind social groups together. Putnam 
further claimed that this resource of social capital enables civil society to act as an 
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empowering force for economic and political change and development. Putnam then 
went on to argue that the capacity of government to provide social services depends 
upon the stock of 'social capital' derived from participation in civic associations, as 
these associations provide public authorities with valuable information. These civic 
associations thus have a direct impact on the quality of public services as watchdogs 
and monitors of governmental performance. They also contribute indirectly to this 
process by encouraging norms of reciprocity and mutual trust essential to 
collaboration in both the public and private sectors. The notion of social capital can 
thus be linked to other neo-institutional forms of analysis. Thus in a neo-institutional 
economic transaction cost analysis those embedded within networks of social capital 
can minimise transaction costs as the institutionalised conduits of communication and 
trust which flow between those embedded within its framework act to lower the costs 
of obtaining information. Thus, in some respects closely mirroring the line of thought 
popularised by the Developmental State theorists, Putnam (1993: 171) argued that 
social trust, and hence political and economic development, in modem societies arises 
from two related sources - norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. 
Putnam's (1993) work has, however, been subject to a number of criticisms, the most 
stringent of which has been the claim that the civic associations of which he discusses 
hardly appear up to the grand tasks to which he assigns them. (Levi 1996: 47) 
Similarly, while Putnam's work can be loosely linked to the developmental state 
literature, his argument that the root of effective government is to be found within 
civil society basically means that the state becomes, in his theorising, little more than 
a dependant variable to be noted, but not seriously considered. (Levi 1996: 50) Thus 
Putnam's work can be seen in some instances to make it appear that state performance 
is merely a function of social networks, thereby falling into the same socially 
reductionist trap that the Marxists and Pluralists had fallen into over twenty years ago. 
Putnam's later work (1995), however, does began to take issue with this deficiency -
with his realisation that the state can act to provide a structure from which fruitful and 
profitable social relationships can be constructed. In his later work Putnam thus 
argues that while civic engagement can strengthen state institutions, effective state 
institutions can also act to create an environment to enable the strengthening of levels 
of civic engagement. (Putnam 1995) Putnam's later work thus begins to more closely 
resemble the claims of the later Developmental State theorists that state and society 
120 
can act synergistically in order to provide mutual empowerment of each other. This is 
an important idea as recent research would tend to suggest that the social capital that 
is most crucial to the success of developmental outcomes is formed in networks that 
are neither public nor private but instead fill the gap between the two spheres. (Evans 
1997c) 
While not an exact match for the empirical reality of many East Asian countries 
Putnam's argument does however follow a broadly similar train of thought to that 
advanced by the Developmental State theorists, especially in relation to the role of 
social networks. His work thus provides a useful lens through which to compare and 
analyse the divergent results of the recent programs of reform in the Cook Islands and 
Papua New Guinea. In both the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea a centralised 
bureaucratic state has been imposed on top of much smaller, previously self-managing 
societies. The key between the two, and this is a difference which is of crucial 
importance to any explanation behind the achievement of such ·different 
developmental outcomes in these two countries, is the way in which the country's 
existing social structures and networks interacted during their respective programs of 
structural reform. In his work on Italy Putnam focused on horizontal civic 
associations that fostered ties among social equals, that while deeply rooted in history, 
were not in themselves primordial in character. In contrast to this, however, in the 
Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea horizontal civic associations have had to vie 
with the continued existence of strong affective kinship linkages for the loyalty of 
their constituents. The way in which these linkages were operationalised in the 
reform process is thus the key to understanding both the success of the Cook Islands 
reform program and the failure of the Papua New Guinea reform program. 
Social Capital in the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea 
In the Cook Islands, existing social institutions and networks interacted positively to 
both alleviate the negative impacts of the reform process as well as to encourage the 
positive and successful interaction between various aspects of Cook Islands society in 
the achievement of the ERPs stated objectives. In contrast to this, similarly framed 
social institutions and networks to those that had underlain the success of the Cook 
Islands reform program acted through a variety of social mechanisms to actually 
121 
undermine the reform process in the case of Papua New Guinea. And, as we shall 
see, the key difference behind these two divergent outcomes can actually be traced 
back to the very concept that supposedly underlies successful forms of state-society 
interaction - social capital. In both the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea social 
capital played a decisive role in the success or failure of their respective programs of 
structural adjustment and reform. The main difference lay in the manner in which this 
social capital was operationalised. In the Cook Islands this social capital acted to 
bring the nation together in a time of hardship and to provide social safety nets for 
those hit hardest by the reform process. In Papua New Guinea, however, sources of 
social capital acted to divide the country and to intensify already massive cleavages 
between and within the countries diverse and heterogenous population. Why this 
apparent source of social 'developmental' capital acted in such very different ways 
can be traced back to the key difference between these two countries - their relative 
and absolute degree of social homogeneity. 
In the Cook Islands the entire country is relatively socially homogenous. From 
Penrhyn in the North to Mangaia in the South the various island groups that make up 
the modem day Cook Islands all share a high degree of social and cultural 
concordance. Their traditional languages are all mutually intelligible and are 
probably actually best ~lassified as dialects of the· same language. This is not, 
however, to claim that the population of this country is entirely homogenous or that, 
in a related theme, there is no cultural or political discordance in the country. In fact 
the islands of the Northern Group have often discussed the idea of secession from the 
Cook Islands. In doing so they have cited the loss of much of their Black Pearl 
derived wealth to the larger population of the So'uthern Group and their long historical 
affiliation with island groups now contained within the boundaries of modem day 
Samoa. However, even in spite of this discordance, no one can deny the high relative 
degree of social and cultural homogeneity that runs across the entire chain of islands 
that make up the Cook Islands. Thus while some degree of cultural discordance does 
exist within the country, when compared to other modem countries of the world, 
especially those of the African sub-continent, the degree of social and cultural 
discordance contained within the country pales in comparison. Papua New Guinea, in 
extreme contrast to the Cook Islands, possesses one of the most heterogenous 
. populations in the world. Divided into several thousand different communities, many 
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possessing their own unique languages, the population of Papua New Guinea is still, 
despite twenty-five years of existence as an independent state, intensely fragmented 
along linguistic, cultural and historical divides. Thus while Papua New Guinea has 
been an independent state for nearly twenty-five years, its existence as a nation-state 
is at best merely nationalist political fiction and at worst an ill-conceived joke. Papua 
New Guinea's stock of social capital is thus severely fragmented along longstanding 
social and cultural cleavages. While cooperation within the 800 or so socio-cultural 
groups which make up Papua New Guinea is strong, cooperation between these 
groups is almost non-existent. In Papua New Guinea the presence of 'too much' 
social capital has thus acted to severely constrain developmental efforts. The 
mechanism whereby this abundance of social capital has prevented the achievement 
of successful reform is quite simple. The high level of social capital contained within 
the socio-cultural groups that constitute the population of Papua New Guinea has 
. acted to preclude the creation of broader horizontal ties. 
Horizontal Ties 
The existence of social capital on its own is not enough to bring about developmental 
success. The necessary complement to the existence of social capital in the 
achievement of developmental success is in fact the existence of broad forms of 
horizontal ties. And herein lies the problem. While both the Cook Islands and Papua 
New Guinea possessed abundant sources of social capital, only in the Cook Islands 
did this social capital enable the creation of these broader horizontal ties. Once again, 
however, the reasoning behind this turn of events is both simple and intricately tied to 
notions of social and cultural homogeneity. In Papua New Guinea the existence of so 
much diversity between groups has caused the social capital that exists within these 
groups to be focussed into an extreme form such that while intra-group social capital 
is high, inter-group social capital is extraordinarily low. Additionally, the mechanism 
of the wantok system, prevalent across the country, acts to exacerbate this already 
unstable situation, by further promoting in-group solidarity versus broader non-
affective forms of social community. In the Cook Islands the situation IS very 
different. There, a high degree of social homogeneity has meant that enough 
similarity exists between groups to allow inter-group interaction to occur, thereby 
facilitating the creation. of the broader horizontal links that appear necessary to 
transform social capital into a positive developmental force. In the Cook Islands this 
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process has been further promoted through the evangelical nature of the country's 
Christian churches. This is in direct contrast with Putnam's work where he argues 
that in Italy the church has not contributed to the construction of the horizontal social 
linkages he found conducive to the formation of social capital, due he argues to the 
vertical nature of the linkages between individuals and the church. Thus in Putnam's 
words "good government in Italy is a product of singing groups and soccer clubs, not 
prayer." (1993:176) This is not the case, however, in much of Polynesia. In general 
the Christian churches in the Pacific are Protestant, evangelical, fundamentalist, and 
hence distrustful of the vertical legacy of the Catholic Church. Thus, in the m~ority 
of the Polynesian countries the Protestant, evangelical nature of the churches mean 
that the Christian church is, unlike in the Italian case, a vital source for those all-
important broad horizontal ties. However, while a similar argument could 
conceivably be made for Papua New Guinea the high degree of social diversity within 
the country effectively eliminates the positive effects on broader horizontal linkage 
formation that the Protestant churches may bring. Additionally the Catholic Church, 
with its tendency towards hierarchy has a very strong presence within Papua New 
Guinea as opposed to its relative weakness throughout much of Polynesia. This 
extreme divisiveness, and its negative impact on developmental outcomes is most 
vividly apparent in the functioning of the country's parliament. There, the 
mechanisms of want ok-ism and factionalism which categorise the heterogenous social 
space of Papua New Guinea, are at their most extreme. 
Patrimonialism Patronage and Clientalism in Melanesia 
In much of Melanesia, status within groups is based upon the ability of an individual 
to redistribute wealth through the distribution of gifts. However, it is understood that 
that such 'gifts' will be repaid later with interest. The most powerful people were 
those who not only had no debts, but who also were owed debts by others. 
(Bonnemaison 1978) These individuals who are owed such repayments by a large 
number of people were often termed as 'big men' within the general anthropological 
literature. In Melanesia these men of prominence - these 'big men' - are seen to 
personify power. For these 'big men within Melanesian society, their status, and the 
status of the group to which they belong, is thus dependent upon their ability to 
mobilise resources. Possessing this power is not, however, without its cost. Attached 
to the power of the big man is thus an associated set of obligations. While he 
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commands the compliance of those who owe him debts they in return expect his 
patronage. This practice has many implications for modem political life in Papua 
New Guinea. There is thus a common understanding in PNG that once a person 
achieves political office they will help their kin and others who supported their bid for 
power. (Schoeffel 1996: 99) The fiscal assets of the state are thus often used by 
Parliamentarians to maintain their patronage networks, both within and outside of 
Parliament, while implementation of developmental policies is powered by more 
often by patronage than concern for achieving sustainable development. Thus, in 
Papua New Guinea commercial and political activities, especially those away from 
Port Moresby and the other provincial capitals, thus often have a social goal as well as 
an economic goal. 
Government of Papua New Guinea is conducted through a Westminster Parliamentary 
system where MPs are elected through a first-past-the-post (FPP) election system. 
The high tum over of Mrs, up to 60 percent at each election, limits the degree to 
which Parliamentarians devote themselves to developing long term policy strategies. 
The high numbers of candidates who run for political office combined with the 
peculiarities of the FPP system mean that mean that members of parliament can be 
elected with less than 10 percent of the vote cast. 5 The vicissitudes of Papua New 
Guinean elections, where more than half of the MPs elected in 1992 collected less 
than 20 percent of the vote cast in their electorate, thus lead to candidates focusing on 
mobilising support amongst a small band of voters - normally drawn from the 
candidate's own social-cultural group of wantoks. Campaigning is thus heavily 
dependent upon the utilisation of traditional forms of redistributive association where 
by the candidate provides resources in return for votes on the understanding that 
should they be elected to Parliament they will use their new position to continue to 
reward their supporters. The widespread utilisation, and acceptance, of these forms of 
relationship help maintain the fragmentary nature of parliamentary government in 
Papua New Guinea. This system of redistributive relationships is maintained within 
parliament itself. The high turnover of MPs combined with the nature of the 
clientalistic nature of Papua New Guinea politics mean that political parties, where 
they exist, are based more on ideas of patronage rather than those of ideology. In fact 
125 
the notion of political parties in Papua New Guinea does not extend far outside of 
Parliament building. Party allegiances are constantly shifting as various individuals 
play parties off against one another in order to acquire the most advantageous position 
possible to them. A result of this constantly changing political environment in which 
many small parties vie with one another for power, is that coalition Government is the 
norm. However, given the patronage basis of these parties, it is no wonder that 
coalitions are fragile institutions, and mass defections of party members are not rare 
occurrences. An explanation of the patronage basis of the PNG national political 
system thus helps to begin to explain the reasons behind both the various fiscal crises 
that the country has faced over the last decade and the country's failure to 
successfully achieve occasions of structural adjustment and reform. The state-society 
forms of linkages that do exist in Papua New Guinea are all predatory in their nature. 
This, however, is not to preclude the possibility of development in countries, such as 
Papua New Guinea. 
Institutional Transformation 
. The argument has been made by some (Hollingsworth 1997) that forms of economic 
coordination and governance cannot be easily transferred from one society to another 
as they are embedded distinctive social systems of production which are peculiar to 
their particular social context. To some extent the failure of Papua New Guinea to 
achieve their developmental goals would appear to uphold that assertion. To leave the 
argument there, however, would be to both hopelessly over-simplify the debate as 
well as needlessly condemn those countries that did not fit into the 'Western' or 'East 
Asian' mould to an inescapable future of underdevelopment. The answer to this 
seeming paradox lies in the dynamic nature of institutions themselves. 
Institutional Change 
While Peter Evans (1997c) has argued that while state-society synergy is most easily 
fostered in societies characterised by egalitarian social structures and robust, coherent 
state bureaucracies, Evans has also argued that synergy is constructable, even in the 
more adverse circumstances typical of third world countries. Evans thus argues, the 
5 In the 1997 election 2 232 candidates contested 109 seats, a ratio on average of over twenty 
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key to state-society synergy is the translation of "social ties from engines of parochial 
loyalties onto vehicles for more encompassing forms of organisation." (Evans 1997c: 
192) The fluid and dynamic nature of institutions provides us with the means by 
which we can overcome the developmental dead-end that the Developmental Statist 
literature at first glance appears to assign to countries with heterogenous populations. 
Structural Adjustment Programs set out not only to change the material relations of 
existence but the very norms and values that underlay that 'new' existence. 
Implementing reforms does not thus just involve changing structures, rules, and 
procedures. Countries hoping to achieve lasting change need to transform peoples 
attitudes. Societies, however,' may not benefit from trade or specialisation if the 
transactions costs incurred in the process of exchange outweighs the benefit of an 
exchange. (Ensminger 1992: 18) Governments and other organisations reduce 
transaction costs by the clear specification of property rights, the provision of 
information and the enforcement of law and order. Economic growth does not 
therefore come from technological change alone, instead following the work of the 
NIBs institutional change, especially that which reduces transaction costs, is the key 
to obtaining economic growth. (Ensminger 1992:18) 
The first step in transforming the developmental state literature into a broader policy 
instrument is thus the realisation that development must be treated as a dynamic 
process. Institutions are sticky - that is they are highly resistant to dramatic periods 
of change - but they nonetheless are themselves constantly changing in light of 
changing social forces. Viewing development as a process entails having a design 
that is flexible and changes as a result of learning from the implementation process. 
(Mosse 1998: 4) Additionally, the realisation must also be made that all projects, 
even the most cut and dried, have permeable boundaries and are influenced by their 
wider social and institutional environments. For as Pierre Landell-Mills (1992) has 
claimed: 
the design and operational practices of public institutions must be at one with the 
social values of the society in which they are embedded ... [as] formal rules alone 
candidates per seat. 
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cannot protect an institution if its members do not behave in a manner consistent with 
the values that underlie the rules. (1992: 546) 
Lastly, but most importantly, the realisation of the implicit basis of social 
homogeneity behind the success of the East Asian developmental states also needs to 
be acknowledged. Only once this has been done, can we then begin to modify the 
various models of the developmental state that exist in the literature towards dealing 
with the problem of heterogeneity. 
Conclusion 
In drawing out the implications of this thesis we can learn much from the work of 
Peter Ekeh. In his analysis of post-colonial Africa Peter Ekeh (1975) identified the 
existence of two quite separate public realms, both of which are still readily 
identifiable in many of the developing countries of the world, including those of the 
Pacific. Within these countries government operates within both a 'primordial' pUblic 
realm (governed by primordial groupings, ties and sentiments) and a colonially 
derived 'civic' realm (governed by Western ideals of accountability and 
professionalism). While this primordial public realm continues to exist within both 
countries it's effects however have led to very different reform outcomes. The 
problem appears to not be one of dismantling this primordial and often heterogenous 
realm as the earlier Modernisation theorists claimed, but rather of finding ways in 
which to harness the social resources found within this diversity for the achievement 
of developmental goals. The developmental state model, as it presently stands, does 
have problems. However, if the steps shown above are successfully used to modify 
and augment the current models, as governance, in all its various guises, should 
always be rooted in local processes, then the developmental state paradigm may yet 
provide us with a useful and effective developmental model, 
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APPENDIX ONE 
COOK ISLANDS ERP OBJECTIVES 
Public Sector Reform 
Redefine the role of government emphasising policy and regulatory 
functions 
Fiscal responsibility 
Ensure effective financial and economic management 
Improve public sector management and efficiency 
Promoting Private Sector Growth 
Promote public confidence in the reform program 
Improve the environment for competitive private sector-led growth 
Facilitate access to capital through an efficient financial sector 
Improve access to business advice 
Simplify access to land 
Facilitate foreign and domestic investment by the private sector 
Develop agriculture 
Develop marine resources 
Develop tourism 
Develop other productive sectors 
Social Equity and Sustainability 
Support and protect vulnerable groups 
Ensure environmentally sustainable socioeconomic development 
Mainstream gender issues into development planning 
(Source: ADB 1998) 
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APPENDIX TWO 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA SAP OBJECTIVES 
1) Revise macro-targets to achieve macro-economic stability. 
2) . Maintain a competitive and market determined exchange rate. 
3) Eliminate budget transfers to all commercial statutory authorities. 
4) Maintain a wage freeze from April 1995 to December 1995. 
5) Restructure the public service to increase efficiency through retrenchment, 
improved personnel management systems, and improved payroll efficiency. 
6) Abolish the statutory minimum wage. 
7) Restructure the Department of Finance and Planning. 
8) Make adequate counterpart funding available. 
9) Implement a tariff/indirect tax study. 
10) Abolish remaining reserve activities. 
11) Repeal regulations to the Investment Promotion Act. 
12) Abolish remaining price controls. 
13) Complete current privatisation sales. 
14) Complete framework legislation for customary land registration. 
15) Re-examine the roles of the IP A and limit the role of the IP A to that of promotion 
not gatekeeper. 
16) Introduce tax incentive policies into tax/customs legislation. 
17) Forestry Issues: 
a) Maintain power with the Forestry Board not the Minister; 
b) Ensure that landowners get a minimum of K20 per square metre of logs in 
excess ofKI00 per cubic metre (hold part in trust funds); 
c) Ensure that all new licences meet sustainability criteria; 
d) Continue to fund the National Forest Authority and SGS (PNG) in 1995 
real terms. 
18) Make coffee/livestock and other industry corporations financially autonomous by 
December 1996 and refrain from establishing new corporations. 
19) Introduce domestic market reforms by fully liberalising produce marketing, 
processing and abattoir activities. 
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20) Develop and implement a rescheduling of Rural Development Bank: plantation 
debt. 
21) Require industry corporation to assume responsibility for price 
support/stabilisation. 
22) Review expenditure targets and planning in order to achieve targets for 1995 and 
agree with the World Bank on targets for 1996-1999. Provide adequate funding 
for the Social Fund. 
23) Shift resources to local authorities and give local authorities the ability to hire and 
fire. 
24) Set up autonomous non-government organisation funds to the value of K4-K5 
million. 
25) Introduce health reforms: 
a) Close or sell under-utilised health services; 
b) Encourage provincial health boards; 
c) Introduce higher outpatient fees; and 
d) Introduce new procedures for pharmaceutical sales. 
26) Introduce a system of fees and loans for tertiary students in order to help recover 
costs. 
27) Prepare an action plan for Public Sector Reform following departments and 
agencies including: 
a) Finance; 
b) Agriculture; 
c) Health; 
d) Higher Education; 
e) Trade; 
f) Industry; 
g) Tourism; 
h) Transport; 
i) Works; 
j) Energy; and 
k) Environment. 
(Source: Mawuli 1997) 
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